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Introduction
Huizhong Zhou
Western Michigan University

Health care is an important component of an economy that
involves the provision of goods and services by both the private and
public sectors, economic and other regulations, and public policies. As
health care technologies have advanced rapidly in the past few decades
and the demand for health care continues to grow, health care expenditures have been increasing steadily in industrialized nations. In the
United States, for example, health care expenditures as a share of the
gross national product (GNP) grew from 7.4 percent in 1970 to 9.3 percent in 1980, and to 12.4 percent in 1990. It reached more than 15 percent of the GNP in 1995. Changes in the health care supply and
demand have prompted changes in health care finance, insurance, and
service delivery. Health care reforms have become an ever-present
subject in federal as well as state politics for the past decade. Although
there have been no sweeping changes in legislation at the federal level,
significant changes have been taking place in the health care sector.
The chapters in this volume address some important aspects of
health care reforms, including Medicare reform, managed care and its
effect on the health care system, efforts to cover the uninsured, the
effect of health insurance on labor market and employment decisions,
and the role of tax policy in health care in the past and the future.
While conducting sound and solid economic analyses of health care
issues, the authors of the chapters all recognize the political implications as well. This political economy approach puts the discussion of
health care reforms in the proper perspective, since health care involves
many stakeholders and its reforms inevitably have political as well as
economic repercussions.
Medicare reform is central to health care reform efforts, because
more than 39 million people currently get insurance and health care
through Medicare. As Medicare is tax financed, its reform is extremely
difficult economically, and politically as well. Len Nichols’s chapter
explains these difficulties and contrasts two leading proposals for
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Medicare reform, one from the current congressional health policy
leadership and the other from the Clinton administration.
Nichols identifies two fundamental sources of Medicare’s long-run
financial strain. One is purely demographic; there were 3.9 workers
per beneficiary in 1998, but there will be only 2.3 by 2030. The other
source of strain is cost growth; while overall health care costs in the
United States have been rising as a share of income, Medicare costs
have been growing even faster than general health care costs for the
past 30 years. Simplified calculations indicate that some payroll tax
increase is inevitable as the share of our population over 65 increases in
the first half of the twenty-first century. Nichols proposes that the key
to minimizing this tax increase is to control the rate of growth in costs
per beneficiary, and that the cost reduction can only be accomplished
by a fundamental restructuring of incentives for beneficiaries, health
plans, and fee-for-service Medicare. The principles of structural
reform are to offer beneficiaries incentives to choose lower-cost health
plans and health service delivery arrangements, and to make health
plan pricing policy efficient. However, efficient plan-pricing systems
that are available to large private companies may not work well in
Medicare, because Medicare confronts additional constraints such as
concerns for geographic equity and income equity.
Having stated the principles for Medicare reform, Nichols then
evaluates two major proposals that emerged in 1999, the Breaux-Frist
proposal, which grew out of the Bi-Partisan Commission’s plan, and
President Clinton’s plan, which was a response to the former. The two
proposals share some important principles. First, they both have competitive price incentives for beneficiaries, plans, and fee-for-service
Medicare. Second, both proposals make prescription drugs an optional
part of the Medicare benefit package. Finally, both have provisions
that protect low-income and high-risk individuals and address geographic cost differences. However, the two proposals differ in their
treatment of three key features: the amount of the government contribution toward health plan enrollment choices by beneficiaries, use of
national averages to influence local competition, and adjustment for
geographic differences in price and utilization to Medicare beneficiaries. An example constructed by Nichols indicates that, in general, the
Breaux-Frist proposal imparts stronger incentives for health plan efficiency. However, beneficiaries would pay more on the margin for all
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private plans under Breaux-Frist. Finally, Nichols points out that major
health care policy changes can only be achieved with a broad bipartisan
consensus, and he outlines a compromise that could result from the two
proposals.
Another aspect of the health care system that has attracted a lot of
attention in recent reform efforts is managed care. Managed care
developed out of various efforts to contain costs in the 1970s and
1980s, as health care costs increased rapidly during that period. The
growth of managed care has raised important questions about its
impact on the well-being of patients and the structure of the medical
care system in general. Much of the public debate about these issues
has been conducted using opinions and anecdotes. In his chapter titled
“Managed Care and Social Welfare: What Has Managed Care Really
Done to the U.S. Health Care System?”, Laurence Baker provides and
synthesizes evidence on the impacts of managed care on care, outcomes, satisfaction, and expenditures of patients, as well as on the
overall structure and functioning of the health care system. A large
number of studies have produced some consistent and convincing conclusions. In terms of treatment, the studies find that managed care
patients use the hospital less than patients in indemnity plans. As managed care imposes restrictions on patient choices and other inconveniences, HMO enrollees are less satisfied with their plans than
enrollees in other types of plans, primarily indemnity or preferred-provider organization plans. However, research on health outcome on the
whole fails to find a consistent pattern either for or against managed
care. Finally, studies on expenditures frequently report that managed
care patients spend less on health care than patients in indemnity plans.
Baker then reviews evidence about the impact of managed care on
the overall health care market, because the presence of managed care in
an area may influence care for patients enrolled in other plans—the socalled “spillover effect.” These studies find that overall spending and
spending for non–managed care patients is lower in areas where managed care has a high market share. Studies also suggest that managed
care can influence the number and types of providers, the capacities of
the health care system, and the ways in which the system is organized.
For example, researchers report that areas with high HMO market
share had fewer hospital beds in the mid and late 1980s, that managed
care prompted consolidation in provider markets, and that managed
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care slowed the adoption of many technologies, particularly high-cost,
infrastructure-intensive new technologies. Again, there is little evidence on health outcomes from these market comparison studies.
Based on the findings about the impact of managed care on the health
care system, Baker raises a number of important questions about the
future development of the health care system. How will managed care
affect the development of the delivery system; for instance, technology
advancement and the training of medical professionals? To what
extent can managed care further reduce medical costs? These questions have important policy implications.
Jonathan Gruber addresses health care reforms from a different
perspective and asks what should and can be done to provide health
insurance to the uninsured in the United States. Despite expansions in
the Medicaid program in the past 15 years, there are more than 43 million people uninsured, representing over 18 percent of the non-elderly
population. In his chapter, “Covering the Uninsured: Incremental Policy Options for the United States,” Gruber first identifies who the uninsured are in the United States. Then, drawing lessons from Medicaid
expansion efforts across the United States over the past 15 years, he
discusses a number of policy options to extend coverage to the uninsured, and their effectiveness and efficiency.
Of the 43 million uninsured in the United States, almost 11 million
are children. Nearly 60 percent of the uninsured are in families where
the head of the family is a full-time, full-year worker. This fact has
motivated continued efforts to increase coverage through the expansion
of employer-provided insurance. Based on cost-efficiency arguments,
Gruber proposes that the government should pursue a “filling the cup
from the bottom” policy that places priority to those groups that have
little other recourse to insurance. The policy should encourage efforts
to make insurance available to those who are already eligible for Medicaid but have not taken it up. Further expansions of public insurance
up the income scale can certainly extend coverage to the uninsured and
is an approach taken by the recent Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). One problem with this approach, however, is that the
coverage may be extended to people who already have private insurance. To mitigate this crowd-out effect, state programs can take advantage of the flexibilities built into the CHIP by making the benefits less
generous than Medicaid and introducing premiums and co-payments
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for services. Incremental changes in tax subsidies can also extend coverage to some of the uninsured. The current system of tax subsidies
leaves three groups without subsidies for the purchase of health insurance: those who work for firms that do not offer health insurance, those
who are neither employees nor self-employed, and those who work for
firms that do not offer a Section 125 plan that allows employees to contribute their share of health insurance premiums on a pretax basis.
Recently there have been a number of proposals to expand the tax
deductibility of health insurance. Gruber points out that expansive tax
policies may not be able to increase coverage to a sizable fraction of
the uninsured. Moreover, generous tax credits may induce those who
have group insurance to switch to highly subsidized nongroup insurance. Insurance portability and other mandates and insurance market
reforms can also reduce the number of the uninsured. However, Gruber
cautions that although private insurers are free to raise premiums, government interventions generally will not be effective in extending coverage to the uninsured.
Health care reforms are complex because changes in the health
care system may affect other aspects of the economy in a significant
way. For instance, types of health insurance and their availability have
important implications to labor market behavior of individuals as well
as firms. Brigitte Madrian’s chapter explains the link between the
health insurance market and the labor market, and how health insurance arrangements affect decisions regarding employment, retirement,
and career changes. Madrian first points out that, of the many pieces of
the health insurance system in the United States, the most significant
one is employer-provided health insurance, which provides coverage to
64 percent of the non-elderly U.S. population. Because some types of
health insurance are provided as a condition of employment while
other types are more readily available when individuals are not
employed (for example, Medicaid), health insurance has an important
impact on the decision of employment itself. Madrian estimates that
individuals with access to retiree health insurance leave the labor market about 6 to 18 months earlier than those who do not have access to
such insurance. These individuals are also more likely to retire before
the age of 65. Moreover, individuals with access to retiree health
insurance are much more likely to make a gradual transition from work
to retirement than those without retiree health insurance. As the frac-
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tion of employers offering retiree health insurance has fallen by almost
half over the past 15 years, and some Medicare reform proposals consider to raise the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67, it is predicted
that these changes are likely to increase the average retirement age.
Based on her own and other research, Madrian asserts that health insurance institutions also affect unskilled single mothers’ decisions on
working or taking welfare, married women’s decisions on participating
in the labor force, and decisions on changing jobs and self-employment.
Health insurance may also affect the labor demand decisions of
employers. The fixed-cost nature of health insurance gives firms an
incentive to reduce the labor costs by hiring fewer employees at longer
work hours and fewer but more productive employees. Similarly, as
part-time workers are exempt from the nondiscrimination rules as
required by the tax treatment of employer expenditures on health insurance, employers may choose to hire part-time workers in lieu of fulltime workers as a way to economize on insurance costs. Madrian concludes that because there have been significant changes in the health
insurance market in the United States over the past 15 years, it is
important to understand the relationship between health insurance
institutions and the labor market, and to evaluate the impacts of health
care reforms on the labor market and the economy as a whole.
Catherine McLaughlin’s chapter in a way is a complementary
piece to Madrian’s, as it provides more detailed evidence regarding
how firms and consumers make their choices under the current health
insurance system in the United States. Ninety percent of the firms with
100 or more employees choose to offer some kind of health insurance
to their workers, while less than half of the firms with less than 10
employees choose to do so. Small firms are less likely to offer employees health insurance mainly because of the high premium relative to
their revenues; they typically face higher premiums than larger firms.
Another reason for not offering health insurance is that employers
believe that workers can get health insurance from their spouses and
may wish to trade health insurance for higher wages. Indeed, a survey
conducted by McLaughlin and Zellers reveals that in firms where
employers responded that their employees’ ability to get insurance
elsewhere was an important reason for not offering insurance, 73 percent of the employees did obtain health insurance from other sources.

Introduction

7

McLaughlin also finds that higher paid workers are much more likely
to be offered health insurance. Only 43 percent of workers earning less
than $7 per hour are offered health insurance by their employers,
whereas 93 percent of those earning more than $15 per hour are
offered. The availability of another source of insurance enables workers to choose employment in small businesses that do not offer
employee health insurance, or simply choose not to participate in the
employer-provided insurance. Of the workers who choose not to participate, 75 percent have other group coverage, usually through a
spouse’s plan. Finally, of those workers who participate in the
employer-provided health insurance, half of them have no choice in
plan; most are offered only a traditional fee-for-service plan. About
one-third of those who have choice in plans are offered one or more
managed care plans. For many workers, the choice of their employers
determines the choice of plans.
As health care is either directly financed by taxes, such as Medicare and Medicaid, or subsidized by certain tax exemptions, such as
employer-provided insurance and insurance for the self-employed,
health care reforms inevitably involve tax policy. Robert Helms’s
chapter discusses the role of tax policy in shaping the health insurance
and health care markets and its implications to health policy reforms.
Helms asserts that tax policy since World War II contributed significantly to both the rate of growth of private health insurance and many
attributes of its structure and performance. In particular, tax policy
caused group health insurance to grow at a much faster rate than individual insurance. He argues that the tax treatment of health insurance
introduces inefficiencies into the health markets, increases the costs of
health insurance and medical care, and makes it more difficult for lowincome workers and the self-employed to purchase health insurance.
In view of recent policy debates, Helms notes that the serious proposals
to reform the health insurance market have one feature in common;
they all involve some variation of tax credits. He then evaluates the
effectiveness of the proposed tax credit programs by referencing several studies by health economists. He primarily focuses on the elasticity studies to evaluate how health insurance expenses respond to tax
credits. He concludes from these studies that a tax credit will be more
effective in reducing the number of the uninsured than a tax deduction.
A refundable tax credit will be more effective in reaching relatively
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more of the low-income than a flat dollar tax credit. In addition, it
seems that low levels of tax credit will have relatively small effects on
the purchase of health insurance.
The chapters in this volume reflect the opinions of six leading
health economists on certain important issues of health care reforms in
the United States. While they can only cover part of the complex
health care reforms, they all conduct insightful analyses of the issues
concerned, in terms of economic consequences and political implications that changes in the health care system will bring about. The analytic frameworks and the insights provided in this volume will be
valuable for understanding and evaluating further developments of
health care reforms, which will surely remain a central issue of the
U.S. public policies for years to come.

1
The Not-So-Simple Economics
(and Politics) of
Medicare Reform
Len M. Nichols
The Urban Institute

Despite an unprecedented amount of policy attention since 1995,
the U.S. Congress has been unable to agree upon an approach to longterm or structural Medicare reform. This chapter will explain why
Medicare reform is important but difficult, both economically and
politically. It will contrast the two leading proposals for Medicare
reform, from the current congressional health policy leadership and the
Clinton-Gore Administration, respectively. This chapter concludes
with a brief discussion of a possible compromise that could be crafted
from these proposals, if the political will and leadership is forthcoming
after the 2000 elections.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDICARE
Medicare is our most sacred social contract precisely because it
binds the generations together with the promise to pay for the health
care needs of the elderly today in exchange for the expectation that
future generations will pay for the needs of the current generation of
workers. In 1965, when the Medicare program began, only about half
of the elderly had any health insurance. Insurers were reluctant to sell
to the elderly who manifested health problems, and the poverty rate
was sufficiently high that many elderly simply could not afford insurance even if it was priced with actuarial fairness. Public intervention
was absolutely essential for all seniors to have access to insurance and
care. Today, over 39 million people get insurance and health care
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through Medicare, and of these, 34 million are aged and 5 million are
nonaged disabled.
Medicare is also an extremely important income support program
for health care providers. Figure 1 shows the percent of revenue from
different types of providers that is derived from Medicare. Hospitals
and home health agencies are obviously dependent upon Medicare, and
physicians and nursing homes are seriously affected by Medicare payment policies as well. Thus, providers are major stakeholders as well
as beneficiaries and taxpayers. This fundamental duality of the Medicare program—an insurance program for the elderly and severely disabled as well as an income support program for all major providers—
makes the politics of Medicare reform even more complicated than it
would otherwise be.

THE LONG-RUN FINANCING CRISIS
Since Medicare is mostly payroll-tax or income-tax financed, there
are two fundamental sources of Medicare’s long-run financial strain.
Figure 1 Medicare’s Share of Provider Revenues
35
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The first is purely demographic: there were 3.9 workers per beneficiary
in 1998, and by 2030 there will be only 2.3. The second source of
strain for Medicare is cost growth. Medicare costs, in the aggregate
and per beneficiary, have grown even faster than health care spending
in the United States generally. These two facts require that unless
some structural change is implemented, the Medicare program may
become unsustainable in the future.
Figure 2 puts the cost growth problem into some perspective. It
shows total national health expenditures (NHE) as a share of gross
domestic product (GDP), Medicare’s share of NHE, and Medicare’s
claim on GDP. As most readers know, health care is a normal good: as
incomes rise, most people and societies purchase more of it; thus, it is
not surprising that NHE/GDP has grown from about 7 percent in 1970
to over 13 percent in 1998 as the promise and efficacy of medical treatment has absorbed increasing shares of our national income growth.
The relative growth of Medicare spending is illustrated through the
increasing share of NHE and of GDP that it claims, almost doubling
and more than tripling, respectively, from 1970 to 1998.
Comparing Medicare to general NHE on a per enrollee or per capita basis is perhaps most instructive. Medicare costs per beneficiary
Figure 2 Shares of Health and Revenue Related to GDP
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have grown in real terms—over and above general inflation—at
slightly more than 5 percent per annum since 1970. Overall NHE per
capita, by contrast, has grown at 4 percent per year. Thus, while overall health care costs have been rising as a share of income and in real
terms, Medicare costs have risen even faster than general health care
costs for the last 30 years.
A bit of slightly oversimplified algebra will make clear the stark
nature of the long-term Medicare financing problem.1 Let B = the
number of elderly beneficiaries, c = the expected costs of covered
health service per beneficiary, p = the fraction of those costs paid for by
beneficiaries through premium payments, w = the average earnings of
workers, L = the number of workers in the society, and t = the payroll
tax rate required to finance the Medicare program. In equilibrium, program costs in a pay-as-you-go insurance program like Medicare are
completely financed by beneficiaries and taxes
Eq. 1 cB = pcB + twL.

Now the total population (T) is divided into the share that is young
and ineligible for Medicare (y), and the nonyoung (1 – y) who are.
Only some fraction of the young (f) work. Therefore L = fyT, and B =
(1 – y)T. Substitution into Equation 1 and solving for t, the required
payroll tax rate, yields
Eq. 2 t = [(1 – p)c/w][(1 – y)/fy].

The first bracketed term represents the publicly financed Medicare
costs per dollar of average earnings, and the second term is the ratio of
beneficiaries to workers. The required tax rate increases with both of
these ratios. Note that health policy can affect only two of the five key
parameters in our pay-as-you-go tax rate equation: p, the fraction of
Medicare costs that beneficiaries are asked to pay in premiums, and c,
the average covered cost per beneficiary.
As our society ages, y will continue to decline. So unless labor
force participation increases enough to offset this, fy will continue on
its current downward path (as it is for most OECD countries and some
developing countries as well). Then at least one or more of three things
must happen: 1) growth in cost per beneficiary must be curtailed, 2) the
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fraction of covered health costs borne by the elderly and their families
must increase; or 3) the payroll tax rate must increase. Clearly, the
more success we have with the first, the less political pain we must
inflict with the second and/or third.
To illustrate the order of magnitude of the problem we face, if we
hold p constant at today’s level (9.8 percent) and current growth trends
continue for all variables on the right-hand side of Equation 2, the
required payroll tax rate t will increase from today’s implicit 5.5 percent to 14.4 percent in the next 20 years.2 A doubling of the current
beneficiary share, p, reduces the required tax rate in 2018 to only 13.2
percent. Given the nature of our political discourse over the last few
years, it is hard to imagine that double-digit payroll tax rates for Medicare alone will ever be politically acceptable, at least not in the first
one-third of the twenty-first century.
Reducing annual real growth in cost per beneficiary from the historical 5 percent to 3 percent and doubling the beneficiary premium
share would bring the required payroll tax rate down to 8.9 percent by
2018. As a final example, if we were somehow able to reduce the
annual real growth in costs per beneficiary to 1 percent, then we could
keep p on its current trajectory to 12 percent and the payroll tax rate
would have to rise to a level no higher than 6.6 percent.
One important inference from this set of exercises is that some
payroll tax increase is inevitable and reasonable to expect as the share
of our population over 65 increases in the first half of the twenty-first
century. Another lesson is that controlling the rate of growth in costs
per beneficiary is the key to minimizing that tax increase, which will
surely remain a goal even as we preserve our commitment to all the
elderly. This chapter focuses on alternative paths to reduce the growth
in c, the Medicare-covered health services cost per beneficiary.

PRINCIPLES OF STRUCTURAL REFORM
We have established that the fundamental goal of long-term Medicare reform is to reduce the real rate of growth of costs per beneficiary.
This can only be accomplished by a fundamental restructuring of

14

Nichols

incentives for beneficiaries, health plans, and fee-for-service (FFS)
Medicare as well.
Beneficiaries must have incentives to choose lower-cost health plan
and health service delivery arrangements, or plans and providers will
have no incentive to become more efficient. The simplest way to
impart these incentives is to take serious steps toward implementing
market principles—letting low-cost providers charge beneficiaries less,
and requiring high-cost providers to charge beneficiaries more—while
assuring that quality remains within acceptable bounds. There may
indeed be a natural trade-off between cost and quality, but the basic
idea behind structural Medicare reform is to allow beneficiary preferences to play a larger role in defining the appropriate place along that
trade-off than they have in the past, rather than relying exclusively on
executive branch determinations and dictates pursuant to legislative
instructions.
In addition, policymakers have to define other trade-offs with efficiency, like those with equity arising from income differences—price
incentives contradict ensuring access for the poor, for example—or risk
differences. Ultimately, legislation determines how much people of
different income and health risk will pay on average, though the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) could be given the assignment
to create incentives within certain bounds as defined by Congress and
the White House together. Finally, the complex issue of appropriate
geographic adjustment could present a set of subtle and not-so-subtle
trade-offs. Pursuing payment and benefit equity across the country
may be impossible in a geographically heterogeneous nation like ours,
where not only payment rates but utilization patterns vary tremendously as well. We will return to geographic adjustment issues again in
the proposal section, for they are among the thorniest in Medicare
reform.
Incentives for private plans to become efficient providers of acceptable or higher quality care would also be easier to implement through a
new pricing system than any other known way. In many ways, structural Medicare reform is really about how to get health plan pricing
policy right. Today it is highly inefficient because payment is formulaic and administered and is based ultimately on FFS Medicare costs.
This is not a linkage that promotes efficient behavior by either health
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plans or FFS providers, and thus is not in the long-run interests of
either Medicare beneficiaries or taxpayers.
A short digression is worthwhile at this point to clarify that managed care is consistent with the original intent of the architects of
Medicare. A fair reading of the legislative history of the Medicare program indicates that the original intent was to provide our elderly with
the same kind of health insurance that most workers were offered. In
1965, that was indemnity coverage for FFS medicine, typically through
a Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan. Today, the private industry norm is
some kind of managed care. Thus, Medicare actually lags the private
sector by quite a bit in moving most of its beneficiaries to managed
care.
In my view, some form of managed care is here to stay, notwithstanding the increasingly emotional debate about patient protection
acts in the current Congress that reflects the current backlash over costcontrol techniques. Now, some managed care policies and plans surely
need changing, but to argue that we can do away with care managers
trying to balance cost and quality in clinically appropriate ways is to
delude ourselves that 1) all health providers and styles of care are
equally outstanding, and 2) we have unlimited resources to spend on
health care in this country. Both propositions are patently false, and
stakeholders that oppose managed care—for example, physicians who
want their unquestioned autonomy and higher incomes back, hospitals
who want to charge what they want in order to avoid changing the way
they are organized, and politicians willing to exploit a small number of
genuine horror stories for political gain—are exaggerating the problems of managed care to further their own self-interests.
That said, ensuring that quality can be properly valued in the Medicare marketplace will not be easy. Advances in measurement are
occurring, but there is still much work to do by plans, providers, and
beneficiary/family education specialists alike. This work is vital to the
future of a competition-driven health system. But while we may wait
for the perfect set of quality measures to be devised, to do nothing and
just trust unmanaged FFS medicine to solve all our quality and
resource allocation problems is clearly not the answer either, as the
recent Institute of Medicine report shows (Kohn, Corrigan, and
Donaldson 2000).
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Trying to make health plan pricing policy more efficient also creates two other types of trade-offs: conflicts with special missions of
providers and perhaps of the Medicare program itself, and geographic
equity. Academic medical centers that train our future health professionals and conduct the clinical research that improves medical practice—such as teaching hospitals, hospitals that have historically
provided a disproportionate share of uncompensated care to the poor
and the uninsured, and hospitals that are the only source of medical
care in some semirural areas of the United States—all provide more or
less public goods for which competitive market forces will always
underpay. But forcing health plans to become more efficient through
Medicare payment reform will reduce their ability to implicitly subsidize these activities. The wise thing to do would be to take the funding
for these activities out of Medicare and Medicaid and have a clear and
honest debate about how much research, teaching, uncompensated
care, and rural provider support we want to provide, and then fund
these activities directly with public funds, federal, state, and local. But
wisdom and U.S. health policy are not often included in the same sentence, and while the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 took an important
step by removing some graduate medical education payments from
Medicare payments to health plans and instead paying them directly to
teaching hospitals, providers of these public goods have strong incentives to resist fully efficient Medicare pricing policy until some alternative funding stream for most of their current special activities can be
assured.
Geographic equity is also complicated by a zealous pursuit of efficiency. Basically, efficiency would require that prices be set locally at
the minimum level to attract services from efficient providers of
acceptable quality. But given the geographic heterogeneity of the U.S.
health care system and the statutory principle that beneficiaries should
pay a premium equal to a fixed percentage of the costs of average
Medicare (ambulatory, or Part B) benefits, local efficiency would make
it impossible to charge beneficiaries the same amount nationwide. But
absolute geographic equity—defined as spending the same amount of
money per beneficiary nationwide—would also be problematic,
because the same money would buy very different amounts of health
care in different parts of the country. Thus, balancing geography and
efficiency requires judgment about a complex trade-off, and this issue
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is one in which the major Medicare reform proposals differ substantially, as we shall see in this chapter.

ALMOST IDEAL MEDICARE
HEALTH PLAN PRICING SYSTEM
Given the principles of structural reform, a useful conceptual
experiment might be to ignore the real world constraints on the Medicare program for a moment and discuss the larger features of an almost
ideal pricing system, and then examine how the constraints on Medicare do and do not force deviations from the ideal.
In many ways, the best example of an organized health plan purchaser for Medicare to emulate is that of a large, multistate employer
with nationwide union contracts that force benefit packages to be
equivalent everywhere. Health care, like politics, is local, and private
employers do not seem to be troubled by this; they just adapt their
health plan arrangements to fit local conditions within the context of
their company-wide labor–management agreements. The simplest way
to start, and a way that Medicare could surely emulate, is to define a
standard benefit package that will be purchased everywhere. In the
modern world of twenty-first century health care, that package should
include reasonable prescription drug coverage in addition to the current
statutory Medicare benefit package. Health plans would then be asked
to bid on this package. The government payment amount would be
fixed near the middle or lower end of the bid distribution, and beneficiaries would have to pay extra out of their pockets to enroll in high
bidding plans. This competitive bidding arrangement would encourage
all plans to become more efficient so that they could bid lower and
offer premium rebates to attract beneficiaries. Again emulating the
best private purchasers today, Medicare would collect and disseminate
comparative quality data on plans and their affiliated providers, for this
would give beneficiaries the maximum feasible information on which
to base their enrollment decisions. Finally, after some reasonable time
for remedial action, Medicare would exclude plans and providers who
failed to meet acceptable quality or performance targets.
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This sort of almost ideal health plan pricing system would have
three main virtues. First, it would impart maximum incentives for
health plans to become more efficient over time. Second, it would
guarantee access to the same set of benefits nationwide. This is in contrast to today, where beneficiaries in Miami get zero premium (above
their statutory Part B payment) prescription drug coverage through
Medicare Plus Choice plans, and beneficiaries in Minneapolis have to
pay large amounts out of pocket to get plans to offer prescription drugs
to them, all because the current payment formulas are based on local
FFS costs and practice patterns and make very little analytic sense.
The third advantage of an almost ideal health plan pricing system is
that it allows Medicare to price all health plans locally and avoid the
thorny problems of deriving and administering geographic adjusters,
which are inherently imperfect.
There are two major risks of the almost ideal health plan pricing
system. First, while it does guarantee standard benefits nationwide, it
cannot guarantee that beneficiaries will pay the same premium everywhere for the same benefit package. In fact, only one plan in each
region is likely to have only the statutory premium attached. Higher
bidding plans will have to charge a premium, and lower bidding plans
can offer beneficiaries rebates off their statutory amount. This should
encourage health plans to become more efficient, but it is not what
some analysts and advocates mean when they talk about Medicare
being available to all at one nationwide premium for all beneficiaries.
Now there are regional disparities today for both availability and price
of extra benefits beyond the current parsimonious (excluding drugs)
Medicare benefit package, and at least one plan in each area will be
available at the statutory price. But if regional disparities in premium
payments for most Medicare health plans become too large, then a
reevaluation of the definition of the Medicare “entitlement” may be
demanded and appropriate.
The second major risk of an almost ideal Medicare health plan
pricing system is that it does depend completely on local competition
to engender efficient bids. If that local competition is not forthcoming
(in rural areas, for example) or not sustainable (if health plan consolidation leaves oligopoly or monopoly health plans in certain areas), then
some other way to generate pressures for efficiency must be found.
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CONSTRAINTS ON MEDICARE
Even if the almost ideal health plan pricing system could be implemented and made to work well everywhere, Medicare is not and cannot
ever be exactly like a large multistate employer. A private employer
can strive for efficiency with no worries about spillover consequences,
such as provider availability for 39 million beneficiaries, many of
whom are very vulnerable and some of whom are chronically ill or disabled, both of which are fairly rare occurrences among working families that employers usually cover.
First, precisely because of these chronically ill and disabled, as
well as rural beneficiaries, Medicare cannot ignore FFS providers the
way large employers can now if they so choose. Only about 15 percent
of beneficiaries are in Medicare + Choice plans today, thus managed
care capacity will have to be expanded quite a bit before FFS can be
allowed to fade away. Given the preponderance of FFS enrollees
today, Medicare simply has to modernize this part of the program as
well, rather than just focus on health plan payment policy and wait to
achieve efficiency gains until all beneficiaries choose the new and
improved managed care plans. Modernization will require selective
contracting, performance requirements, and locally negotiated payment discounts with doctors and hospitals, none of which are features
of the Medicare program today, and all of which are features of organized private purchasers who do a credible job of managing more or
less FFS delivery systems (e.g., preferred-provider organizations).
Medicare must also worry about this problematic geographic
equity because it is a national program. There is no simple scientific
test to decide if having the same benefits everywhere or charging the
same premium everywhere is the better definition of geographic equity.
The very idea of geographic equity may be a bit problematic in a country with the heterogeneous health care systems that the United States
has. Given that some form of geographic adjustment in payment rates
is necessary, it is also difficult to come up with factors that are truly
exogenous to local health care system demand. For example, nurses’
wages are clearly input prices to both hospitals and doctors’ offices, so
a geographic adjustment factor including their wages makes intuitive
sense. But nursing wages are higher where the demand for health care
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is greater, so they are hardly a purely exogenous reflection of the relative costs of providing medical care in different places around the
country.
The Medicare program must also worry about income equity more
intensely than private employer purchasers of health insurance. Lowincome Medicare enrollees cannot be expected to bear high out-ofpocket costs, either for health plans or for health services. Since
approximately 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have incomes
below poverty (Moon, Waidmann, and Storeygard 2000), payment provisions for protections that may impede the pursuit of efficiency must
be made.
Similarly, differential health risks, while present in relative terms
in all insurable populations, may be more of a problem in Medicare
than in other settings. For health plans, the absolute financial consequences of being saddled with a disproportionate share of the highest
risks are more severe, and thus provisions for risk adjustment of premium dollars received by plans are essential. Equally essential is absolute guaranteed open enrollment and the absence of risk-related
beneficiary premiums and co-pays so that no one with chronic or serious illness is prevented from getting medically necessary care.

ALTERNATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS
Since 1995 there have been quite a few proposals to restructure
Medicare,3 and in 1999 two major proposals emerged to galvanize the
debate and to act as magnets or centers of gravity for rather different
perspectives around which to coalesce. I label these the Breaux-Frist
and Clinton proposals, respectively, after the leading politicians who
have sponsored them. Breaux-Frist grew out of the Bi-Partisan Commission’s plan, which was released in March.4 President Clinton’s plan
was developed as a response to the Bi-Partisan Commission plan and
was released in July.5 Specific legislation has now been drafted and
some details have been changed, though no formal bill has been
marked up in committee and actually voted on in either chamber. Still,
the key contours I will outline have not changed, and they will serve to
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clarify these alternative approaches to long-term structural reform of
the Medicare program.
First, I will highlight the important principles that the proposals
share. To begin with, they both have competitive price incentives for
beneficiaries, plans, and FFS Medicare. This is one essential key for
long-run Medicare reform to promote efficiency and thus to reduce the
long-run real rate of growth of cost per beneficiary. Second, both proposals make prescription drugs an optional part of the Medicare benefit
package. The acknowledgment that prescription drugs are central to
modern medical practice is important, even though neither drug provision is as generous as those made outside the context of structural
Medicare reform in the bidding wars for the 2000 presidential election
campaign. Finally, each major proposal has provisions that would protect low-income and high-risk individuals, as well as address the
thorny issue of geographic cost differences. These are important areas
of agreement, and they suggest that a compromise is possible within
this broad outline.
But the Breaux-Frist and Clinton proposals differ in their treatment
of three key features: the reference price, or the amount of the government contribution toward health plan enrollment choices by beneficiaries; use of national averages to influence local competition; and
adjustment for geographic differences in price and utilization or patterns of delivery of health care services to Medicare beneficiaries.
The Reference Price
Each reference price is best understood in the context of each proposal’s specific and unique bidding process. For Breaux-Frist, there
are two benefit packages: core and high-option. Core includes only
current law benefits, and high-option adds (at least) an $800 (actuarial
value) drug benefit and (at most) a $2,000 stop loss (maximum beneficiary out-of-pocket payment). Health plans must submit a high-option
bid, and they may submit a core bid as well if they are willing to sell a
package with just current law benefits (all bids in all proposals are presumed to be for the average risk enrollee, and both proposals assume
risk adjustments will be made before payments are made to plans).
HCFA, as the manager of FFS Medicare, must offer a core bid everywhere in the United States. This bid must be set to break even, i.e.,
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finance itself, over the year. HCFA must also partner with any willing
private insurer to offer a high-option plan wherever firms are willing to
sell the supplemental policy to go along with its core package of FFS
services.
The Medicare board computes the core bid for each plan that did
not submit one on its own, and then computes the national weighted
average (NWA), an enrollment-weighted average of all bids for the
core plan nationwide. For the NWA calculation, each bid is also
deflated by its geographic adjuster, as determined by the board. (The
geographic adjuster will be explained in some detail later, for this is the
third key element wherein Breaux-Frist differs from Clinton).
The Breaux-Frist reference price is 88 percent of the NWA for core
plans and 0.88 × NWA + 25 percent of the statutory minimum cost of
the drug benefit ($800) for high-option plans, or 0.88 × NWA + 200. If
a core plan bid exactly the NWA, the beneficiary would have to pay
0.12 × NWA to enroll in it. If a high-option plan bid exactly the NWA
+ 1,000, the beneficiary who chooses it would pay 0.12 × NWA + 1000
– 0.25 × Drugcost = 0.12 × NWA + 800. (This paragraph assumes the
geographic adjuster and the risk adjuster for that beneficiary are each
1.0 for simplicity of exposition).
The larger point is that this type of reference price builds in both
carrots and sticks; high-bidding plans must charge more than these reference amounts, and plans that bid less could offer beneficiaries discounts. Thus, this kind of pricing structure imparts strong incentives
for plans to become efficient or lose market share.
Clinton also has core and high-option benefit packages, but they
are structured somewhat differently than in Breaux-Frist. The core
defined benefit is the current law package plus zero cost sharing on a
specific set of prevention benefits. The high-option package adds a
specific outpatient prescription drug benefit (no deductible, 50 percent
co-insurance up to $5,000 in drug spending) to the Clinton core.
HCFA would add the prescription drug benefit to the “high-option”
FFS plan. Private plans must bid a price at which they are willing to
supply each package. Plans could also add the cost of reducing regular
Medicare cost sharing, as long as this does not increase the actuarial
value and cost by more than 15 percent.
HCFA and/or FFS Medicare do not bid, per se. Yet the reference
prices for the Clinton proposal are pegged at 96 percent of the local
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FFS cost for the core package and at 96 percent of the FFS cost of the
core package plus the cost of HCFA-administered drug benefit. This
has the effect of insulating beneficiaries who choose FFS from ever
paying more than the statutory part B premium amount, i.e., beneficiaries under Clinton’s plan will always be able to select FFS without a
financial penalty for FFS’s inherent inefficiency at controlling costs.
However, low-bidding plans will be able to offer premium rebates to
beneficiaries, with beneficiaries getting 75 percent of the savings and
the government getting 25 percent of the savings. In this way, the Clinton reference price structure is all carrots: since FFS is expected to usually be the highest-cost plan, private health plans have incentives to bid
low to gain market share but no stick forcing them to bid low to be
competitive as the NWA provides under Breaux-Frist.
Use of National Averages to Affect Local Competition
Breaux-Frist uses the NWA as a check on local plans and on FFS
Medicare. Breaux-Frist also uses the local bids to force FFS Medicare
to become more efficient or lose market share. (This will become a bit
more clear in the examples I present below). Clinton uses the FFS premium guarantee to protect beneficiaries while still offering plans the
reward of higher market share for competing successfully (at lower
cost) against FFS Medicare. Clinton’s proposal also has plans to modernize FFS, i.e., make it more like a preferred-provider organization.
Adjustment for Geographic Differences
The third major difference between the proposals for long-term
Medicare reform is treatment of geographic cost differences. BreauxFrist would adjust bids only for local input price differences. This
approach is consistent with a particular view of utilization differences:
that they are clinically unjustified and mostly driven by ignorance of
best medical practice or pursuit of economic gain by providers. Clinton’s original proposal called for “full” geographic adjustment, which
seemed to promise to adjust for all FFS utilization differences as well
as price differences among different areas. But the final proposal as
specified in the FY2001 budget documents defined the geographic
adjuster as an enrollment-weighted average of FFS and managed care
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costs, locally as compared to national averages, which at least allows
for managed care utilization to dampen slightly the degree for which
utilization differences are adjusted. The Clinton approach is consistent
with a view that most, if not all, utilization differences among areas are
legitimate—more or less the opposite of the Breaux-Frist view.
The significance of these divergent views is made clear in Table 1,
which decomposes Medicare + Choice payment rate deviations from
the national average into input price and utilization sources in eight different metropolitan statistical areas. I used the simple hospital wage
index to proxy input prices. The table shows that areas that cost more
than the national average, from Trenton to Miami, could mostly have
high utilization (the Florida locations), high prices (Los Angeles and
Flint), or just slightly elevated utilization (Trenton). Areas with below
average costs (Tacoma and South Bend) have substantially lower utilization, even sufficiently low enough to more than counter the effect of
higher prices (Tacoma). The point of this table is to suggest, however,
that the Breaux-Frist geographic adjuster will have very different
effects and be much more popular in Los Angeles and Tacoma than in
Miami. Clinton’s adjuster, on the other hand, is likely to be the most
popular of the two adjusters everywhere, which is no doubt why it was
designed precisely the way it was.
Table 1 Geographic Disparity in Medicare Managed Care Plan Costs
2000 Medicare +
Choice payment
($)
Miami
724.23
Ft. Lauderdale
623.63
Palm Beach
564.73
Los Angeles
627.76
Flint
576.49
Trenton
521.93
Tacoma
439.62
South Bend
415.86

% above
U.S. avg.a
43.4
23.5
11.8
24.3
14.2
3.4
–12.9
–17.6

% due to price
HWIb – 1
2.3
1.7
–0.5
20.9
10.2
–0.4
16.3
–2.1

% due to
utilization
40.2
21.4
12.4
2.9
3.6
3.8
–25.1
–15.9

SOURCE: Author’s analysis of Health Care Finance Administration data. Price deflator is the hospital wage index.
a The U.S. average is $504.96.
b Hospital wage index.
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EXAMPLES TO HIGHLIGHT THE DIFFERENCES
IN THE BREAUX-FRIST AND CLINTON PLANS
The following hypothetical examples are designed to illustrate how
the competing proposals would translate a given set of “facts,” i.e., private health plan bids and FFS costs, into marginal prices that beneficiaries would pay, and thus, ultimately, into incentives for long run
efficiency. It is not simple to construct an example that permits an
“apples to apples” comparison across reform proposals because they
have different benefits in their “high-option” plans and because their
treatments of FFS Medicare are so dissimilar—Clinton does not force
HCFA to bid per se, whereas Breaux-Frist requires it to break even
with its premium collections. Nevertheless, the following is offered as
a first order approximation of an example that permits a fair comparison, and while I have made some simplifications compared to the
“actual” proposal throughout (these proposals are moving targets in
any event), I have been careful to preserve the rank order of beneficiary
premiums that would actually occur among plans and geographic
areas.
I use four “plans”: two private HMOs (Plans 1 and 2), FFS Medicare, and FFS Medicare with a high-option supplement (FFS + D),
where D = prescription drugs. Both private plans offer each proposal’s
high-option package: the implicit assumption to keep the premium bids
identical under both Breaux-Frist and Clinton is that the more expansive drug benefit under Clinton has the same actuarial value as the drug
benefit plus stop loss in the Breaux-Frist high-option package. Table 2
lists the bids by each plan in a low-cost and a high-cost area. (A high-

Table 2 Bids of Sample Plans ($)
Low-cost area

High-cost area

Plan 1

6,100

8,300

Plan 2

6,710

8,930

FFS

6,200

6,200

FFS+D

7,300

7,400

NWA

6,000

6,000
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cost area is presumed to have 10 percent higher prices and 20 percent
higher utilization than the national average. A low-cost area is presumed to have 5 percent lower prices and utilization). NWA is the
national weighted average computed under the Breaux-Frist rules.6
Table 3 shows the reference prices in the low-cost and the highcost areas (for the Clinton plan, the reference prices are relevant to
plans 1 and 2 since this reference price includes drugs for the highoption plan). Note that the Clinton reference prices are uniformly
higher in the same geographic area. This shows the protection Clinton
gives to FFS, while Breaux-Frist provides stronger incentives for
health plans to become more efficient.
Table 4 shows what beneficiaries would pay out of pocket on the
margin for each of the specific health plan choices in the example.
Recall that, under the Clinton plan, beneficiaries pay the Part B premium for FFS without drugs. I proxied this amount by making it equal
to 10 percent of the nationwide FFS average cost in my example, or
$620 per year. Note that the Clinton plan would charge beneficiaries
less for all plans in the low-cost area, and considerably less for private
plans in the high-cost area, because the Clinton reference price is so
high. However, and perhaps surprisingly, Breaux-Frist would charge
beneficiaries less for standard FFS than Clinton.

Table 3 Reference Prices, Given Example Bids ($)
Low-cost area

High-cost area

Breaux-Frist

5,700

6,600

Clinton

6,642

8,943

Table 4 Beneficiary Payments, per Year, per Beneficiary ($)
Low-cost area
Breaux-Frist

High-cost area

Clinton

Breaux-Frist

Clinton

Plan 1

920

863

2,220

638

Plan 2

1,530

1,388

2,850

1,107

FFS

1,220

620

320

620

FFS+D

2,120

1,120

1,320

1,120
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This result illustrates the power of the NWA versus the Clinton reference price. In high-cost areas, FFS is relatively cheap under BreauxFrist since it is forced to bid the national average everywhere, and by
definition the national average FFS is lower than the average cost in
high-cost areas. The NWA formula makes FFS even more attractive.
The Clinton proposal, on the other hand, keeps the absolute price of
FFS the same everywhere, and the surprising result is that because of
the way the Clinton reference price is computed (with geographic
adjusters, not shown but available from the author on request), the private health plans are actually cheaper in high-cost areas—to beneficiaries—than they are in low-cost areas. This is in some ways an artifact
of this particular example, wherein excess utilization is more important
in defining the high-cost areas than excess prices, but as Table 1
showed, this is also a fair representation of Florida’s high-cost Medicare markets in real life.
The upshot of this example is that because Clinton adjusts areaspecific reference prices for utilization differences and input prices,
whereas Breaux-Frist only adjusts for input prices, Breaux-Frist
imparts in high-cost areas much stronger incentives on high-cost private health plans to become more efficient, or they will be hard pressed
to survive in high-cost areas. Now high-cost areas—which are, after
all, high-cost because of their historical FFS utilization and pricing patterns—are where the greatest potential for new savings lie, as efficiencies are sought. Thus, Breaux-Frist imparts the strongest incentives for
private plans to become efficient in the areas where it is likely to do the
most good from a program-wide efficiency perspective. Clinton, by
contrast, ends up protecting the excess utilization in high-cost areas by
making private plans here relatively inexpensive compared to FFS + D,
until this protection is eroded by the slightly declining geographic
adjuster over time as costs elsewhere (note the low cost area’s private
premium bids) reduce the geographic adjustment factor over time. It is
clear from Table 4 that health plans in high-cost areas would greatly
prefer the Clinton approach. In absolute terms, they would prefer Clinton in low-cost areas as well, though relative to FFS, private plans
under Breaux-Frist are better off than under Clinton.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXAMPLE
In general, Breaux-Frist imparts stronger incentives for health plan
efficiency. Private plans in high-cost areas—especially if utilization is
the main reason they are high-cost now—would have to become much
more efficient very quickly or charge such high premiums they would
likely lose business to FFS. Indeed, the NWA calculation works in
such a way that FFS Medicare seems relatively cheap in high-cost
areas. Beneficiaries would pay more on the margin for all private plans
under Breaux-Frist, and for HCFA’s FFS plan with prescription drug
coverage. In the example, the NWA also works to make the out-ofpocket cost of FFS exceed the price of the lowest-cost plan in low-cost
areas, which implies that managed care plans might be encouraged to
enter here, since they could likely compete against the national average-priced FFS plan.
As advertised, the Clinton plan protects FFS beneficiaries well, in
that FFS Medicare, offered to them for the usual Part B premium, is the
lowest-cost plan in each type of area. In the example, no private plan
bid lower than the Clinton FFS plan, but private plans were cheaper
than Clinton’s FFS plan that includes prescription drugs. Thus, beneficiaries who wanted prescription drugs and were price conscious in both
high-cost and low-cost areas would be able to find non-HCFA alternatives to their liking. In a surprising reflection of the implications of
“almost full” geographic adjustment, the out-of-pocket premium for
the private plans with drugs is lower in the high-cost areas under Clinton than in the low-cost areas. From the point of view of encouraging
beneficiaries to migrate to managed care in high-cost areas, this is
good. But the Clinton approach, relative to Breaux-Frist, is clearly
going to discourage managed care growth in low-cost areas. It also
may stall significant growth in high-cost areas as well, since it will be
hard to provide the extra benefits beneficiaries want (e.g., outpatient
prescription drugs) and also to price below FFS Medicare, especially if
FFS Medicare modernizes along the lines of the Clinton proposal. Of
course, if managed care cannot control cost growth better in the long
run, then it should not—and would not—grow relative to FFS. The
Clinton plan does a better job overall of hedging the bet that managed
care is destined to win this competition.
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Each plan has both potential and obvious flaws. In my judgment,
the Clinton plan’s incentives are potentially weak in high-cost areas.
Especially to the degree that norms of excess utilization are responsible
for historically higher than average costs in these areas (as in Miami,
etc.), there may be much more inefficiency to wring out of the system
than the Part B premium allows room. Recall, the Clinton plan is all
carrots. Thus, plans can price lower than FFS but they can’t go below
zero, and FFS doesn’t have to charge more when it’s more expensive
than the reference price, as in Breaux-Frist. Thus, a potential private
plan premium discount relative to FFS costs—the Part B premium, or
roughly 10 percent of national average FFS costs in the example—is
constrained to be no more than $620 in 2000.
The Breaux-Frist plan, by contrast, may have too harsh an incentive structure. It would clearly be disruptive in the short run in highcost areas, precisely where managed care enrollment within Medicare
is highest today. Ironically, if imposed without a transition phase as the
plan was originally drafted, it would likely kill off Medicare managed
care plans in precisely the areas where Medicare needs managed care
to help it save resources in the long run. The complement to this effect
is that the NWA protects FFS in these high-cost areas, which is
unlikely to be wise for long run Medicare payment policy.

OUTLINE OF A COMPROMISE
These implications, relative strengths, and flaws of each Medicare
reform proposal all point to a fairly obvious compromise that might
actually make decent long-run policy sense: start with the Clinton plan
and gradually wean FFS from this much protection by lowering the reference price over time to something closer to the Breaux-Frist concept.
The wisdom of reforming Medicare deliberately as opposed to precipitously should be obvious.
In the long run, a locally defined contribution based on competitive
bidding makes perfect sense, as does making FFS Medicare compete.
But FFS Medicare must be given time to modernize, and payment
reform should not kill off any options in year one, or there will be precious little competition and reform in the long run. It seems likely that
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Medicare will need both sticks and carrots in its ultimate pricing arsenal—as Breaux-Frist has—to achieve the lowest possible c (real
growth in per beneficiary costs). It would be wise to reevaluate the
Clinton concept of more or less full utilization adjustment, though
recent work by Cutler and Sheiner (1999) suggests that zero utilization
adjustment is probably not appropriate either, and truth may be closer
to two-thirds than some people now think. Finally, to make all Medicare health plan pricing reforms palatable, Medicare must work hard
on quality measures and plan accountability. Ultimately, the limit to
how aggressive pricing reforms can be will be set by how much the
people in the United States trust the health care delivery systems we
allow Medicare to pay for.

LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF MEDICARE REFORM
To conclude, it is important to remember that Medicare is not just
an abstract set of incentives that may be oddly structured for economists’ tastes. Economists can best serve the Medicare debate by identifying the trade-offs inherent in competing policy objectives and real
world conditions, and in analyzing the likely outcomes of alternative
incentive structures. That is, at best, economics merely clarifies the
choices real policymakers face. If we have learned anything in Washington during the eight years of the Clinton Administration, it is that
major health policy changes, as structural Medicare reform would be,
can only be achieved with a broad bipartisan consensus. Only with this
consensus can entrenched interests—which will always oppose
reform—be overcome. However, the other lesson that economic analysis can offer Medicare reformers is that the cost of delay is higher
future pain (in tax rates) and hasty, ill-considered implementation
snafus and unintended consequences. That is surely a poor enough
bargain to keep minds in Washington concentrated on Medicare
reform.
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Notes
I am very grateful to David Cutler, Mark Miller, Bob Donnelly, Greg White, Carolyn
Davis, Phil Ellis, Mark McClellan, Marilyn Moon, John Holahan, Steve Zuckerman,
Josh Weiner, Stu Gluterman, Anne Mutti, Mike O’Grady, Kathy Means, Nora Super
Jones, Jeff Lemieux, Stuart Butler, and Bob Reischauer for many helpful discussions
about the issues raised in this chapter and concerning Medicare reform generally. All
errors remain my sole responsibility. All opinions in this chapter are my own and do
not represent those of the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its sponsors.
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

This algebra section is taken from Nichols (2000). I simplify a bit by assuming
there are no non-elderly disabled beneficiaries, no elderly workers, and that all
public funds are financed with a payroll tax. Including the precise details would
complicate the algebra without changing the essential point at all, since the general fund financing that reduces the actual required payroll tax rate also increases
the fraction of income tax revenue that must be dedicated to Medicare. Nevertheless, the stylized “t” that is calculated in this simplified example is higher than is
actually required because of current income tax financing and because of the payroll and income generated by elderly workers.
Author’s calculations; details available on request.
Reischauer, Butler, and Lave (1998); Moon (2000); Helms (2000). See also the
papers by McClellan, Cutler, Fuchs, Reinhardt, and Saving in the Spring 2000
issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
The bipartisan commission’s proposal can be found at http://medicare.commission.gov/medicare/index.html. Breaux-Frist was introduced in the U.S. Senate as
S. 1895 in November of 1999.
The Clinton plan can be found in the FY2001 budget documents. Contact the
author for further details.
Under Clinton, the FFS plans do not bid, per se, but under Breaux-Frist they do.
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to the U.S. Health Care System?
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For most of the last century, the U.S. health care system was
financed primarily through traditional indemnity health insurance plans
that paid doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers on a feefor-service basis. By the 1960s, most Americans received insurance of
this type through either their employers or government programs, such
as Medicare and Medicaid (HIAA 1991). In the midst of economic
prosperity that minimized constraints on the revenues they could collect, and faced with the then comparatively low cost of health care,
health insurers and the government provided ample funding for the
widespread provision of ever more advanced health care. In the process, this subsidized and encouraged the training of new physicians,
the building of new infrastructure, and the development of increasingly
advanced, and almost always more expensive, technologies. By all
accounts, these developments contributed significantly to the capabilities of medicine to cure disease and improve the health and functioning
of patients. By the 1970s and 1980s, though, rapidly increasing costs
gave rise to a number of cost-containment efforts. Perhaps the most
prominent of these efforts is the growth of managed care, encompassing a range of changes in the practices of health insurers that have
eroded the pillars of the traditional fee-for-service health care financing
system.
The growth of managed care has raised important questions about
its impact on the well-being of patients. An increasing number of
opponents argue that expansion of managed care has put cost cutting
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front and center, displacing concerns about quality and health, and will
inevitably harm patients and reduce the well-being of the U.S. population. But this view may not be completely correct. Advocates of managed care argue that fee-for-service medicine fostered waste and
inefficiency, and that by developing better methods of allocating
resources, society can obtain the same value from its health care system for less money. Moreover, maintaining the traditional health care
financing system was increasingly costly, and savings generated by
managed care can also contribute value to society.
Much of the public debate about the impact of managed care has
been conducted around opinion and anecdote, without careful analysis
of the large body of evidence available on the impact of managed care
on health care, outcomes, and costs. This chapter aims to contribute to
these debates by presenting and synthesizing key evidence, seeking to
evaluate what is known about the impact of managed care on the wellbeing of the U.S. population. The first sections briefly discuss the origins and definition of managed care and present a framework for analyzing the impact of managed care on the well-being of society. The
next section reviews evidence on treatment patterns, outcomes, satisfaction, and expenditures in managed care organizations. Following
that is a discussion of the impact of managed care on non–managed
care patients and on the structure and functioning of the health care
system in general. The next section presents some supplementary evidence on cost savings from growth in managed care. The final sections
synthesize the evidence presented, discuss welfare implications, and
consider the future of managed care.

WHAT IS MANAGED CARE AND
WHERE DID IT COME FROM?
The health care system that grew up in the United States after
World War II was a lavishly funded affair. With a strong economy, it
was relatively easy for employers to include generous indemnity health
insurance in employee compensation packages. These insurance plans
typically provided broad coverage of health care spending with no
restrictions on the physicians or hospitals used by the beneficiaries,
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provided for little oversight, if any, of the treatment decisions made by
physicians, and placed few restraints on the amounts that could be
charged. Free spending in the private sector was augmented by extensive public sector spending in the form of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, providing fee-for-service coverage for the elderly and poor,
as well as programs like the Hill-Burton program for the development
of hospital infrastructure, and the National Institutes of Health for
medical research.
Although financial incentives are not the only force that influences
the health care delivery system, they can play an important role in
shaping the system’s institutions and behavior. It is perhaps not surprising that the health care system that grew up in this environment
reflected, in at least some ways, the financial forces that nurtured it.
With few financial constraints, it was easy for providers to supply their
patients with many advanced services. Under many traditional indemnity plans, neither the patient nor the provider bore any of the cost of
treatment, so one would expect providers and patients to demand all
services that would have had even some probability of a benefit for the
patient, even those that were very costly to the insurer and to society.
Moreover, the inclination to do everything possible for patients was
reinforced by the fact that providers paid on a fee-for-service basis
received additional compensation for furnishing more—and more
expensive—services. Because increasing numbers of patients had
insurance, these incentives helped to ensure the availability of
advanced medicine to broad segments of the population.
Beyond influencing the treatments provided for individual patients
in a physician’s office or hospital, the availability of generous compensation for providing extensive and expensive care with the latest techniques also influenced the infrastructure of medicine. It attracted new
medical students who ultimately contributed to the increasing number
of physicians, particularly specialists; it fostered the development of
new hospitals; and it encouraged the adoption of new techniques and
equipment, in turn creating a ready market for the purchase of new
innovations that helped fuel a large and active research establishment.
All of this contributed to the formation of a health care delivery
system that enjoyed wide public support as a world leader, particularly
with respect to its advancement and ability to make high-tech care
available to broad segments of the population. But, maintaining this
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system turned out to be a costly endeavor. The United States spent
then, and continues to spend now, markedly more than any other country in the world. In 1997, the United States spent 13.9 percent of its
gross domestic product on health care, while the next highest figure
was from Germany, at 10.7 percent. Other industrialized countries like
France (9.6 percent), Canada (9.2 percent) and the United Kingdom
(6.8 percent) were even lower (OECD 1999).
As the costs of sustaining the system increased over time, cracks
began to appear in the foundation of public support that backed the system. Spending large amounts of money to obtain highly valued items
is easily justifiable, but, first in the 1960s and more evidently in the
1970s and 1980s, some began to question whether the value received
from the health care system was commensurate with the level of spending. Some of the unease was generated by the fear that additional
health care spending was not generating significant improvements in
health. Despite leading the world in health care spending, life expectancy, infant mortality, and other population-level indicators of health
remained worse in the United States than in other developed countries.
Moreover, some evidence suggested that excessive health care, potentially detrimental to health, was being provided. One study found that
at least one-third of carotid endarterectomies, surgery to improve blood
flow to the brain, were unnecessary and inappropriate, as were at least
17 percent of angiograms, invasive X rays of the coronary arteries
(Brook 1989). Both of these procedures carried nontrivial risks to
patients, and the knowledge that these and other potentially risky procedures were being overprovided gave further reason for reexamination
of the incentives in the system. If it is health that ultimately produces
the value society derives from the health care system (a debatable proposition to which I return below), then spending that does not produce
health is inefficient and should be redirected to purchase other goods or
services that generate value for society.
All of this led to a variety of efforts to mitigate the incentives generated by the traditional insurance system that appeared to be encouraging high spending on things of questionable value. These efforts
included things like the widespread introduction of co-payments and
deductibles, the imposition of second opinion requirements for elective
procedures, and Medicare’s Prospective Payment System. Most prominent among them, though, is the growth of managed care, which began
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in earnest in the early 1970s and reached full swing during the 1980s
and 1990s.
The term managed care refers collectively to a set of activities that
health plans and others can undertake to mitigate the propensity for the
provision of more and more expensive services fostered by unmonitored fee-for-service medicine. There are three main managed care
strategies. The first is centralization of control over utilization decisions. Fee-for-service medicine was characterized by virtually complete autonomy on the part of physicians and other providers, in
consultation with the patient, with respect to care choices. Under managed care, health plans can take on more significant roles in overseeing
care choices. For example, patients and their physicians may be forced
to obtain preapproval from a utilization review organization for diagnostic tests or surgical procedures if the plan is to pay for the services.
Plans can then deny approval for services that they deem to be inappropriate uses of resources. Many plans regulate the use of specialists by
forcing patients to sign up with a particular primary care physician or
group of physicians and then obtain a referral from this “gatekeeper”
physician or group when specialized services are required. Plans can
also engage in activities like promulgating guidelines for care or developing detailed formularies of approved pharmaceutical products for
which they will pay, effectively limiting prescribing to the approved
list. Less direct forms of control are also possible. For example, many
plans periodically review the practice patterns of physicians to identify
those whose use of services appears excessive, and they may provide
incentives for meeting the targets.
Second, health plans can impose indirect controls on utilization by
using financial arrangements that put providers at risk for the financial
implications of the patient care decisions they make. For example,
plans can use capitation contracts in which physician groups (or even
individual physicians) are paid a fixed amount per patient per month to
care for the patients who have signed up with them. This effectively
reverses the fee-for-service incentive to provide more care to each
patient. In other cases, plans may withhold a portion of the payments
due to physicians and reallocate these funds at the end of the year
based on the performance of physicians or groups in meeting utilization, quality, or other targets imposed by the plans.
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Finally, health plans may define networks of physicians and health
care providers with whom they will work and provide incentives for
patients to see only those providers chosen. Defining a panel offers
plans the advantage of selecting only those providers with whom they
are interested in working, as well as the potential to obtain contracting
advantages and discounts from physicians who would like to be
included in the panel. Some plans define relatively broad networks of
affiliated physicians and providers, while other plans focus their efforts
on building relatively narrow panels and carefully managing them to
include only those providers whose patterns of practice are most consistent with their goals. Plans that have formed networks can impose
restrictions on the ability of patients to choose providers outside of the
network. Some plans will not pay for care delivered by physicians or
hospitals not included in the approved panel. Other plans provide
some financial incentives for patients to see providers in the panel, but
they will pay at least part of the bill for out-of-network care.
Beyond the three main categories of plan activities, there is a wide
range of other things that plans can do to influence practice patterns.
Many plans engage in efforts to change physician opinions about the
best ways to care for their patients. They may, for example, provide
information and work with physicians to define standards for care.
Plans may also influence practice patterns simply by collecting data on
the performance of services that the plan or other observers like the
National Center for Quality Assurance believe to be indicators of quality.
Today, most health plans use more than one of these techniques,
and plans vary widely in the combinations of approaches they use and
in the weight they put on each approach. To some extent, different
combinations of approaches define the stereotypical organizational
forms that are commonly observed in the marketplace. Staff and group
model HMOs, like Kaiser Permanente and the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, tend to tightly define a network of providers
whose financial incentives are closely aligned with the incentives of the
plan and restrict patients to choose only providers in the network.
Because the panels are carefully defined and financial incentives are
already integrated, there is relatively little need to impose strong central controls on utilization or use financial incentives to limit costs.
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Independent practice association (IPA) model HMOs typically
have more loosely defined networks of physicians and restrict patients
to remain within the network. The looseness of the network and the
lack of integration with the plan requires stronger efforts to contain utilization. IPA-model HMOs vary in the emphasis they place on financial incentives as opposed to direct controls, but the prototypical IPAmodel HMO relies heavily on some combination of them.
Preferred-provider organizations (PPOs) are characterized by relatively loose panels, some incentives to choose providers in the network
(but weaker incentives than those used by HMOs), and limited efforts
to control utilization. As a result, PPOs have been regarded as potentially less effective at controlling costs than other organizations. Many
formerly unmanaged indemnity plans have also adopted managed care
techniques over the past years, typically consisting of efforts to impose
some (frequently limited) central control on utilization patterns.
Taken as a whole, the growth of managed care represents a massive
shift in the financial incentives at work in the U.S. health care system.
Between 1981 and 1998, HMO enrollment grew from 10 million to
105.3 million, with about 30 percent of this growth coming after 1995
(Hoechst Marion Roussel 1999; Interstudy 1994). PPO growth was
also substantial, and by some accounts the vast majority of the U.S.
non-elderly population was enrolled in some form of managed care
plan by the late 1990s.

A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
THE IMPACT OF MANAGED CARE
Growth in managed care has prompted questions about its impact
on the health care system and on the well-being of patients, which
could be evaluated from a number of different perspectives. Here, I
take society’s perspective and attempt to discuss the issues important in
determining whether society’s total utility, or value, has been increased
or decreased by managed care.
Individuals can be characterized as getting utility from three
things. First, people get utility from health. Second, people can get
utility from the amenities or other attributes of the health care system
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that do not necessarily improve health but reduce their hassles or
increase their enjoyment. People value short waiting times in doctors
offices and friendly staff, even if these things do not directly make
them healthier. The American public has also expressed a desire for
high-tech, advanced care even though this has not always been shown
to produce better health than lower-tech, less aggressive medicine.
Some people may simply value the knowledge that they are receiving
the most up-to-date treatments from the most highly trained specialists.
For others, receipt of high tech therapies may foster the perception that
health is being maximally improved, even in cases where this is not
actually the case. Finally, individuals get utility from the amount of
money they have left after their spending on health care, including
health insurance, out-of-pocket spending, and spending for any other
health care goods and services. I can thus write a representative individual’s utility function as
Eq. 1

u = u(h, a, y – yh ),

where h denotes health, a denotes amenities, y denotes income, and yh
denotes spending on health care. Obtaining the maximum amount of
utility requires trading off the purchase of more and better health care,
which could generate more health and better amenities, with consumption of other things.
Society consists of many individuals, so from society’s perspective
one can write
Eq. 2

U = U(H, A, Y – Yh).

For simplicity, society’s total utility could be thought of as a summation of the utility of each individual, although in reality it is probably
more complicated than that. Thinking about overall social utility,
though, produces the same problem for society as for an individual. In
order to obtain the maximum amount of collective utility, we must
trade off the purchase of more health care with nicer amenities against
the use of our collective income for other pursuits.
The social perspective can differ in important ways from the individual perspective. Most notably, focusing on social utility maximization allows for trade-offs between members of society. Foregoing
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expensive services with low probability of success for some patients,
and using the savings to purchase immunizations for others might
improve total social utility, but it would be redistributive, producing
individual winners and losers. The incidence of costs can also vary
among individuals—some may save more or pay more than others
toward the collective social spending on health care. Although individual-level analyses of welfare can be interesting and important, the
question of overall social benefit or loss is an important question from
a general policy perspective, and it is the one I focus on here.
The question, then, is whether social utility is higher or lower in a
world dominated by managed care than it would have been in a (hypothetical) world without managed care. In a given time period t, a system dominated by managed care will produce some level of health,
amenities, and spending that will yield a level of utility UtM. A fee-forservice system would also produce some level of health, amenities, and
spending, generating UtF. Society is better off with managed care at
that point in time if UtM > UtF and worse off if UtM < UtF.
Since the health care system is continuing to evolve, an evaluation
would also do well to take into account both present and future levels
of utility, with appropriate discounting to account for the difference
between value now and value later. When utilities over time are taken
into account, activities that have value now but hurt future value, like
cost cutting that produces no current change in treatments but does
affect research and hence the prospects for future treatments, would
have to be weighed against each other.
Without knowing the specific functional forms, it is impossible to
precisely evaluate society’s utility or the impact managed care has on
it. However, given information about the impact of managed care on
health, amenities and patient satisfaction, and costs, we can draw inferences about the likely effects. That is, an informed perspective on this
question can be obtained by evaluating any reduction in health and
amenities managed care has brought about relative to any savings it has
generated. The next three sections discuss the large and growing literature that provides insight into these questions.
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TREATMENT PATTERNS, SATISFACTION, AND
OUTCOMES FOR PATIENTS IN MANAGED CARE
One important body of literature compares treatment patterns,
health outcomes, satisfaction, and spending for patients who enroll in
managed care organizations and those who do not. This literature contains hundreds of studies, and I do not attempt to review them all here.
Rather, I summarize the results of several good reviews that synthesize
information from the many original studies. Luft (1981) summarized
studies done between 1959 and 1975. Miller and Luft (1994) compiled
results from studies done between 1980 and 1993. Miller and Luft
(1997) compiled results from studies done between 1994 and 1997.
Dudley et al. (1998) reviewed work primarily on outcomes done
between 1980 and 1997.1 A wide range of studies are also reviewed in
Glied (2000) and Chernew et al. (1998).2
The comparison studies discussed here share some general characteristics. First, they almost all focus on patients enrolled in HMOs.
This is useful because HMOs are a classic form of managed care organization and are still probably the most aggressive form of managed
care organization in the marketplace. Yet, existing studies provide little
information about the experience of patients in PPOs or other types of
managed care plans.
Second, almost all of these studies attempt to compare patients in
HMOs to patients in traditional indemnity plans. This is a sensible
comparison group, but it does raise issues because of the general evolution of health plans over the past decade. It is relatively rare now to
find even indemnity health insurers that have not adopted some managed care strategies. Earlier studies may thus provide more easily
interpretable comparisons than later studies, because the characteristics
of the control group in earlier studies are clearer. More recently, studies of Medicare patients may be most useful since Medicare maintains
a relatively unmonitored fee-for-service system for its traditional
enrollees.
Third, few of these studies are randomized. Most of them examine
groups of patients for whom the plan in which they are enrolled is the
product of a choice made by the enrollee or by some other entity, like
an employer. If the health status, preferences, or other characteristics
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of HMO enrollees differ from those of other patients, results from comparative studies could be biased. Indeed, a large body of literature suggests that health status does frequently differ between patients in and
out of HMOs (e.g., Hellinger 1987, 1995; Glied 2000). Many comparison studies do attempt to control for differences in the characteristics
of patients, but the methods used and the quality of the available control variables vary from study to study. One notable exception is the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment, a randomized trial conducted in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. As part of the trial, 1,149 patients were
randomized to join the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, a
staff-model HMO, providing a study design capable of avoiding problems with selection bias (Manning et al. 1984).
Despite these inconveniences, this literature does provide an
important window into the impacts of managed care, producing a number of very consistent and strong findings. I review evidence on treatment patterns first, followed by satisfaction, health outcomes, and
spending.
Comparing Treatments for Managed Care
and Non–Managed Care Patients
Managed care patients use the hospital less than patients in indemnity plans. The earliest studies indicated lower hospital utilization
stemming from reductions in admission rates (Luft 1981). Work done
between 1980 and 1993 frequently finds reductions in length of stay as
well. Miller and Luft (1994) reported that HMO hospital admission
rates were lower in 8 of 11 studies that presented evidence on admissions, with the most credible evidence suggesting reductions of 26 percent to 37 percent. They also found shorter lengths of stay in 15 of 16
observations in their study, with the strongest evidence suggesting a
length of stay reduction of 14 percent. Evidence from the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment confirms these results, reporting 40 percent lower inpatient admission rates and total inpatient days among
patients randomized to the HMO arm of the trial (Manning et al. 1984).
The most recent (nonrandomized) evidence, however, produces a less
clear pattern and smaller differences, although there are relatively few
recent results on hospital utilization (Miller and Luft 1997).
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A common goal of managed care plans is to replace relatively
expensive hospital utilization with less expensive outpatient care.
Thus, one might expect to see reductions in hospital use offset by
increases in outpatient visits. Although early evidence tended to support this view (Luft 1981), more recent evidence is not as clear. Miller
and Luft (1994) found higher outpatient utilization among HMO
patients in half of the 14 observations they reviewed, and lower outpatient utilization in the others (although the studies they reviewed with
the strongest data tended to suggest higher or similar outpatient utilization in HMOs). Miller and Luft (1997) reported no overall pattern in
the results of studies done between 1994 and 1997. Evidence from the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment also suggested no differences in
the overall rate of face-to-face visits (Manning et al. 1984).
A wide range of studies suggest that patients enrolled in HMOs are
less likely to get intensive, costly tests and procedures. Miller and
Luft’s two reviews (1994, 1997) included a total of 24 observations on
a range of advanced and frequently expensive services, including treatments associated with childbirth, heart disease, and cancer. They
found less use among HMO patients in 22 of the 24 cases. In most of
these cases the reductions were relatively large: the modal odds ratio
associated with HMO enrollment was about 0.80, indicating that the
odds of receiving the intensive procedure were about 20 percent lower
in HMOs relative to indemnity plans. Some more recent studies confirm these findings. For example, Chernew, Fendrick, and Hirth (1997)
reported lower use of cholecystectomy in HMO patients than indemnity patients at a given point in time.
Interestingly, while many studies report lower use of costly tests
and procedures among HMO patients at a given point in time, some
research suggests that trends over time are similar in and outside of
HMOs (Chernew et al. 1998). For example, Langa and Sussman
(1993) found similar growth between 1983 and 1988 in the use of coronary revascularization among HMO and non-HMO patients, although
HMO patients use the technology less at any given point in time.
Chernew, Fendrick, and Hirth (1997) showed that the change in cholecystectomy use by HMO patients over 1989–1994 was similar to the
change seen in the overall health care system.
Studies also suggest that HMO enrollees are also less likely to get
access to home health care than indemnity patients. Both Miller and
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Luft (1997) and Dudley et al. (1998) identified multiple studies indicating significantly less home health use among HMO patients.
On the other hand, HMO patients are more likely to receive preventive care. Miller and Luft (1994) reported that HMO enrollees consistently receive more preventive tests, including cancer screening,
hypertension screening, and a variety of regular examinations. HMO
enrollees also receive more health promotion activities, like smoking
cessation counseling, than indemnity plan enrollees. Dudley et al.
(1998) confirmed this finding with more recent data. Evidence from
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment also supports this view, finding higher rates of preventive visits among those randomized to the
HMO (Manning et al. 1984).
Comparing Satisfaction for Managed Care
and Non–Managed Care Patients
Along with changes in treatment patterns have come many changes
in the amenities of the health care system. In pursuit of lower costs,
managed care plans have imposed restrictions on patient choice of providers; minimized staff, which has led to shorter visit times and less
opportunity for interaction; and placed more burdens on patients to
navigate increasingly complex systems for obtaining approval for care.
Many patients, along with their doctors, have sought care that was
denied, sometimes for reasons that are difficult to understand. Many
physicians are dissatisfied with the payment rates of managed care
plans. Increasing reliance on gatekeeper physicians and financial
incentives that reward physicians for doing less have undermined
patient trust in physicians, which can color the perceptions of both
patients and physicians. As they have become more prominent, these
kinds of changes have led to widespread anecdotal reports of dissatisfaction and backlash among patients and providers.
Consistent with these reports, studies that assess overall patient
satisfaction almost always find that HMO enrollees are less satisfied
with their plans than enrollees in other types of plans, primarily indemnity or PPO plans (Miller and Luft 1994, 1997; Dudley et al. 1998).
This overall finding is not surprising, but it has two important nuances
that should be noted. First, studies that separately identify satisfaction
with financial and nonfinancial aspects of health plans typically find
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the greatest discontent in nonfinancial areas. HMO enrollees systematically report being less satisfied with things like the technical proficiency of the care they received, their relationships with clinicians, the
amount of time spent with clinicians, and access and availability of
specialists. On the other hand, HMO enrollees are frequently more satisfied with the financial aspects of their plans. Managed care plans frequently require less out-of-pocket spending than indemnity plans with
potentially high deductibles. Managed care plans can also require less
paperwork to handle for insurance reimbursement than indemnity
plans.
Second, studies that focus on lower-income populations, many of
which have joined HMOs under emerging Medicaid managed care programs, frequently find that HMO enrollees are more satisfied with both
financial and nonfinancial aspects of their plans. This may be understandable given that many of these patients are covered by Medicaid,
and fee-for-service Medicaid has historically been very difficult to navigate. Outside of Medicaid, lower-income groups seeking low premiums can end up in high-deductible or other stringent plans that do not
offer much care to enrollees.
Comparing Health Outcomes for Managed Care
and Non–Managed Care Patients
On the whole, the literature on health outcomes fails to find a consistent pattern either for or against HMOs. Studies from the 1980s and
early 1990s tend to suggest equal or better quality of care in HMOs.
Fourteen of 17 observations summarized by Miller and Luft (1994)
showed HMOs to be the same as or better than indemnity plans on a
range of measures, including care for patients with congestive heart
failure, colorectal cancer, diabetes, hypertension, cerebrovascular accident, or chronic problems like joint pain and chest pain. Only a few
observations suggested worse quality of care in HMOs.
But, this pattern disappears in more recent work. Miller and Luft
(1997) reviewed a number of articles that examined outcomes ranging
from mortality to measures of physical functioning among patients
with specific serious health conditions, to more general measures of
patient health applicable to the broad population. Some of the studies
reviewed found better outcomes in HMOs, including studies showing
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HMO enrollees having lower risk of ruptured appendix, lower risk of
dying in the intensive care unit, lower breast cancer mortality, better
stage at diagnosis of cancer, better physical functioning (as measured
by activities of daily living [ADL] and instrumental activities of daily
living [IADL] scales), better glycosylated hemoglobin levels among
diabetics, and better mental health functioning. On the other hand, a
number of studies found worse outcomes in HMOs, including studies
reporting higher mortality rates among breast cancer patients and highrisk newborns, as well as worse physical and mental health functioning
among chronically ill patients and elderly patients. In between, a large
number of studies reported no pattern of different results or a mixture
of findings favorable and unfavorable to HMOs.
Of 35 observations considered by Dudley et al. (1998) comparing
mortality, clinically significant morbidity, and laboratory abnormalities, most found no significant differences between HMOs and indemnity plans. Among the few that did find significant differences, there
was no clear pattern favoring either HMOs or indemnity plans. Dudley
et al. (1998) also reviewed several studies of process of care measures.
Here, although a number of studies found differences between HMOs
and indemnity plans in one direction or another, there was also no clear
pattern favoring one over the other.
This literature supports the general view that there is not a systematic effect of HMOs on outcomes. In particular, there is no clear evidence that population outcomes are systematically worse in HMOs.
That said, though, it is important to note that there are some subgroups
of the population that evidence suggests may be affected. First,
although the literature is not unanimous, there is some evidence that
outcomes are worse among vulnerable populations in HMOs (e.g.,
Ware et al. 1996), which may give rise to concern for their well-being.
Second, there are some particular conditions for which outcomes in
HMOs appear to be worse and others for which outcomes appear to be
better. Drawing the general conclusion that there is no systematic
effect of HMOs based on population-wide evidence from a number of
different conditions implicitly assumes that each of society’s constituent subgroups and all health conditions should carry equal weight in an
overall assessment. But this need not be the case. Society may find it
desirable to put more weight on the health outcomes of some members
of the population, like the socioeconomically disadvantaged, or give
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more weight to those who suffer from some diseases and less to those
who suffer from others. In this case, a thorough evaluation would need
to aggregate results for each population group and condition, weighting
by measures of their significance. Developing a scheme to weight conditions and carrying out such a calculation is beyond the scope of this
chapter and will have to be left for future study.
The fact that the literature does not support the view that outcomes
are systematically worse in managed care plans may be something of a
surprise given the extensive news coverage devoted to the adverse
impacts of managed care on health. But, it is important to remember
that bad things happened to undeserving patients under fee-for-service
too. In some cases, it is likely that this was the result of overprovision
of care encouraged by the financing system, although such events were
rarely reported in the press and were certainly not linked to the health
insurance system in place at the time.
It is interesting to note that the earliest studies suggested better outcomes in HMOs than outside, but this pattern fades with time. One
(although not the only) interpretation of this finding is that the spread
of managed care has influenced treatment patterns throughout the market, leading differences between HMOs and other plans to disappear
over time as the other plans come to more closely resemble HMOs.
Comparing Expenditures for Managed Care
and Non–Managed Care Patients
Studies of expenditures by HMO and indemnity patients frequently
report that expenditures are lower in HMOs. Miller and Luft (1997)
reported that the majority of the studies they reviewed showed lower
total spending on health care for HMO patients than fee-for-service
patients, with spending differences ranging from 16 percent to 34 percent. Earlier data are sparser, but the two studies reviewed by Miller
and Luft (1994) that provided information about total spending
reported spending by HMO enrollees to be 11–13 percent lower than
spending by fee-for-service patients. Note that these expenditures
include spending by the plan on health care received, not the premiums
paid for coverage or other costs. From society’s perspective, expenditures for care are perhaps the more important dimension to consider.
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While most of the evidence available focuses on HMOs, there is
some limited evidence on expenditures for PPO patients, but it ends up
mixed. Smith (1997) suggested that PPO patients have lower expenditures than indemnity patients, but Hosek et al. (1990) found that PPOs
have higher unit costs.

EVIDENCE FROM MARKET LEVEL STUDIES
Additional information about the impacts of managed care is available from studies that compare the performance of the health care system in market areas with high levels of managed care activity and
market areas with lower levels. The approach taken in these kinds of
studies is to classify markets3 based on the overall level of managed
care activity, frequently measured as HMO market share (i.e., the proportion of the population enrolled in an HMO), and then examine differences in the structure of the health care delivery system, treatments,
costs, and outcomes in markets with varying levels of market share.
One important aspect of market level studies is exploration of the
so-called “spillover effects” of managed care, by which the presence of
managed care in an area influences care for patients not enrolled in
managed care plans. This could occur through a variety of mechanisms. Managed care could influence the structure of the health care
delivery system or its capabilities. For example, markets with high levels of managed care activity could end up with more outpatient surgery
centers and fewer MRI machines, which could influence the treatment
options available even to non–managed care patients. The presence of
managed care could also influence the treatment choices of physicians
if managed care plans disseminate information or otherwise influence
physician practice patterns, and this information reaches physicians
who care for non–managed care patients.
Comparing Expenditures among Markets
Expenditures are by far the most common focus of market comparisons (see, e.g., Baker 1997, 1999; Clement et al. 1992; Feldman et al.
1986; Gaskin and Hadley 1997; Noether 1988; McLaughlin 1987,
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1988; Robinson, 1991, 1996; Rodgers and Smith, 1995; Welch, 1994).4
Most of these studies focus on overall expenditures, including expenditures by both managed care and non–managed care patients, but some
include only expenditures by non–managed care patients to explicitly
explore the potential for spillover effects on spending. Many of these
studies focus on in-hospital spending, although some of them examine
broader measures that encompass spending on outpatient and other
care. Using whatever measure, though, these studies by and large
report that overall spending and spending for non–managed care
patients is lower in areas with high levels of market share. In particular, more recent studies clearly suggest that the presence of managed
care in an area reduces overall hospital expenditures and spending for
fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries.
Interpreting the results of these studies is complicated by the fact
that expenditures are the product of price and quantity, so lower expenditures could reflect change in one or the other or both. Some of the
evidence is consistent with the view that treatment patterns have
changed, so that patients in high managed care areas (even non–managed care patients) receive fewer intensive treatments and fewer hospitalizations. Medicare hospital expenditures, for example, should not be
strongly subject to variation in price since the Prospective Payment
System centrally determines prices. Hence, the most natural interpretation of studies that show reductions in Medicare inpatient spending
associated with higher managed care activity (e.g., Baker 1997, 1999;
Clement et al. 1992; Rodgers and Smith 1995) is that practice patterns
have shifted so that patients receive fewer hospitalizations and fewer
intensive tests and procedures. Some direct evidence supports this
finding. Baker et al. (2000b) and Heidenreich et al., (2000) reported
that treatments for fee-for-service Medicare patients who suffered
acute myocardial infarctions varied with the level of area HMO market
share.
Outside of Medicare, it is more plausible that increased managed
care activity led to reductions in the prices charged by hospitals and
other providers, which could contribute to reductions in overall expenditures in some of these studies. Some studies suggest that increased
competition between hospitals can reduce expenditures (Chernew et al.
1998), and that the presence of managed care plans can enhance competition (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Feldman et al. 1990).
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Comparing Infrastructure and Capabilities among Markets
A range of market comparison studies suggest that managed care
can influence the number and types of providers, the capabilities of the
health care system, and the ways in which the system is organized. In
most cases, these studies report that the characteristics of high managed care markets reflect the changes in care patterns that managed
care brings about. Consistent with findings that managed care plans
tend to use hospitals less, Chernew (1995) reported that areas with
higher HMO market share had fewer hospital beds in the mid and late
1980s. Consistent with the view that managed care plans are apt to use
less care overall and refer their patients to specialist physicians less
often, Escarce et al. (1998, 2000) and Polsky et al. (2000) reported that
high managed care areas attract and retain fewer physicians, particularly specialists. Consistent with the fact that managed care plans tend
to selectively contract with a limited number of providers to obtain
many services for their patients, Baker and Brown (1999) reported that
managed care prompted consolidation in the mammography market.
Managed care may also contribute to consolidation in other provider
markets. Burns et al. (2000) reported that physicians and hospitals in
markets with more HMOs (although not higher market share) were
more likely to form alliances between 1993 and 1995 compared to
those in markets with fewer HMOs.
Evidence also supports the view that managed care has slowed the
adoption of many technologies, particularly high-cost, infrastructureintensive new technologies. Baker and Wheeler (1998) and Baker
(forthcoming) suggested that high managed care areas saw slower
adoption of MRI equipment over the 1980s and 1990s. Baker and
Phibbs (2000) suggested that managed care slowed the adoption of
mid-level neonatal intensive care units (NICUs). Cutler and Sheiner
(1998) reported that managed care is associated with slower diffusion
of a range of hospital-based technologies. Cutler and McClellan
(1996) showed that high managed care areas adopted cardiac revascularization services at slower rates between 1984 and 1991. This literature is not unanimous, however. Baker and Spetz (1999) reported no
differences in an index of hospital technologies between higher and
lower managed care areas, and Hill and Wolfe (1997) reported mixed
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effects of managed care on diffusion of a range of technologies in Wisconsin during and after a transition to managed care dominance.
Comparing Health Outcomes among Markets
There is relatively little evidence on outcomes from market comparison studies. The evidence that does exist concurs with that discussed earlier, namely, that there is not a body of work clearly showing
that managed care has systematically worsened outcomes. Baker and
Brown (1999) examined breast cancer stage at diagnosis and mortality
rates in high and low managed care areas and found no significant differences. Baker et al. (2000b) examined mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) patients and also found no significant
differences. Baker and Phibbs (2000) reported that mortality rates for
high-risk newborns were probably improved by managed care–induced
reductions in the diffusion of mid-level NICUs.

AGGREGATE SPENDING PATTERNS SINCE
THE RISE OF MANAGED CARE
Comparisons among plans and among markets suggest that managed care is able to lower expenditures to at least some extent. Another
source of information is the patterns in overall health care spending
over the time period in which managed care has come to play an
important role in the health care system. After rising at an annual rate
of more than 10 percent between 1980 and 1990, annual growth in
spending slowed to a rate of 4–5 percent between 1994 and 1997,5
about the time when managed care had grown to the point where it
could plausibly be a force in U.S. health expenditures. The slowdown
was most pronounced in hospital spending, where annual growth rates
fell to just above 3 percent during this time period, consistent with
research suggesting that managed care has particularly targeted hospital use. Other areas of spending that do not seem to have been as
strong a focus of managed care plans during this period, like prescription drugs, maintained high growth rates.
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More recently, however, rates of increase in spending have picked
up. Figures for 1998, the most current available at the time of this writing, suggest annual growth in total health care spending was higher
than it had been in previous years, although still below the 10 percent
increases seen in the 1980s.

SYNTHESIS: ARE WE BETTER OFF OR NOT?
What can all of this evidence together tell us about the impact managed care has had on society? Existing literature supports the view that
managed care has significantly shifted practice patterns, reducing the
use of the most advanced and intensive treatments and the use of hospitals. These changes appear capable of spilling over to non–managed
care patients, who are also treated differently in places where managed
care is prevalent. Further, changes in treatment patterns and other
incentives accompanying growth in managed care appear to have influenced the structure and capabilities of the medical care system.
There is, however, little evidence that any of these changes have
systematically worsened the health of patients. Evidence does support
the view that some patients with some conditions have worse outcomes
under managed care than fee-for-service, but evidence also suggests
that other patients do better. While managed care has not led to overall
worse health, it has led to increasing dissatisfaction. Patients are
annoyed by a host of factors, including the burdens placed on them in
managed care plans, their perception that health care has become more
impersonal, their perception (not necessarily supported by the evidence) that the health care they are receiving is of lower quality, their
inability to have complete autonomy in the choice of physicians, and
their inability to receive all of the care that they might want, particularly the most advanced and expensive treatments.
At the same time, managed care does seem to have produced some
savings in the form of lower expenditures on health care. While there
is debate about whether or not these savings will persist over time, evidence so far suggests that managed care patients spend less than
indemnity patients, that spending is lower in high managed care areas,
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and that overall U.S. health expenditures grew at slower rates during at
least part of the era of managed care.
If managed care does not bring about changes in the health of the
population, an assessment of its impact on the current utility of the
population depends on the value of the expenditure reductions it produces compared to the value of reduced amenities and satisfaction. At
least to this point, evidence would suggest that the net impact of managed care is that we now purchase less fancy and less satisfying health
care at a cost that is at least somewhat lower. Society’s utility will be
higher under managed care than under the former regime if the value of
the savings outweighs the value of the lost amenities, and it will be
lower if not.
Judging from the public outcry against managed care, it appears
that many Americans are unwilling to accept this trade-off. Public
backlash against managed care is increasingly evident, and it has
prompted numerous regulatory and legislative attempts to inhibit the
ability of managed care organizations to engage in activities that they
have used to manage utilization, like capitation, utilization review, and
restricting choices of providers.
One might wonder, however, about the extent to which the public
reaction reflects the results of careful consideration. Many Americans
believe that they receive their health care for “free” from their employers or from the government; they do not take into account the true costs
of purchasing their health care when they evaluate the costs and benefits of health care proposals. A backlash is understandable when a public is confronted with a reduction in amenities without offsetting
savings that are easily recognized, but it need not imply a reasoned
conclusion that managed care has lowered utility. Furthermore, many
Americans appear to believe that managed care has led to worse health
outcomes, a view for which the currently available empirical evidence
is not strong. The rejection of managed care might be less pronounced
if debate were informed by actual evidence rather than by anecdote and
media reports.
On the other hand, there are many informed consumers in the
United States, and there has been public debate about health care market changes and health reform proposals for a number of years, frequently highlighting the trade-offs between higher costs, utilization,
and amenities. Yet the backlash continues. In some contexts, the
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debate over President Clinton’s health care proposals in 1993 and 1994
was carried out in the framework of a trade-off between encouraging
more restrictive managed care in return for savings that could be put to
other purposes, like covering the uninsured, and it was rejected. Perhaps in the managed care backlash, Americans—at least some of
them—have shown their desire to pay, perhaps in large amounts, to
receive the most advanced and expensive health care in the world, even
if it does not make them truly healthier.
It is not clear how many Americans fall into this latter category. It
is not difficult to believe that much of the managed care bashing
observed today is the result of incomplete information about the true
effects of managed care. Going forward, informed public debate about
the true costs and benefits of managed care could significantly help the
country arrive at a consensus about the most useful set of public policy
steps to take with respect to managed care.
It would be inappropriate to end this discussion without a comment
on the problem of the uninsured. The United States is now, and has for
a long time been, burdened with the fact that our health care financing
system leaves many people without coverage at all, subjecting them to
worse than average health care access and leaving them with much
worse than average health outcomes. The advent of managed care has
done little to change this, either for better or for worse, so it is not truly
a factor in a debate about the impact of managed care on overall utility.
At the same time, one of the early hopes for managed care was reductions in spending and premiums and a true community spirit, which
might have enabled more employers and individuals to purchase health
insurance and contributed to reductions in the rate of uninsurance. In
practice, though, this does not seem to have happened.

ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Beyond the impact managed care has had on the U.S. health care
system up to this point, there are important questions that it raises
about the future development of the health care system. In some ways,
these are potentially more important than questions about the impact of
managed care to date. Managed care has put us on a path toward the
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future that is different from the path we would have been on had we
continued with the traditional fee-for-service system, and these two
paths could easily diverge substantially over the course of time. This
section highlights four important issues that will contribute to determining the destination of the managed care path.
First, what effects will managed care have on the future development of the delivery system? Substantial changes in the number and
types of providers and the capacity of the system could compound over
time and greatly alter the future characteristics of the health care delivery system. One particularly important possibility is that technology
advancement will be inhibited. Areas with high levels of managed care
are less likely to adopt new technologies and equipment. Fewer potential purchasers for new products may mean less effort devoted to developing new products for market. Managed care also appears capable of
influencing the time spent on research. For example, faculty in medical schools have traditionally been an important source of new innovations, but they face increasing pressure in managed care–dominated
environments, which may lead them to devote more time to clinical
activities and less to their research efforts. Moy et al. (1997) and
Campbell et al. (1997) substantiated this possibility, reporting that
increases in managed care activity and competition are associated with
reductions in the number and dollar amount of research awards
obtained by faculty researchers. One of the historical strengths of the
U.S. health care system is the level of innovation and new advances
that have brought great benefits to patients. Reductions in innovation
could have very important implications for overall well-being, albeit in
ways that could be hard to assess since we are unlikely to be able to
identify the things not invented because of managed care.
While managed care could well alter the path of future innovation,
it is important to note that it is unlikely to kill innovation altogether.
Managed care plans are unlikely to discourage all innovations; rather,
they can be expected to focus most intently on those that they perceive
to be cost-ineffective. Managed care may, in fact, substantially reward
new innovations viewed as cost-effective. Managed care plans may be
able to reward these kinds of innovations much more quickly and substantially than the traditional fee-for-service system because of the
influence they can have over utilization decisions. Moreover, managed
care plans have not always been able to cut off the use of new and
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expensive technologies that patients strongly demand (even when they
have tried to do so, patients have frequently been able to turn to either
the courts or the press to gain coverage of new treatments), making it
far from clear that markets for new innovations will dry up under managed care. A survey conducted by Weisbrod and LaMay (1999), in
fact, reported that managers of firms involved in research and development do not view managed care as reducing their inclination to conduct
research on advanced and expensive new technologies, particularly
those that hold the greatest prospects for substantial improvements in
medical capabilities.
Beyond technology development, managed care could also alter
the future development of other aspects of the delivery system. For
example, existing evidence suggests that managed care plans tend to
use the intensive services provided by specialists less than indemnity
plans, and cross-market comparisons report that areas with high levels
of managed care have fewer specialist physicians. Growth in managed
care has also fueled powerful discontent among physicians. This suggests the potential for managed care to reduce the number of candidates for medical school, particularly the number of students
interested in pursuing specialized career paths, which could leave the
future health care system with a very different mix of providers than
we currently have and influence the future of patient care.
A second key question with respect to the future impact of managed care is the extent to which costs will be lower. Evidence up until
now suggests that managed care has lowered costs at least somewhat.
However, this may only consist of one-time savings obtained by
squeezing inefficiencies out of the health care system without fundamentally changing the growth path of expenditures. On the other hand,
the savings seen so far could reflect a persistent lowering of the future
trajectory of expenditures. The dollar difference between these two
scenarios is large. If health expenditures continue growing at 3–5 percent per year instead of 10 percent, the accrued savings over time
would be much larger than if we return immediately to 10 percent
growth rates after having lower growth for four or five years in the mid
1990s.
It is difficult to assess the direction in which costs are likely to go.
On one hand, overall spending rose faster between 1997 and 1998 than
it had during the preceding three years, consistent with the suspicion
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that at least some of the savings obtained in the mid 1990s were the
results of one-time savings, and that cost growth is tending toward a
return to its former high level. On the other hand, the consensus view
among economists is that technology growth is the leading driver of
increasing health care costs (Fuchs 1996), accounting for as much as
half of the rise in expenditures in recent decades (Newhouse 1992;
Chernew et al. 1998). As noted above, evidence suggests that managed
care can somewhat slow the adoption of new technologies, although
the extent to which this will persist is not clear.
A third issue is the extent to which the preferences of the population will evolve. While the U.S. population now appears to strongly
value the amenities to which they have become accustomed, preferences could change over time. Patients in the United States may adapt
their expectations to managed care and become less concerned about
reductions in amenities once they are not so recent in memory. Growth
in managed care and increases in the availability of information about
objective quality of care may also lead people to place greater value on
actual quality and health outcomes than on amenities, which may now
be valued in part because there is little other information available on
which to base judgements.
Finally, the impact of managed care in the future depends on the
characteristics of managed care in the future. The current public backlash against managed care has led many managed care organizations to
voluntarily allow more freedom in choosing a provider and impose less
oversight on physician decision making. Numerous legislative and
regulatory activities aim to further limit the ability of managed care
organizations to engage in the practices they have relied upon in the
past to manage care. One plausible outcome of this is a weakening of
the most aggressive managed care plans and a corresponding return
toward previous cost and care trends, for better or worse, over the long
run.
Only time will tell, but one can hope that clear discussions among
policymakers and the public can help bring about a well-informed consensus about the importance of health, amenities, and health care
spending that can guide efforts to improve our health care system as we
go forward.
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Notes
1. The Luft (1981), Miller and Luft (1994, 1997), and Dudley et al. (1998) reviews
make explicit attempts to include only studies meeting certain quality standards,
including passing peer review and having included reasonable attempts to control
for confounding differences in patient samples.
2. The sets of studies reviewed in these articles are not completely independent.
Although there is no overlap between the two Miller and Luft reviews, both Glied
(2000) and Dudley et al. (1998) to a large extent overlap the Miller and Luft
(1994, 1997) reviews.
3. Cities, defined by the set of Metropolitan Statistical Areas, are the most common
unit of analysis, although others are sometimes used (e.g., states or counties).
4. Some additional studies report evidence on premiums (e.g., Baker and Corts
1996; Feldman, Dowd, and Gifford 1993; Wickizer and Feldstein 1995; Goldberg
and Greenberg 1979; Baker et al. 2000a; Hill and Wolfe 1997). Some of this work
suggests that managed care premiums are lower, or that overall premiums are
lower in areas with more managed care, although it is not unanimous. This tends
to corroborate evidence suggesting lower overall expenditures, but since premiums can be influenced by cost shifting and other peculiarities of the insurance
market, this evidence is not as valuable as evidence on expenditures when assessing the impacts on the overall well-being of society.
5. Expenditure data are from the Health Care Financing Administration’s Web site:
www.hcfa.gov.
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The United States is alone among major industrialized nations in
not having a universal guarantee of insurance coverage for its citizens.
As a result, over 43 million Americans are currently uninsured, including over 10 million children. But this large uncovered population
should not be taken to indicate that the U.S. government does not intervene in the market for health insurance to help those unable to obtain
coverage. On the contrary, the single fastest growing federal entitlement program over the past decade is the Medicaid program, which
provides health insurance coverage for low-income populations. In
1988, federal Medicaid expenditures were $54 billion; by 1998, expenditures had grown by almost 400 percent to $184 billion. But over this
same period, the fraction of the non-elderly population without insurance coverage actually rose by almost 20 percent.1
The fact that this rapid growth in the Medicaid program has not
checked the growth in the uninsured highlights the limitations of current public insurance policy as a means of guaranteeing universal
access to the health care system. However, with universal coverage
effectively erased from the policy horizon, partial solutions to the
accessibility problem (such as the Medicaid program) are likely to be
the alternative of choice for dealing with this problem in the near
future. Indeed, since the failure of President Clinton’s ambitious health
insurance reform plan, government policy in this area has focused on
incremental reforms. The two most important reforms of the past five
years have been the expansion of public health insurance for children
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through the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and regulatory reforms of the private health insurance market through the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Recently,
attention has turned to a third option—expanding tax subsidies for
health insurance coverage.
In this chapter I will review the important health policy issues
involved with different incremental routes to coverage of the uninsured
in the United States. Then, after reviewing the facts about insurance
coverage in the United States, I discuss what we have learned from the
past 15 years of expansion of the Medicaid program, our traditional
source of insurance coverage for indigent populations. The “Policy
Directions” section contains a detailed analysis of the alternative directions that might be taken in expanding health insurance coverage in the
United States: expanding the public insurance safety net up the income
scale, filling in the gaps in the existing public insurance safety net,
reforming the insurance market to increase access to private market
policies, expanding limited mandates on employers, and using tax subsidies to induce expanded private coverage. The final section provides
a brief summary.

INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
While the elderly population is almost universally covered by the
Medicare program, there are five primary insurance categories for the
U.S. non-elderly population. These categories and how they have
changed over time are shown in Table 1. The primary insurance category is coverage through the workplace, through which 64 percent of
the non-elderly population obtain insurance coverage. Another 7 percent of the population obtains insurance coverage through other private
insurance, primarily purchased in the nongroup insurance market. The
primary remaining source of insurance coverage is the Medicaid program, which covers 11 percent of the non-elderly population; another 5
percent are covered by other sources of public insurance.
The final category is the uninsured. There are over 43 million
uninsured, representing over 18 percent of the non-elderly population.
Despite expansions in the Medicaid program, this figure has grown sig-
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Table 1 Sources of Insurance Coverage for the Non-Elderly Population
1987
Sources of coverage

Number
(millions)

1997
%

Number
(millions)

%

Total private coverage

162.8

75.9

167.5

70.9

Employment-based

148.5

69.2

151.7

64.2

Own

72.5

33.8

77.4

32.8

Dependent

75.9

35.4

74.3

31.5

Other private

14.3

6.7

15.8

6.7

Medicare

11.6

5.4

11.3

4.8

Medicaid

18.4

8.6

26.0

11.0

No health insurance

31.8

14.8

43.1

18.3

214.4

100

236.2

100

Total near-elderly
population

nificantly over the past decade because private insurance coverage has
declined more rapidly than Medicaid has grown. It is this precipitous
decline in employer-provided insurance coverage that provides the
backdrop for thinking about new public efforts to cover the uninsured.
Who are the uninsured? Their characteristics are explored in Table
2. Almost 11 million of the uninsured are children. Importantly, the
majority (almost 60 percent) of the uninsured are in families where the
head of the family is a full-time, full-year worker, and another quarter
are in families where there is part-time or part-year work. This fact has
motivated continued efforts to increase insurance coverage through the
expansion of employer-provided insurance. Interestingly, while the
uninsured are poorer than average, they are not all poor; almost 40 percent of the uninsured have incomes over $30,000 per year. At the same
time, the percentage of the income group that is uninsured falls sharply
with income, from 43 percent under $5,000 of income to only 8 percent
above $50,000 of income.
Why do we care if individuals are uninsured, more, say, than we
are concerned about individuals simply being poor? Most directly,
public concern about the uninsured derives from consideration of
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Table 2 Characteristics of the Uninsured
Number
(millions)

% of total
uninsured

% within
category

Total

43.1

100

100

Child

10.7

24.9

15.0

Adult worker

24.6

57.0

18.2

7.8

18.1

26.2

Family head is full-time, full-year

25.7

59.5

14.6

Family head is part-time/part-year

10.5

24.4

29.7

6.9

16.1

28.4

Under $5,000

5.0

11.6

42.8

$5,000–$9,999

3.8

8.7

28.8

$10,000–$14,999

5.4

12.4

37.0

$15,000–$19,999

4.7

10.8

32.6

$20,000–$29,999

7.7

17.9

26.6

$30,000–$39,999

5.1

11.8

18.2

$40,000–$49,999

3.7

8.5

14.4

$50,000 +

7.8

18.2

7.8

Characteristic

Adult nonworker

Family head is nonworker
Family income

health insurance as a merit good, with intrinsic value beyond income.
There is a general assumption that it is important for individuals to
have insurance to maintain their health status. However, many economists emphasize that medical care may actually be of limited relevance
for health, relative to the other behavioral and environmental factors
that affect the health of low-income persons. So, an important and
open question is whether providing more insurance coverage would
actually improve the health of our population.
More indirectly, the uninsured impose real burdens, or “externalities,” on those with insurance. This can occur most directly through
communicable disease; if individuals without insurance forego vaccinations, for example, it can worsen the health of everyone. It can also
occur indirectly, through financial channels. For example, hospitals
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pay over $15 billion dollars per year in “uncompensated care,” primarily to the uninsured, for which they receive no reimbursement. Covering the uninsured would save these costs to the rest of society.
Finally, and potentially most importantly in economic terms, the
prospect of becoming uninsured may have large productivity costs, as
individuals with insurance are afraid to leave their jobs for fear of losing that insurance. This “job lock” has been shown to be a quantitatively important phenomenon by economists, with estimates that
suggest that the fear of losing health insurance may lower mobility by
as much as 25 percent. If individuals are locked into low-productivity
positions with health insurance, it is a real loss in the value of output
for the U.S. economy, and its financial implications may dwarf the $15
billion in uncompensated care noted above. More complete insurance
coverage could alleviate this job lock.

MEDICAID POLICY
The primary public intervention in insurance markets for the nonelderly in the United States is the Medicaid program. At the outset, it
is important to highlight that Medicaid is a program that serves three
distinct populations: low-income women and children, the low-income
disabled, and the low-income elderly, particularly nursing home residents. Spending is split roughly evenly between these three groups. In
this chapter, I will focus on the first of these groups, women and children, since I am concentrating on health insurance coverage, and the
elderly and the disabled are primarily covered by the Medicare program for their medical expenditures.
Historically, Medicaid eligibility for women and children has been
tied to participation in the Aid for Families with Dependent Children
program (AFDC). This linkage with AFDC restricted access to the
program to low-income single mothers, in some cases very low
income. For example, the income cutoff for eligibility for a family of
four in South Carolina in 1984 was only 29 percent of the poverty line.
Beginning in 1984, and particularly after 1987, the program began to
expand eligibility for all children and pregnant women; that is, these
expansions applied only to the expenses of pregnancy for women. By
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1992, states were required to cover all pregnant women and children
under the age of six up to 133 percent of poverty (independent of family composition), and were allowed to expand coverage up to 185 percent of poverty. In addition, children born after September 30, 1983,
were mandatorily covered up to 100 percent of poverty (once again
independent of family composition).
On top of these federal mandates was a host of state actions to
expand coverage, both at a faster pace and to a broader range of children than is provided for by federal legislation. For example, children
in Texas saw a 28 percentage-point increase in their eligibility for Medicaid between 1984 and 1992, while eligibility for children in Wisconsin actually declined by 4 percent (Gruber 1997).
How Does Medicaid Affect Health?
Ultimately, the question of interest for policymakers is how these
policy changes impacted the health of the low-income population, and
at what cost. To understand the effects of Medicaid policy on health,
however, it is important to trace through the channels by which
changes at the legislative level are translated to actual health improvements.
The process by which Medicaid determines health is depicted in
Figure 1. The first step in evaluating the effect of Medicaid policy
changes on outcomes of interest, such as health, is to examine the
effects on the eligibility of persons for the Medicaid program. The
next step is the translation of Medicaid eligibility into Medicaid coverage. An important general feature of social insurance programs is that
individuals do not always take up the benefits for which they are eligible. Previous research has found that only about two-thirds of those
eligible for the unemployment insurance, AFDC, and food stamps programs take up their benefits.2
The previously uninsured are not the only group that takes up benefits, however. In fact, two-thirds of those made eligible for the expansions actually had private insurance already. Some of those individuals
will find it attractive to drop that private insurance and join the Medicaid program. Along some dimensions, Medicaid is a much more generous plan than most private policies, since it has no co-payments,
covers prescription drugs, and often covers optional services such as
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Figure 1 Medicaid Eligibility Policy

SOURCE: Gruber (2000).
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dental care. In contrast, under the typical private insurance policy,
individuals pay one-third of their total medical costs out of pocket, in
the form of co-payments, deductibles, and premium-sharing.
Moreover, once covered by Medicaid, individuals will not automatically increase their utilization of medical care. Many physicians
do not treat publicly insured patients, possibly because public insurance programs generally reimburse at rates far below private fee levels.
A number of observers have alleged that there is a shortfall in the supply of physicians willing to serve Medicaid patients. The American
Medical Association (1991) reported that 26 percent of physicians
described themselves as “nonparticipants” in the Medicaid program,
and only 34 percent reported that they participated “fully” and were
accepting new Medicaid patients. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that many of the patients who would be made eligible for public
insurance are concentrated in areas that are underserved by physicians.3
Finally, increases in the utilization of care will not necessarily
improve child health—for example, a number of studies suggest that
much of the acute care received by children is inappropriate and may
have little health benefit. Kemper (1988), for example, found that 21
percent of pediatric hospitalization days were of “doubtful necessity,”
and that this percentage is higher for insured than for uninsured children. And, as noted above, the relevance of medical care for health is
not yet firmly established in many domains, particularly for children.
Whether or not increases in utilization improve health outcomes,
there is a definite link between increased utilization and increases in
Medicaid program costs. Thus, the final step in assessing the efficacy
of Medicaid policy is to compare the costs of utilization increases to
any health benefits, to compute the cost-effectiveness of eligibility
increases.
What Have We Learned from the Medicaid Expansions?
As I have noted, Medicaid has expanded dramatically over the past
15 years, and it has done so at a very differential pace across the United
States. This variation across the states has provided a “natural laboratory” for studying the impacts of Medicaid on insurance coverage,
health utilization, and health outcomes. A large number of studies have
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examined the various links in Figure 1, with several important conclusions.
First, the Medicaid expansions tremendously increased the eligibility of low-income women and children for health insurance coverage.
Figure 2 shows the growth in eligibility for health insurance coverage
under Medicaid for children and for pregnant women. For both
groups, there is a gradual increase in eligibility from 1984 through
1987, and a much more rapid increase thereafter; these correspond to
the two eras denoted above. By 1992, almost one-half of all women
were eligible for Medicaid for the expenses of pregnancy, and almost
one-third of children aged 0–14 were eligible for all of their medical
spending.
Second, the rate at which this new Medicaid eligibility was translated to new Medicaid coverage is quite low. Estimates of the take-up
rate, or the increase in coverage among those made eligible, are
approximately 25 percent, suggesting that three-quarters of those made
eligible by the expansions did not take up coverage. This fact is confirmed by Figure 3, which shows time-series data on coverage for children and women of child-bearing age. While both series rise steeply,
the increase is much less than that of eligibility; moreover, much of the
rise after 1989 is due to the recession, not eligibility policy.
Third, one reason for this low take-up is that two-thirds of those
made eligible for the expansions already had private health insurance
coverage. The fact that such a large share of the newly eligible population under the Medicaid expansions had access to private insurance
raises the prospect that many of the new enrollees on the program may
have been “crowded out” of private insurance purchases. The timeseries evidence on insurance coverage in the United States would seem
to confirm the crowd-out hypothesis; there is a remarkable time-series
correlation between Medicaid coverage and private insurance coverage
over this period.
A number of careful econometric studies have considered the magnitude of crowd-out, in terms of the change in private insurance coverage due to Medicaid policy, relative to the increase in the Medicaid
rolls.4 Virtually all of these studies have concluded that crowd-out is
significant, with estimates as high as 50 percent; that is, for every two
persons who joined the Medicaid rolls, one person is losing private
health insurance.
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Figure 2 Medicaid Eligibility of Women and Children
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Fourth, despite the fact that only some of those joining Medicaid
were formerly uninsured, there is a noticeable improvement in utilization of health services. Studies have found significant increases in utilization of first trimester prenatal care by mothers who became eligible
for Medicaid, and in the utilization of preventive physician visits by
children who became eligible (Currie and Gruber 1996a,b). For example, Currie and Gruber found that children made eligible for Medicaid
saw a 50 percent reduction in the likelihood of going a full year without a doctor’s visit.
Fifth, these increases in utilization were translated to improved
health. The primary focus of studies in this area has been on mortality,
which is an easily measured and interpreted, albeit extreme, measure of
health. Studies have found that the expansions of Medicaid led to an
8.5 percent decline in infant mortality, and a 5.1 percent decline in child
mortality (Currie and Gruber 1996a,b). These are significant effects.
Finally, these expansions did significantly increase the costs of
the Medicaid program, as would be expected given increased enrollment and utilization. Given the impact on infant mortality, and the
associated increased costs, the expansions were associated with a cost
on the order of $2 million per life saved. Is this figure large or small?
Relative to the promised cost savings by those who advocate increased insurance and preventive care, this figure is quite large. However, relative to either the economics literature on individual revelations of the value of their life through choices (such as purchases of
safety equipment or taking risky jobs, which implies a value of $4–$7
million) or to the cost per life saved through other government programs (such as safety regulations for cars and busses, which can cost
upwards of $1 billion per life saved) this seems like a reasonable
investment.

POLICY DIRECTIONS
Given the failure of the Medicaid expansions to check the growth
of the uninsured in the United States, there is considerable interest in
alternative policy directions for expanding insurance coverage. The
major attempted reform of recent years was the Health Security Act
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(HSA) initiative of the Clinton Administration in 1994, which proposed through employer mandate and expanded public subsidies to
move toward universal coverage of the population. In the wake of the
spectacular defeat of this effort, more incremental reforms have proceeded in recent years, at both the federal and state level. In this section, I will review alternative approaches to this problem, and consider
their pros and cons from a health economics perspective.
Guiding Principle: Efficiency
When thinking about policy alternatives, it is important to recognize that any new spending on insurance expansions will be limited in
the current budgetary climate. That makes it critical to focus on the
efficiency of new spending, or the bang-for-the-buck. That is, for any
program, it is imperative to consider how many individuals will gain
insurance coverage on net, relative to the amount spent. The crowd-out
discussion in the previous section points out that this is not a trivial
issue. The more that public dollars are spent on populations that
already have insurance, the more that the take-up of these public programs is likely to be among those who already have insurance.
At the same time, the bulk of the uninsured reside in working,
lower-middle income households, and the vast majority of these households do have health insurance. So if serious inroads are to be made on
the uninsured, the issue of crowd-out cannot be avoided and must be
addressed head-on. This suggests that policy be designed in a manner
that minimizes the appeal of any public subsidies to those who already
have health insurance, while still making the program attractive to
those who don’t.
Further Expansions of Public Insurance up the Income Scale
One straightforward alternative for increasing insurance coverage
is to continue to expand our public insurance safety net. This was the
approach taken by the recent Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP), enacted by Congress as part of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997. This program provides roughly $5 billion per year in matching
funds for states to expand health insurance coverage for children
beyond the eligibility provided for by existing Medicaid programs.
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States can use these funds to either expand the traditional Medicaid
program or to create a new program that meets certain criteria but is
more flexible than Medicaid along some dimensions. For example,
under alternative programs there is more flexibility about the benefits
package covered and more freedom to charge premiums and co-payments to enrollees. Initially, many states have focused on Medicaid
expansions, but more and more appear to be turning to alternative program structures to circumvent some of the restrictions of the Medicaid
program.
The problem with this approach is that the CHIP program will be
spending its dollars primarily on those children around 200 percent of
poverty, a population that is already heavily privately insured. For
example, among those children between 200 and 250 percent of poverty, only 14 percent are uninsured and almost 80 percent already have
private health insurance. This raises the prospect of significant crowdout with the CHIP expansions, and little new coverage as a result.
On the other hand, the flexibilities built into CHIP are likely to
help mitigate crowd-out. By making the benefits package less generous than Medicaid, and by introducing premiums and co-payments for
services, state CHIP programs make it less attractive to drop one’s private health insurance to join the public program. Clearly, as public
insurance is expanded further and further up the income scale, given
the strong correlation between income and private insurance coverage,
more and more limitation of this form is called for.
An important priority for research is to assess whether the flexibilities in CHIP have a real impact on crowd-out. Some causal evidence
suggests that they might. Two states that introduced nontrivial premiums into their Medicaid programs (Minnesota and Florida) have seen
relatively low levels of crowd-out, less than 10 percent in each case.
While this evidence is only suggestive, it does highlight the potential
importance of making the program less attractive as it is expanded up
the income scale.
Outreach
While expansions of insurance up the income scale seems an obvious way to reach more uninsured, the CHIP legislation largely ignored
a needier and more obvious population: those who are already eligible
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for Medicaid but don’t take it up. Indeed, most estimates suggest that
there are on the order of four million children who are eligible for
Medicaid but don’t take up coverage. Moreover, while most women
who are eligible for coverage of birthing expenses are signed up for
that coverage by hospitals, there is tremendous underuse of prenatal
care services by women who are eligible for Medicaid but don’t use it
to cover those services. The reasons for this limited take-up are
unclear and reflect some mix of poor information about eligibility and
stigma about enrollment in a public insurance program.
Regardless of the cause, however, this is a very high bang-for-thebuck population. Of those children not on Medicaid already but with
incomes below 150 percent of the poverty line, 53 percent are uninsured. This suggests that the highest priority for government policy is
to expand coverage of this group through outreach initiatives, even if
they are somewhat costly. In other words, in thinking about expanding
insurance coverage in the low-income population, it is probably best to
think about filling the cup from the bottom: start by maximizing the
coverage of the lowest-income population with few other insurance
alternatives, and then move to higher-income groups that often have
access to private coverage.
Other Demographic Groups
For largely political reasons, the expansions of health insurance
through both Medicaid and CHIP have focused on children and pregnant women. Yet there is little coherent argument for covering an 18year-old woman up to 200 percent of poverty, while a 19-year-old
woman receives no public coverage unless she is pregnant or on welfare. This is particularly true given the low use of prenatal care by
lower-income women; if they had continuous insurance coverage, they
would perhaps be more likely to seek care as soon as they got pregnant.
One particularly helpful proposal that has been discussed is to
extend coverage to the parents of Medicaid and CHIP children. This
would have the additional advantage of increasing take-up by the children, because once the parents are eligible it might increase their
awareness of the entire family’s entitlement.
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Insurance Market Reforms
The problem with any public insurance expansion in today’s budgetary climate is that funding is likely to be extremely limited. As a
result, much attention has been paid to insurance market reforms as a
means of expanding coverage. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) attempted to address one perceived cause
of uninsurance in the United States, which was practices of private
insurers that made the individual insurance market an unattractive
place to purchase insurance. In particular, this bill mandated that private insurers permit the conversion of group policies to individual coverage, so that high-cost individuals who were leaving their jobs could
continue to access insurance. It also set limits on the applicability of
preexisting conditions exclusions, and it guaranteed that small groups
who applied for insurance would be offered coverage.
In principle, these types of reforms are an alternative means of
expanding coverage with little public cost. However, while the evidence thus far is limited, it suggests that these reforms have had little
effect, primarily because insurers have an easy means of circumventing
these restrictions: raising prices, which are not federally regulated.
At the same time, a number of states have been passing similar and
often more expansive private insurance market regulations. In addition
to the types of features noted above, states are experimenting with
price regulation that is designed to deal with the primary problem facing HIPAA, primarily for small firms and to a lesser extent for individuals. A number of states have mandated that prices stay within certain
bands, so that the highest-cost firm or individual cannot be charged
more than the lowest-cost firm or individual. Some states have even
gone so far as to mandate community rating, whereby all firms or individuals in certain categories must be charged the same price.
The evidence on the impact of these state regulations is once again
limited. But one recent provocative study suggests that these policies
have increased access for the most costly populations at the expense of
the least costly: insurance coverage has risen for older and higher-cost
workers but has fallen more for younger and lower-cost workers, for a
net reduction in insurance coverage. This would be consistent with an
insurer reaction to these regulations of raising all premiums while making them uniform, in order to ensure the profitability of insurance.
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Thus, the experience of both HIPAA and state regulations suggests
the substantial limits of insurance market reform as a mechanism for
expanding insurance coverage. While the evidence thus far is limited,
there is certainly no suggestion that these reforms are dramatically, or
even modestly, increasing insurance coverage, and they may in fact be
having perverse effects on coverage.
Mandates
Another route of somewhat limited public intervention is targeted
mandates on employers, at a level much more modest than the major
mandates envisioned by the Health Security Act. The most important
existing federal and state mandates on employers related to insurance
coverage are the “continuation of coverage” mandates that were passed
by a number of states starting in the 1970s, and then by the federal government in 1986. These laws stipulate that employers must allow their
employees to continue to purchase insurance at group prices, which are
generally much lower than nongroup costs, for a period of time (18
months by federal law) after leaving a job. This is a valuable benefit
for employees who are losing jobs or moving to new positions without
health insurance, as it allows them to tap into the much more efficient
group market rather than face the high prices and often discriminatory
practices of the individual insurance market.
A number of studies have suggested that these types of continuation policies have been a success in raising insurance coverage significantly among job leavers, particularly among those who don’t move
immediately into a new job with insurance. These studies have found
that continuation coverage also had the collateral benefit of loosening
“job lock” by allowing individuals a source of modestly priced coverage when they wanted to move from low- to high-productivity positions. Moreover, there is no evidence that these mandates have been
particularly onerous to employers; for example, there has been no
effect of the mandates on employers’ propensity to offer insurance.
These studies suggest that there could be value in further extending
continuation coverage; for example, by subsidizing the costs of group
policies for those leaving their jobs, and by making this insurance
available for a longer period of time.
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Tax Policy
The final type of alternative to be considered is tax subsidies. Currently, health insurance purchases are subsidized for two groups:
employees and the self-employed. Employee costs are subsidized
through the exclusion of employer-paid health insurance premiums
(and some employee-paid premiums as well) from an individual’s taxable income. This subsidy is currently estimated to cost over $100 billion per year in foregone revenues to the federal government (Sheils
and Hogan 1999). The costs of the self-employed have been partially
subsidized since 1986; currently 60 percent of the health insurance
costs of the self-employed can be deducted from taxable income, and
this share will rise to 100 percent by 2003 (Meyer, Silow-Carroll, and
Wicks 1999).
This system of tax subsidies leaves three groups without tax subsidies for the purchase of health insurance:
• those who work for firms that do not offer health insurance,
• those who are not employees nor self-employed, such as the
unemployed or early retirees (before the age of Medicare eligibility), and
• those who work for firms that do not offer a Section 125 plan
(i.e., a “cafeteria plan”) that allows employees to contribute the
employees’ share of health insurance premiums on a pretax basis.
Each of these holes represents a significant population. Roughly
15 percent of the non-elderly population is at a point in time not eligible for a tax subsidy to health insurance, and roughly 21 percent of
insurance spending among those who are insured is not tax subsidized.5
As a result, a string of recent proposals have considered expanding
in one way or another the tax deductibility of health insurance. In its
most ambitious form, some of these proposals would end the employer
tax exclusion and introduce unlimited individual tax exclusions in its
place. However, most of the proposed legislation in this area has suggested more limited (although still potentially quite costly) interventions, usually in the form of limited credits or deductions toward the
purchase of health insurance. Even within this framework, however,
there is considerable variation in the details of the policies proposed,
along dimensions such as the generosity of the credit, the income
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ranges to which it would apply, and the potential pool of people eligible.
I have built a detailed simulation model to analyze the impact of
tax policy alternatives (Gruber 2000), and there are two important lessons from this analysis for using tax policy to cover the uninsured.
First, even expansive tax policies cannot cover a very sizeable fraction
of the uninsured. For example, I estimate that a policy that provided a
$2,000 credit for single persons and a $4,000 credit for families for the
purchase of nongroup insurance will cost almost $35 billion dollars per
year, a sum that almost certainly exceeds congressional willingness to
spend money to address this issue but would cover only about 5.5 million uninsured, or less than one-seventh of the uninsured population.
Second, there is an inverse relationship between the generosity of
policies and their efficiency. For example, a credit that is one-quarter
as generous as that described above would cost only $1.4 billion per
year, and would cover almost one million uninsured. This is a cost of
only $1,550 per person who gains insurance, compared to a cost of
over $6,200 per person who gains insurance with the more expansive
credit. This is because as the credit is made more generous, targeting is
worse. More generous credits are taken up extensively by both those
who already have nongroup insurance, so that we are just paying their
costs, or those who have group insurance and are paying some costs,
and so would rather switch to highly subsidized nongroup insurance (a
crowd-out-type effect). Thus, we see the same problem that we saw
with public insurance expansions: as policy attempts to get more generous, it faces larger crowd-out problems and declining efficiency of
public spending.

CONCLUSIONS—WHERE DO WE GO?
The sizeable growth of the uninsured population in the face of the
robust economy of the past six years is striking and disturbing. It suggests that we cannot count on standard economic forces to simply solve
this problem, and that serious reductions in the number of uninsured
may require more dramatic government intervention. The experience
of the Medicaid expansions suggests that government intervention can
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work to improve the health of low-income populations, but that as this
intervention is expanded farther, the cost of further reductions in the
uninsured population may be quite steep.
It seems clear that the first policies the government should pursue
are bottom-of-the-cup policies that target those groups which generally
have little other recourse to insurance. One clear group in this category
is the up to seven million children currently eligible for, but not
enrolled in, public insurance. Another such group may be very lowincome adults who have been excluded from the dramatic increases in
insurance eligibility of the past decade and a half. These are groups
that are primarily uninsured and for which the bang-for-the-buck
would be highest for new government health insurance expenditures.
Beyond this, society must recognize the high costs of additional
reductions in the number of uninsured. These costs can be minimized
through public insurance expansions, which are relatively unattractive
to those with private insurance today, such as by adding premiums or
restricting benefits. Tax policy remains a viable option, but it is difficult to design a tax policy that has a very large impact at a modest cost.
Tax subsidies are likely to be most useful as part of a larger package,
rather than as a stand-alone solution.
In conclusion, the economics profession has a lot to add to the
debate over health insurance coverage. We have provided clear evidence that health insurance coverage expansions can improve health,
but that costs can be high due to insurance crowd-out. And economic
principles of efficiency deliver a quite clear message for the first priorities for new public spending on health insurance coverage: start with
the groups that are most in need of insurance coverage. If policymakers heed these lessons, we can efficiently move toward reducing the
burden of uninsurance in the United States today.

Notes
1. Data on Medicaid spending from U.S. Congress Committee on Ways and Means
(1998); data on insurance coverage from Employee Benefit Research Institute
(1999).
2. Blank and Card (1991) estimated that takeup of unemployment insurance benefits
only about two-thirds, and Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimated similar takeup for
AFDC and food stamps.
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3. For example, Fossett et al. (1992) compared Chicago neighborhoods with 50 percent of the population on welfare to neighborhoods with 10 percent of the population on welfare and found that there were twice as many physicians practicing in
the wealthier areas (on a per child basis).
4. See, for example, Cutler and Gruber (1996) Dubay and Kenney (1997), Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton (2000), and Rask and Rask (2000).
5. Author’s tabulations from the March 1997 Current Population Survey.
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Health Insurance
and the Labor Market
Brigitte Madrian
University of Chicago

The system of health insurance and health care delivery in the
United States is very much like a patchwork quilt, one pieced together
from scraps of cloth of different shapes, sizes, patterns, and textures,
and colors. Like the quilt, we have a patchworked array of insuranceproviding institutions in the United States, each covering a different
segment of the population, and each with its own idiosyncratic rules—
its differences in shape, size, pattern, texture, and color, if you will.
There are
• the Medicare part A and B pieces that cover those over age 65 and
the disabled under age 65;
• the Medigap pieces that provide additional coverage to the elderly, beyond that available through Medicare;
• the various state Medicaid pieces covering those who are or who
have recently been on welfare, or those whose incomes are sufficiently low;
• the myriad of employment-related health insurance pieces, covering many but not all employees, along with their spouses and
dependents;
• the employment-based retiree health insurance pieces, covering
the former employees of companies, those who have since
retired; and
• the pieces that cover students attending various universities
throughout the country and elsewhere.
And then there is the backdrop, the part of the quilt that generally goes
unnoticed: the uninsured individuals who are not covered by any of the
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other insurance pieces and who must pay for their medical expenditures out of pocket or receive uncompensated care.
The analogy can only be taken so far, however. The patchwork
quilt evokes images of warmth, love, home and hearth, hot cocoa, a
crackling fire at a cabin in the woods. In contrast, the patchwork U.S.
health insurance system is more likely to evoke images of frustration,
hassle, red tape, paperwork, and annoying voice-automated telephone
response systems. The patchwork quilt is not a perfect metaphor, but it
is a good one.
There are many important economic implications associated with
the fragmented, patchwork system of health insurance coverage that
we have in the United States. This chapter focuses on one of these economic implications, namely, the relationship between the various institutions that provide health insurance in the United States, and the labor
market decisions made by individuals and employers. More than twothirds of the gross domestic product in the United States is derived
from the labor market—the labor services of individuals employed in
producing goods and services in the economy. Distortions in the efficient operation of the labor market can thus have a tremendous effect
not only on the welfare of specific individuals, but on the economy as a
whole.
But what is the link between health insurance and the labor market? Why is this even a concern? The link derives from the characteristics of the pieces in the patchwork quilt. Many of the insuranceproviding institutions in the United States, the pieces of the patchwork
quilt, have some connection, either directly or indirectly, to the
employment status of individuals. The idiosyncratic relationships
between the labor market and the types of health insurance coverage
that are available to individuals affects the labor market behavior of
both individuals and firms in some very interesting and economically
important ways.
Before analyzing the labor market effects of health insurance in the
United States, it is important to more closely examine the pieces of the
quilt—the various health insurance institutions—and how they are tied
to the labor market.
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HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
By far the most significant piece of the quilt, at least in terms of
magnitude, is employer-provided health insurance coverage. This
employee benefit provides health insurance to 64 percent of the nonelderly U.S. population. Some of these individuals, about half, receive
this coverage by virtue of their own employment, while the rest receive
it as dependents of a spouse or parent who works. In addition, some
employers provide so-called “retiree” health insurance to former
employees who have retired. About 45 percent of the elderly have this
type of health insurance from a previous employer.
It is interesting to consider why the United States, in contrast to
most other developed countries, has a health insurance system in which
employers are the primary providers of insurance rather than the government, at least for the non-elderly, and also why employers are the
primary providers of health insurance but not other types of insurance.
The United States has repeatedly rejected broad attempts to “socialize”
either medical care or health insurance provision. The first such initiative, during the 1930s, failed despite the concurrent genesis of so many
other New Deal government social programs. The most recent initiative was the failed Clinton administration attempt at national health
reform. And there have been other similarly doomed attempts in the
interim. In the absence of universal government-provided health insurance coverage, market forces have pushed employers into their role as
primary providers of insurance. These market forces include
• a substantial price advantage given to employers through the tax
code because firm health insurance expenditures on behalf of
their employees are not counted as taxable income to either the
firm or the employees,
• economies of scale that derive from providing health insurance to
a large group of individuals, and
• the effectiveness of the workplace as a pooling mechanism to
overcome the problems of adverse selection that plague some
individual insurance markets, especially the individual market for
health insurance.
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As an institution, employer-provided health was really established during the two decades following World War II, although there are some
limited examples of employers providing such coverage before the war.
The second, third, and fourth pieces of the quilt are various types
of government-sponsored health insurance: Medicare, Medicaid, and
CHAMPUS. It is interesting that even at the governmental level, there
is no single unified health insurance program. By far the largest government health insurance program is Medicare. Medicare was implemented in 1965 to provide health insurance coverage to the elderly,
individuals aged 65 and over, many of whom were left uninsured or
underinsured upon their retirement when coverage through their
former employers ceased. Medicare also covers some individuals
under age 65, specifically those who are disabled and eligible for
Social Security Disability Insurance. Currently, Medicare covers over
96 percent of those over age 65, and 5 percent of those under age 65.
The third piece of the quilt, Medicaid, is a state-run program
funded jointly by the state and federal governments. This program was
traditionally a health insurance program for welfare recipients, primarily single mothers and their children, and also for the low-income elderly. In recent years it has been expanded to provide coverage to nonwelfare-eligible families with modest incomes, particularly children.
There is great heterogeneity among states in the eligibility requirements for Medicaid, and in the benefits that are actually provided—yet
another example of the fragmented, patchwork nature of U.S. health
insurance. Overall, 9 percent of the elderly are covered by Medicaid,
as are 11 percent of the non-elderly.
The fourth governmentally provided piece of the quilt is CHAMPUS/VA, the program that provides health insurance to members of the
uniformed services and their families, and to veterans. About 3 percent
of the population is covered by this type of health insurance, a fraction
that has been falling steadily for years as the number of those in active
military service declines because of military cutbacks, and as the number of veterans declines.
The final piece of the patchwork quilt is a bit of a catchall—other
private insurance. This category encompasses a broad array of institutions ranging from supplemental Medigap coverage for the elderly,
to university-provided health insurance for students, to individually
purchased policies from traditional insurers such as Blue Cross/Blue
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Shield, to health insurance provided through membership
organizations such as a credit union or a trade or professional
association. Together, these various types of other private insurance
cover about 7 percent of the non-elderly population, and perhaps as
much as one-third of the elderly population.
Then, of course, there are the uninsured, those who do not have
health insurance through their own or a family member’s employment,
who are not old enough or disabled enough to qualify for Medicare,
who are not eligible or decline to participate in Medicaid or CHAMPUS/VA, and who either cannot afford or choose not to purchase health
insurance in the private market. These 43 million individuals represent
about 18 percent of the non-elderly population. Due in large part to
Medicare, only a small fraction of the elderly, about 1 percent, are
uninsured.
With this brief introduction to the various “pieces” of the insurance
quilt, let us now turn to how this patchwork array of insurance institutions affects the labor market decisions made by individuals and firms.

HEALTH INSURANCE AND RETIREMENT
Perhaps the most important labor market outcome to consider is
employment itself—how does health insurance affect individual participation in the labor market? It affects participation because certain
types of health insurance are provided as a condition of employment
(for example, employer-provided health insurance), while other types
of health insurance are more readily available when individuals are not
employed, or not fully employed (for example, Medicaid or universitysponsored student health insurance), while still others are available
regardless of employment status (for example, Medicare for those over
age 65).
With respect to the effects of health insurance, the most widely
studied facet of labor force participation that has been examined is
retirement. To what extent does health insurance determine when and
how individuals choose to withdraw from the labor force? The answer
lies in the interaction between three different pieces of the patchwork
quilt: employer-provided health insurance for active employees,
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employer-provided retiree health insurance, and Medicare. As already
noted, many but not all employers provide health insurance to their
employees and to their spouses and dependents. This insurance, however, is usually conditional on employment; employees who cease to
work usually find that their health insurance coverage ceases as well.
Some companies, however, offer retiree health insurance. About onethird of employers continue to provide health insurance to some or all
of their former employees who have retired. For individuals who work
at these companies and who are eligible for retiree health insurance,
retirement does not imply a loss of health insurance coverage. And
once individuals reach age 65, even the absence of retiree health insurance does not imply a loss of health insurance coverage upon retirement, because virtually everyone aged 65 and older is eligible for
Medicare.
The interactions between these three different types of health
insurance provide several venues through which health insurance can
affect the retirement behavior of older individuals. For example, some
individuals work in firms that provide retiree health insurance while
others do not. For individuals who are younger than 65 and not yet eligible for Medicare, a lack of retiree health insurance should serve as a
deterrent to retirement, at least until individuals reach the age of 65.
Several studies have found consistent evidence that individuals whose
employers provide retiree health insurance leave the labor force earlier
than individuals whose employers do not (Madrian 1994a; Karoly and
Rogowski 1994; Gustman and Steinmeier 1994; Rust and Phelan 1997;
Blau and Gilleskie 1997; and Rogowski and Karoly 2000). My own
research suggests that individuals with access to retiree health insurance leave the labor market between 6 and 18 months earlier than individuals who do not have access to retiree health insurance (Madrian
1994a). These individuals are also much more likely to retire before
the age of 65. Evidence along these lines but of a more anecdotal
nature also comes from a recent Gallup poll in which “61 percent of
workers reported that they would not retire before becoming eligible
for Medicare if their employer did not provide retiree health benefits.”
(Employee Benefit Research Institute 1993).
The key thing that generates the relationship between health insurance and retirement just described is that retiree health insurance
essentially makes employer-provided health insurance portable across
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the transition from work to retirement. Individuals with other types of
portable or quasi-portable health insurance should also be more likely
to retire, at least before the age of 65, than individuals without portable
health insurance. Another institution that makes employer-provided
health insurance at least somewhat portable is COBRA, a federal law
that took effect in 1986 that requires employers to allow former
employees to buy into their former employers’ health insurance plan
for up to 18 months. In terms of motivating retirement, COBRA is not
as generous as retiree health insurance for two reasons: it is of only
limited duration while retiree health insurance is not, and it requires
much greater out-of-pocket payments than does retiree health insurance. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the limited health insurance portability instituted through COBRA increased retirement rates
for those under age 65 by almost 30 percent (Gruber and Madrian
1995).
Individuals who are covered by non-employment-based health
insurance (for example, through Medicaid or policies purchased individually in the private market) also have a type of health insurance coverage that is portable across the transition from work to retirement.
Once again, empirical evidence suggests that these individuals are also
more likely to retire than are individuals with employer-provided
health insurance that would be lost upon retirement, at least before the
age of 65 (Rust and Phelan 1997).
An interesting thing happens at age 65 when individuals become
eligible for Medicare: even for those individuals with employer-provided health insurance that does not continue into retirement, leaving
the labor force no longer implies a loss of health insurance because
individuals are covered by Medicare. Thus, Medicare eligibility
should provide a strong retirement incentive for those individuals not
eligible for retiree health insurance. And indeed, a substantial fraction
of 64-year-olds do retire at age 65 when they become eligible for
Medicare. Empirical research has to date been unable to precisely
quantify the magnitude of this Medicare-induced retirement effect
because age 65 also happens to be the normal age to qualify for Social
Security and the age at which many pension plans provide full retirement benefits. With so many other factors motivating retirement that
are coincident with Medicare eligibility, it is difficult to quantify
exactly how big each of the respective effects are. But the evidence on
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how other types of health insurance affect retirement suggests that
Medicare eligibility should be very important as well.
One idiosyncratic feature of Medicare, which, like other types of
health insurance, also generates interesting variations in retirement
behavior, is that Medicare only covers individuals and not spouses or
dependent children. As a result, the retirement decisions of two individuals without retiree health insurance who are both about to turn 65,
one with a spouse who is younger and the other with a spouse who is
older, could be quite different. For the individual with the older
spouse, retirement at the age of Medicare eligibility will result in a loss
of health insurance coverage for neither spouse—both will be covered
by Medicare. Indeed, the older spouse already is. In contrast, retirement at the age of Medicare eligibility for the individual with a
younger spouse will result in a loss of health insurance coverage for the
spouse if the spouse was covered as a dependent on the employee’s
plan and not through his or her own independent coverage. Interestingly, men with younger wives are less likely to retire than are men
with older wives until their spouses also become eligible for Medicare
(Madrian and Beaulieu 1998). Thus, retirement is affected not only by
one’s own Medicare eligibility, but also by the Medicare eligibility of
one’s spouse.
Health insurance also affects the nature of the transition from work
to retirement. Some individuals move from full-time work to full-time
retirement, while others pursue a more gradual transition from work to
retirement, moving from full-time work to part-time work, and then
eventually to full-time retirement. Because employer-provided health
insurance is typically contingent upon full-time employment, it is usually difficult to maintain employer-provided health insurance while
working part-time. Individuals with retiree health insurance, however,
can retire from their full-time jobs and move to a different part-time or
self-employment job while maintaining health insurance through their
former employers. Research has shown that individuals with retiree
health insurance are indeed much more likely to make a gradual transition from work to retirement than are individuals without retiree health
insurance. Interestingly, many older workers, when asked, express a
desire to make a gradual transition from work to retirement. Thus,
health insurance that is portable across the transition from work to
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retirement appears to be an institution that enables individuals to retire
both when and how they desire (Rust and Phelan 1997).
Understanding how health insurance affects retirement incentives
is a particularly important policy issue because the retirement decisions
of older individuals could be affected quite substantially in the upcoming years by changes in the institutions that provide health insurance to
retirees—a resizing of the pieces in the patchwork quilt, if you will.
The first important change is a dramatic decline in the number of
employers that offer retiree health insurance. The fraction of employers offering retiree health insurance has fallen by almost half over the
past 15 years, in large part because the escalation in medical care costs
has made retiree health insurance an incredibly expensive benefit to
provide. This erosion in the availability of retiree health insurance coverage will make retirement before the age of 65 much more difficult for
many workers. Based on the evidence in the research that I have summarized so far, there will likely be an eventual increase in the average
retirement age if the availability of retiree health insurance were the
only factor affecting retirement that continued to change. While there
has been no research to date explicitly focused on the decline in the
availability of retiree health insurance and its effect on retirement, it is
interesting to note that the decades-long trend in the declining average
retirement age of men ended in 1985, at about the same time that
employers began to drop their retiree health insurance plans.
A second potential major change in the health insurance landscape
for older workers is the prospect of Medicare reform. There is almost
universal consensus in both academic and policy circles that, for any
number of reasons, Medicare needs to be reformed. Unfortunately,
disagreement on exactly how it should be reformed has resulted in legislative paralysis. There have, however, been numerous proposals to
reform Medicare, each of which would affect the labor force participation decisions of older workers in different ways. For example, the
Breaux-Thomas proposal that came out of the recently disbanded
Medicare reform commission would have raised the Medicare eligibility age to conform with the scheduled increase in the Social Security
normal retirement age from 65 to 67. This change would delay retirement for those individuals without access to retiree health insurance, a
group which, as just noted, is increasing in size as employers opt out of
the retiree health insurance business. In addition, increasing the age of
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Medicare eligibility would increase the cost to employers of providing
retiree health insurance, and would likely provide even greater incentives for employers to relinquish their retiree health insurance plans.
Thus, increasing the age of Medicare eligibility is likely to lead to
increases in the average retirement age, both directly through the effect
on retirement incentives of individuals without retiree health insurance,
and indirectly through the incentive it creates for employers to abandon
their retiree health insurance plans.
President Clinton presented a different Medicare reform proposal
that would allow all individuals between the ages of 62 and 64 to buy
into the Medicare program. By making Medicare available earlier,
even though at a nonsubsidized price, this type of reform would actually motivate retirement at younger ages, reinforcing the decades-long
trend toward earlier retirement.
Whether the current average retirement age is too high, too low, or
just right is a normative question that perhaps warrants an entire chapter of its own. The point is that the health insurance landscape for older
workers is currently changing in a very important way as employers
give up their retiree health insurance plans, and it is likely to change
even further as Congress will eventually make reforms to the Medicare
program. These changes will certainly affect not only the retirement
decisions of older workers, but also the savings and consumption decisions of younger workers as they make future plans for retirement. The
overall economic implications of these changes could be tremendous.

HEALTH INSURANCE AND LABOR
FORCE PARTICIPATION
While much of the research on how health insurance affects labor
force participation has been directed at the issue of retirement, older
individuals are not the only ones whose employment decisions are
affected by health insurance. Because the vast majority of prime-aged
men work regardless of whether they receive employer-provided health
insurance, it is women whose labor force participation decisions are
most likely to be influenced by the availability of health insurance.
One specific group of women for whom health insurance is likely to be
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particularly important are unskilled, less-educated, single mothers. As
parents, they are apt to have a higher demand for health insurance coverage than single women without children. But, as single parents, they
do not have access to health insurance coverage through their spouses.
And, as unskilled single parents, they are qualified primarily for lowwage jobs—jobs that are much less likely to come with health insurance. One source of health insurance coverage that is potentially available to these women is Medicaid. However, until recently, welfare
participation was a virtual precondition for the receipt of Medicaid
benefits: employment that generated income sufficient to disqualify an
individual from receiving further welfare benefits also disqualified an
individual from further receipt of Medicaid. Thus, many less-skilled
female workers have faced a choice between not working or working
part time and receiving Medicaid, or working full time and losing both
welfare benefits and Medicaid coverage.
An interesting change in the Medicaid eligibility rules in the late
1980s and early 1990s has made it possible to disentangle the impact of
Medicaid eligibility on labor force participation from that of general
welfare eligibility. A series of federal and state legislative initiatives
have allowed women to maintain their Medicaid coverage for a prespecified period of time after leaving welfare and extended indefinitely
Medicaid coverage to many groups of low-income children. These
changes effectively make Medicaid portable across the transition from
welfare to work for a finite period for welfare recipients themselves,
and for a much longer period for their children. Empirical research
suggests that this type of Medicaid portability increases both the labor
force participation and the hours worked of low-income single mothers
(Yelowitz 1995). The former link between Medicaid and welfare participation was, in fact, a deterrent in motivating welfare recipients to
find full-time work.
Married women are another group whose labor force participation
is likely to be influenced by the availability of health insurance coverage. As already noted, prime-aged men are likely to work regardless of
the availability of health insurance. In contrast, married women’s labor
supply has historically tended to be much more sensitive to the financial incentives associated with work, one of which is health insurance.
Because most companies that offer health insurance make it available
to both employees and their spouses, many married women receive
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health insurance coverage through their husbands. Whether or not a
married woman has health insurance through her spouse turns out to be
a very important factor in whether and how much she works. Married
women with health insurance through their husbands are substantially
less likely to work than are women without health insurance from their
spouses. And those who do work are much more likely to be employed
in part-time rather than full-time jobs—jobs that typically do not provide health insurance (Buchmueller and Valetta 1999; Olson 1998).
Thus, for married women, the lack of health insurance from a spouse’s
employment seems to have a strong influence in motivating married
women to find jobs with health insurance themselves.
A recent study of married women’s labor supply in Spain uncovered another interesting link between health insurance finance and
female labor supply. In Spain, health care is provided by the government and financed out of a mandatory payroll tax paid partially by the
firm and partially by the employee. Payment of the payroll tax entitles
workers, their spouses, and dependent children to health care, as well
as to a pension and sick leave. Among men, compliance with the payroll tax is universal. Among married women, however, over one-quarter of those who are employed work in the “underground” economy
where “required” taxes are not paid (de la Rica and Lemieux 1994).
There are many other less-studied avenues through which health
insurance is likely to affect labor supply. There is some evidence that
the availability of health insurance during times of unemployment
affects both the likelihood of and the duration of an unemployment
spell (Gruber and Madrian 1997). The link between Medicare coverage and the receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance for disabled
individuals under the age of 65 could act as a deterrent for work among
the disabled, or at least work that would be sufficient to disqualify them
from further disability benefits and the Medicare coverage that accompanies these benefits. University-provided health insurance to students
operates in a similar way; individuals can participate in student health
plans if they maintain their student status, which typically involves registering for a certain number of credit hours and maintaining satisfactory grades. Employment, or at least full-time employment, may
jeopardize an individual’s ability to maintain status as a student. Thus,
some students who value their health insurance may be deterred from
entering the labor market.
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HEALTH INSURANCE AND JOB TURNOVER
Health insurance also affects the types of jobs in which individuals
are employed. I have already noted that health insurance affects not
only labor force participation, but also the choice of full- or part-time
work for older individuals contemplating retirement, for married
women, and for single women on welfare. Beyond the full- or parttime dimension of job choice, health insurance also influences the
choice between various full-time jobs for those who want to work fulltime—not only the initial choice of where to work, but also subsequent
decisions about whether or not to change jobs. Economists are interested in the issue of job turnover because it is the process by which
workers are reallocated away from jobs where they are less productive
and into jobs where they are more productive. Impediments to productivity-enhancing job turnover are thus a barrier to economic growth.
To make this point in a rather extreme way, imagine how different your
life and the whole economy would be if your first employer were also
your only employer; that is, if you could never change jobs.
Why does health insurance influence job turnover? One obvious
reason is that not all employers offer health insurance. Individuals who
have employer-provided health insurance and place a high value on it
will be reluctant to switch to a company that doesn’t provide health
insurance. On the flip side, individuals who don’t have employer-provided health insurance and who place a high value on it will be trying
to switch to companies that do provide health insurance. An interesting piece of evidence on this front comes from the behavior of married
men who are working in jobs without health insurance. Married men
without health insurance but who have pregnant wives are twice as
likely to change jobs as married men without health insurance whose
wives are not pregnant (Madrian 1994b). The impending birth of a
child clearly increases the value of health insurance, and these men
respond by changing jobs, presumably in an attempt to find work with
health insurance.
A second reason that health insurance affects the job turnover decisions of individuals is that not all employer-provided health insurance
plans are equal, at least not for an employee who contemplates changing jobs. In addition to variation among employers in the generosity of
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the health insurance package in terms of co-payments, deductibles, and
what is covered, there are two more subtle issues to consider. The first
is that many employers exclude preexisting conditions for a certain
period of time. So, even though a new employer and one’s current
employer may appear to provide identical coverage, the coverage of the
new employer may in fact be vastly inferior for families with medical
problems if these problems are not covered under the terms of a preexisting conditions exclusion restriction. The second issue is that in the
era of managed care, employees do not generally have free choice
among medical providers. Thus, an employment change that is accompanied by a health insurance change is also likely to necessitate a medical provider change. Individuals who value relationships with their
current doctors may thus be averse to changing health insurance plans
even if preexisting conditions are not an issue.
My own research on the relationship between health insurance and
job turnover and that of others confirms that health insurance is an
important factor in the decision to change jobs. One interesting finding
is that among individuals who have employer-provided health insurance, those who also have coverage through the employment of a
spouse are much more likely to change jobs than those who do not
(Madrian 1994b; Buchmueller and Valetta 1996). In essence, health
insurance coverage through a spouse’s employment is portable across
the transition from one job to another and is one way to skirt the preexisting conditions exclusions that may be in place at a new employer.
Another interesting finding is that COBRA, in addition to motivating
retirement among older workers, also motivates job turnover among
younger workers (Gruber and Madrian 1994). COBRA makes the
health insurance from one’s former employer portable across jobs, at
least for a limited time, but apparently long enough for many to skirt
preexisting conditions exclusions.
One particular type of job transition, the movement to self-employment, is also likely to be influenced by the availability of health insurance. The self-employed owners of firms do not generally get the same
tax advantages from purchasing health insurance as do employees.
Moreover, because most of the self-employed tend to be sole proprietors or have very small firms, they are not able to take advantage of
the economies of scale in health insurance provision available to large
firms, or the benefits that large firms have in reducing the negative
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impact of adverse selection on the costs of insuring their employees.
Thus, the health insurance costs of becoming self-employed may be
nontrivial. Some research suggests that health insurance is indeed a
factor in the decision about whether or not to become self-employed,
and that individuals for whom the loss of health insurance is less costly
(for example, those with health insurance through a spouse) are more
likely to switch from employment to self-employment (Madrian and
Lefgren 1998).
The likelihood of a future layoff—involuntary job turnover—may
also affect the job choice decisions of individuals who place a high
value on health insurance. Several years ago I had an MBA student
who had been recently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a condition
that would almost surely be classified as a preexisting condition. Upon
hearing about my research interests, he told me that although he really
wanted to work for a consulting firm and had indeed received offers to
do so, he had decided to accept a job with a large manufacturing company with essentially a policy of lifetime employment. He reasoned
that consulting companies have a reputation for promoting only a very
small fraction of their hires to partner; the rest either leave or are dismissed within the first few years. Given his medical situation, he felt
that it would be imprudent to accept a job in which there would be
uncertainty regarding his future health insurance coverage as a result of
the inherent uncertainty in the long-term job prospects at a consulting
firm.

HEALTH INSURANCE AND
THE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS OF FIRMS
It is also interesting to consider the relationship between health
insurance and job turnover from the employer’s perspective. For an
employer who offers health insurance coverage, sick employees (or
healthy employees with sick dependents) are costly in two ways: they
may be less productive and they are likely to generate higher insurance
claims. Because of their medical expenditures, these employees may
be relatively more attractive targets for layoffs. The link between
health insurance and employment may thus have an adverse effect on
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families with medical problems if these problems lead to claims-based
layoffs. Although I have seen no formal analysis of the prevalence of
this type of layoff behavior, there is certainly anecdotal evidence that it
does occur.
In addition to its effect on the employment and job choice decisions of individuals, health insurance may also influence the labor
demand decisions of employers. There are two features of health
insurance provision that are particularly salient in this regard. The first
is that health insurance is a fixed cost of employment. Expected
employer expenditures on health insurance do not increase when the
weekly hours worked by their employees increase, and they do not
increase when compensation increases; they only increase when more
employees are hired. This feature of health insurance, its fixed-cost
nature, gives firms an incentive to economize on the costs of providing
health insurance in two ways: by hiring fewer employees but at longer
weekly hours, which is one way to maintain production while reducing
the overall costs of providing health insurance, and by hiring fewer but
more productive employees—employees who can produce more than
the average employee would. Some of my own research done in conjunction with David Cutler provides partial evidence that firms have
substituted longer weekly hours for fewer workers as health insurance
costs have increased over recent years. Moreover, the effects are nontrivial. The increase in weekly hours associated with the increase in
health insurance costs between 1980 and 1993 resulted in a change in
average weekly hours among those with health insurance equivalent to
roughly half the change in labor input that is observed in a typical
recession (Cutler and Madrian 1999).
Anecdotally, there have been several strikes in recent years against
companies such as General Motors over the issue of perceived excess
overtime. Companies have scheduled their workers for overtime on a
regular basis, sometimes as many as 20 hours per week, in order to
avoid the health insurance and other fixed costs of employment associated with hiring new workers. The workers, preferring shorter hours to
an overtime premium, have gone on strike in an effort to pressure the
companies into hiring more workers.
The second feature of health insurance that is salient to the labor
demand decision is the distinction between full- and part-time workers
in the tax treatment of employer expenditures on health insurance. As
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already noted briefly, employer expenditures on health insurance are
usually not subject to taxation; however, there is one caveat: employers
must satisfy a set of IRS nondiscrimination rules which stipulate that if
a firm is to provide health insurance, it must make it widely available to
nearly all employees. In essence, employers cannot selectively decide
that they will provide health insurance to some employees and not to
others, either because of favoritism or as a cost-saving measure. However, certain groups of employees, namely part-time, temporary, and
seasonal workers, are exempt from the requirements of the nondiscrimination rules. Thus, employers can deny health insurance coverage to
part-time, temporary, and seasonal workers while still obtaining favorable tax treatment for their health insurance expenditures on full-time
permanent employees. As health insurance becomes more expensive
to provide, the nondiscrimination rules give employers an incentive to
hire part-time and temporary workers in lieu of full-time workers as a
way to economize on insurance expenditures. While there are many
reasons behind the phenomenal growth in the temporary help industry
over the past two decades, the increasing cost of providing health
insurance is surely one of them.
More concrete evidence that employers substitute part-timers for
full-timers in the face of higher health insurance costs comes from the
state of Hawaii. In 1974, Hawaii mandated employer provision of
health insurance to full-time but not part-time workers. Those industries most affected by the mandate, namely industries in which relatively few full-time workers were covered by health insurance initially,
saw a large increase in the fraction of workers employed in part-time
jobs following the mandate. Essentially, employers who were suddenly faced with large health insurance bills as a result of the mandate
decided to substitute part-time workers for full-time workers as a way
to skirt requirement of the new law. In contrast, industries in which
almost all full-time employees were already receiving health insurance
saw little shift in the fraction of full- versus part-time workers (Thurston 1997).
For firms, then, health insurance affects both the size and composition of the workforce that is employed. As health insurance becomes
more costly to provide, employers have an incentive to reduce their
health insurance costs by substituting overtime for employment, skilled
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labor for unskilled labor, and part-time and temporary workers for regular full-time employees.

CONCLUSION
There is an important relationship between labor market outcomes
and the institutions and rules governing health insurance provision in
the United States. Health insurance is an important factor in almost
every labor market decision made by individuals: whether to work,
where to work, how many hours to work, and so on. It is also an
important factor in the human resource decisions made by employers:
how many workers to hire, whom to hire, how to structure the terms
and conditions of employment.
But, given that there are many factors that affect the labor market
decisions of individuals and firms, why the special concern with health
insurance? Because our health care system continues to evolve in ways
that influence important labor market outcomes. Significant changes in
the health insurance institutions of the United States have taken place
over the past 15 years. These include
• the implementation of COBRA, which provides limited health
insurance portability to workers covered by employer-provided
health insurance,
• passage of HIPAA, which attempts to further increase the amount
of health insurance portability in the economy,
• the extension of Medicaid benefits to pregnant women and lowincome children regardless of parental participation in either state
welfare programs or the labor market,
• the shift away from fee-for-service medicine and toward managed
care,
• the tax deductibility of health insurance expenditures of the selfemployed,
• small business health insurance pools,
• a dramatic decline in employer provision of retiree health insurance, and
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• a proliferation in state-mandated health insurance benefits.
And even more substantive changes continue to be proposed, such as
• changes in the Medicare eligibility age,
• changes in or elimination of the tax-deductibility of health insurance and other employee benefits,
• mandatory community rating of health premiums insurance in the
nongroup market,
• further expansions in the availability of publicly provided health
insurance, and, of course,
• broad-based national health care reform, an issue that is not
widely discussed at the moment but, if history is our guide, will
surely resurface at some point in the future.
The merits of these various proposals depend on a variety of
things. While most discussion tends to focus on access to health care
services and the government budget, it is also important to consider the
impact of these proposals on the labor market. Do they promote or
impede labor market efficiency? Do they distort the labor supply
choices that individuals otherwise would have made? Do they change
the hiring decisions of firms?
These issues are perhaps most important not in the United States,
but in the developing countries of the world that are currently struggling to design and implement their own health care and health insurance institutions. An important lesson to be learned from the
experience of the United States is that while employer provision of
health insurance is a convenient way to finance insurance benefits without involving the government budget directly, not everyone is tied to
the labor market. Reliance on and encouragement of employer provision of health insurance will invariably result in government programs
to fill in the gaps and cover the otherwise uninsured. But it is the interplay between these various institutions, some tied directly to the labor
market and others not, that results in distortions of the labor market
decisions of individuals and firms.
Is there a way to eliminate the labor market distortions associated
with health insurance provision in the United States? Yes and no; one
way would be to have nationalized health insurance that covered every-
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one regardless of employment status. Such an institution would provide no incentives to be employed or not employed, at least not on the
basis of health insurance. However, such an institution would invariably involve distortions along other margins. For example, the tax revenue needed to finance nationalized health insurance would invariably
create distortions in the markets that are taxed, quite possibly the labor
market if financed through an income or payroll tax. This would, in
essence, involve trading one set of labor market distortions for another.
It’s a gloomy picture, isn’t it?
The bottom line, then, is that any system of health insurance provision is likely to involve labor market distortions, either directly through
the institutions themselves, or indirectly through the way they are
financed. This is not necessarily bad—after all, many of the good
things that are provided by the government involve trading one kind of
market distortion for another: public education, roads and other forms
of infrastructure, and national defense. By understanding the distortions, i.e., where they come from and how big they are, we can begin to
make informed decisions about which types of reform will have the
greatest beneficial impact on both health and economic efficiency.

References
Blau, David M., and Donna B. Gilleskie. 1997. “Retiree Health Insurance
and the Labor Force Behavior of Older Men in the 1990s.” Working paper
no. 5948, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Buchmueller, Thomas C., and Robert G. Valletta. 1996. “The Effect of
Employer-Provider Health Insurance on Worker Mobility.” Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 49(3): 439–455.
______. 1999. “The Effect of Health Insurance on Married Female Labor
Supply.” Journal of Human Resources 34(1): 42–70.
Cutler, David M., and Brigitte C. Madrian. 1999. “Labor Market Responses
to Rising Health Insurance Costs: Evidence on Hours worked.” Rand Journal of Economics 29(3): 509–530.
de la Rica, Sara, and Thomas Lemieux. 1994. “Does Public Health Insurance
Reduce Labor Market Flexibility or Encourage the Underground Economy? Evidence from Spain and the United States.” In Social Protection

Health Insurance and the Labor Market

107

Versus Economic Flexibility: Is There a Trade-Off?, Rebecca M. Blank, ed.
Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, pp. 265–299.
Employee Benefit Research Institute. 1993. Public Attitudes on Benefit Trade
Offs. Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute.
Gruber, Jonathan, and Brigitte C. Madrian. 1994. “Health Insurance and Job
Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on Job Lock.” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 48(1): 86–102.
______. 1995. “Health Insurance Availability and the Retirement Decision.”
American Economic Review 85(4): 938–948.
______. 1997. “Employment Separation and Health Insurance Coverage.”
Journal of Public Economics 66(3): 349–382.
Gustman, Alan L., and Thomas L. Steinmeier. 1994. “Employer-Provided
Health Insurance and Retirement Behavior.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48(1): 124–140.
Karoly, Lynn, and Jeannette A. Rogowski. 1994. “The Effect of Access to
Post Retirement Health Insurance on the Decision to Retire Early.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48(1): 103–123.
Madrian, Brigitte C. 1994a. “The Effect of Health Insurance on Retirement.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1): 181–232.
______. 1994b. “Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is
There Evidence of Job Lock?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(1):
27–54.
Madrian, Brigitte C., and Nancy D. Beaulieu. 1998. “Does Medicare Eligibility Affect Retirement?” In Inquiries in the Economics of Aging, David
A. Wise, ed. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, pp. 109–131.
Madrian, Brigitte C., and Lars J. Lefgren. 1998. “The Effect of Health Insurance on Transitions to Self Employment.” Unpublished paper, University
of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
Olson, Craig A. 1998. “A Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric
Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Health Insurance Coverage on Weekly
Hours Worked by Wives.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 13(5): 543–
565.
Rogowski, Jeannette A., and Lynn Karoly. 2000. “Health Insurance and
Retirement Behavior: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey.”
Journal of Health Economics 19(4): 529–539.
Rust, John, and Christopher Phelan. 1997. “How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior in a World of Incomplete Markets.”
Econometrica 65(4): 781–831.
Thurston, Norman K. 1997. “Labor Market Effects of Hawaii’s Mandatory
Employer-Provided Health Insurance.” Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 51(1): 117–135.

108

Madrian

Yelowitz, Aaron S. 1995. “The Medical Notch, Labor Supply and Welfare
Participation: Evidence from Eligibility Expansions.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110(4): 909–940.

5
Health Care Consumer Choice
The Role of Information
Catherine G. McLaughlin
University of Michigan

Choice is a highly prized commodity in the United States. The
freedom to choose is fiercely protected. Recently health care consumers have felt as though their freedom to choose has been threatened:
when they seek care, from whom, and how often; the site of treatment,
whether inpatient or outpatient; whether they can spend a third day in
the hospital after a normal delivery; whether they can purchase generic
rather than brand-name drugs. Rightly or wrongly, they blame a lot of
this loss of freedom on the growth of managed care. We are witnessing
a plethora of articles and stories in the mainstream press, on television,
even in movies like As Good As It Gets, as well as testimony at federal
and state legislative committee hearings debating Patient Bill of Rights
legislation.1
What most people may not realize is that before a consumer, a
patient, ever reaches an individual health care provider’s office to discuss a particular diagnosis and treatment, a myriad of decisions have
been made—decisions that influence the selection of the provider, the
treatment, and how much the treatment will cost the patient. The typical health care consumer faces a road map of options, and the consequences of taking one option instead of the other are always attached to
those choices. In many cases, when consumers make one choice, they
are getting on a one-way road with that choice leading to future constraints.
As illustrated in Figure 1, for some adults the first choice that may
in part be conditioned on an individual’s desire for health insurance
coverage is whether to enter the labor market. The role played by
Medicaid in the welfare-to-work decision is frequently discussed. Less
attention is paid to the effect of health insurance coverage on other
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Figure 1 Labor Market and Health Insurance Choices

populations, but the desire for affordable health insurance may also
influence the labor market decisions of those not eligible for Medicaid,
such as spouses of working adults without employment-based insurance.
Adults who do not seek employment or who are unsuccessful in
finding a job end up either covered by Medicaid, obtaining insurance
through another source (e.g., a spouse’s plan or a plan obtained in the
nongroup market), or uninsured.

VARIATION IN FIRM OFFER RATES
The decision of what kind of firm in which to seek employment is
also influenced by the demand for health insurance. Health insurance
options vary by firm. While health insurance is but one factor in firm
choice, it’s not difficult to believe that young, single males may deliberately choose to supply their labor to a small, high-tech firm that
offers no health insurance in exchange for higher wages. It is also
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understandable that a young male who has similar skills but who has a
wife and two small children may choose instead to supply his labor to a
large corporation, earning a lower salary but receiving a rich family
health insurance package at a large group rate.
Approximately 25 percent of working adults are employed by
firms that do not offer health insurance (McLaughlin 1999a). Small
firms, those with 25 or fewer employees, are disproportionately represented in this group. While 90 percent of firms with 100 or more
employees offer some kind of group health insurance package to their
workers, less than half of those with fewer than 10 employees do so.
These differences in offer rates have been fairly constant over time and
stem from a variety of labor and insurance market differences (Brown,
Hamilton, and Medoff 1990; McLaughlin and Zellers 1992).
Affordability
A survey of approximately 2,000 small businesses in seven cities
revealed that the reasons for not offering a group health insurance policy to their employees could be grouped into three different categories
summarized as affordability, employee attitudes, and availability
(McLaughlin and Zellers 1994). The number-one reason given in this
and other surveys is dollars; virtually all small business owners say that
high and rising health insurance premiums are the primary reason for
not offering health insurance. The lack of affordable health insurance
products is a central problem for small businesses and their employees.
Many small businesses operate on low profit margins and face premiums 10–40 percent higher than those paid by large firms (GAO 1992).
The convergence of low profit margins, low wages, and high premiums
means than neither employers nor employees in small businesses can
easily trade revenue or wages for health insurance.
Attitudes
The failure of many small businesses to purchase health insurance
has as much to do with attitudes and perceptions as with affordability.
The majority of owners who did not offer insurance (61 percent) said
that they had no interest in offering any (McLaughlin and Zellers
1994). To some degree, this attitude reflects the nature of the business.
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For example, one shrimper in Tampa said, “I go to the dock every
morning and say ‘You, you, and you, jump on board.’ What am I supposed to do? Get them to sign a Blue Cross and Blue Shield contract
for the day?”2 In addition, many small businesses have very loosely
defined or temporal employment contracts with their workers (e.g., taxi
cab drivers, construction workers).
The driving force behind this lack of interest, however, was the
belief that their workers did not want coverage, that they preferred
higher wages to health insurance. In contrast to what many workers
apparently believe, the employer does not pay for health insurance.
Regardless of who writes the premium check, the workers and consumers pay for insurance through lower wage growth and higher prices
(Pauly 1997); the owners surveyed felt as though their workers were
not willing to make the trade. Many of these employees can piggyback
on the (usually better value) health plans of spouses’ employers, which
appears to be a key reason why many companies do not provide coverage for their employees. Because employees of these other firms rarely
pay the full marginal cost of having family coverage (either directly
through higher out-of-pocket premiums or indirectly through lower
wage growth), employees who have this safety net for coverage often
prefer to be compensated in higher wages rather than in benefits. In
firms where employers responded that their employees’ ability to get
insurance elsewhere was a very important reason for not offering insurance, 73 percent of the employees did obtain health insurance from
another source (McLaughlin and Zellers 1994).
Availability
There was another reason for lack of coverage, however. Some of
these owners would have been interested in providing group coverage
but expressed difficulty obtaining insurance because of insurance
underwriting procedures. For one out of five small businesses without
insurance, the lack of insurance can be attributed to redlining and preexisting condition exclusions (redlining is the exclusion of specific
types of businesses from eligibility for coverage). Insurers may designate a business unacceptable if they consider employees of these businesses to be at a higher risk for illness or injury because of occupation,
age, lifestyles, etc.
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Virtually all insurers of small businesses engage in a practice
known as redlining, drawing a red line across the list of risks, making
all industries with risks above that amount ineligible for insurance
(Zellers et al. 1992). McLaughlin and Zellers also surveyed insurance
companies and independent agents in the same seven cities participating in the employer survey, as well as the 10 national companies with
the largest book of business in the small group market. They asked for
examples of industries that are routinely redlined and received underwriting brochures from 20 different companies.
Eighty-five percent of insurance agents and 48 percent of insurance
company representatives said they redline specific types of businesses. Seven percent of all small business employees whose companies do not offer insurance are excluded because of redlining practices.
As shown in Figure 2, redlined industries are not just those industries
such as asbestos removal firms and mining and logging companies that
have hazardous working conditions. Major employers such as restaurants, bars, hair salons, physician offices, and law offices are also commonly redlined. About 15 percent of small firms are in industries that
are routinely redlined (Zellers et al. 1992).

Figure 2 Types of Redlined Businesses

SOURCE: McLaughlin and Zellers (1994).
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Employees in redlined industries are considered “undesirable” not
only because of working conditions but because of the age, other
demographic characteristics, or lifestyles of employees. Redlined
industries typically employ older workers (over age 55) and/or have
high employee turnover, seasonal workforces, or workforces paid by
commission or on the basis of other contractual terms. The hair salon
industry is particularly illustrative of the problem faced by many of the
employees of these businesses. As one insurer stated, these employees
are seen by insurers as representing a “triple threat: lots of turnover,
young women who get pregnant, and gays with the threat of AIDS.”
Physicians are seen as “heavy utilizers, hypochondriacs,” and lawyers
as “too litigious, they dispute every claim denied.” 3
While some of these individuals have the financial resources necessary to purchase insurance in the individual market or can obtain
group insurance through professional organizations, this is not the case
for some workers, such as hair stylists or professional musicians in
local symphonies. These individuals decided, most likely in high
school, to acquire the human capital necessary to become a professional in this field, not knowing that down the road, when they were no
longer “young invincibles” but 30-year-old pregnant women or 40year-olds with carpal tunnel syndrome or hypertension, they would
have problems getting coverage because of their profession. At this
point, they either have to change careers, learning new skills marketable to industries that are not redlined, seek individual coverage with a
very high premium, or remain without financial protection for any
medical care needs. Now, one policy response could be, “Well, you
chose this career; you earned a return to that investment, and now you
have to face the consequences of that choice.” And, as long as that
individual had full information about potential problems in the future,
an argument can be made that this is an efficient path. In any case,
once an individual has acquired specific skills, it is often difficult to
move freely in the labor market. Those earlier choices lead to constraints.
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VARIATION IN INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION RATES
Eligibility
Seventy-five percent of workers are employed by firms that do
offer insurance (McLaughlin 1999a). Not all workers are eligible,
however; approximately 5 percent of workers are not eligible for their
firm’s plan.
The most common reasons for being ineligible have to do with the
employment contract, particularly working part time (Table 1). Analysis of the 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) data shows that while
80 percent of full-time workers are offered insurance, only 19 percent
of those working fewer than 20 hours a week are. Even this difference
is mitigated by the size of firm, with more part-time workers offered
health insurance by larger firms. In firms with 100 or more workers,
the percentage of at least half-time workers offered health insurance is
virtually the same as that of full-time workers. A worker’s salary also
influences whether or not she or he will be offered health insurance.
Higher-paid workers are much more likely to be offered health insurance. Forty-three percent of workers earning less than $7 per hour are
offered health insurance by their employers, whereas 93 percent of
those earning more than $15 per hour are offered coverage (Cooper and
Steinberg-Schone 1997). Once again, this difference narrows as the
firm size increases (Bucci and Grant 1995). Younger workers are also
less likely to be offered health insurance—only 51 percent of those
younger than 25 years old are offered coverage (Cooper and SteinbergSchone 1997).

Table 1 Reasons for Being Ineligible
• 26% are still in probationary period
• 9% are contract or temporary workers
• 58% are part-time workers
• 2% have preexisting conditions
SOURCE: 1993 Current Population Survey data reported in Yakoboski et al. (1994).
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For a small percentage of workers, medical underwriting practices,
specifically preexisting condition exclusion clauses, result in ineligibility. Preexisting condition exclusion clauses deny coverage to individuals for conditions for which they have received medical care in the past.
With very small groups (fewer than 10 employees), it is not uncommon
for an insurer to deny coverage to the entire business if one or more
employees has a potentially high-cost preexisting condition.
Again, these barriers are more common in small businesses, not
because workers are more likely to have preexisting conditions, but
because insurance companies rarely check for these conditions, much
less act on them, in large firms. Based on their survey, McLaughlin
and Zellers estimated that 15–20 percent of the employees in small
firms were ineligible for coverage, not just for the first six months of
employment or just for the condition, but for any insurance policy.
Exclusions for preexisting conditions may be a primary reason for
“job lock.” (Cooper and Monheit 1993). These exclusions discourage
workers from switching jobs because they or a family member may not
be covered for a health problem under a new insurance plan or may
lose coverage altogether. Some of these conditions are chronic conditions and can therefore affect career choices.
McLaughlin and Zellers (1994) found that the most frequently
excluded conditions were heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and AIDS
(Figure 3). Heart disease was the medical condition that was more
commonly excluded for coverage by insurance companies. Fifty-three
of the 83 insurance company representatives and agents who were
asked about their preexisting condition exclusion policies said they
excluded coverage of heart disease for individuals who have already
been diagnosed and treated for this condition. Other excluded conditions include mental or nervous conditions, degenerative nerve disorders such as muscular dystrophy and multiple sclerosis, kidney
anomalies, and stroke. In some cases, insurers were unwilling to provide coverage for anyone in the firm if one worker had one of these
conditions. Interestingly, insurers cited preexisting conditions or
“health problems” as the main reason small businesses have difficulty
obtaining health coverage.
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Figure 3 Medical Conditions Frequently Excluded

SOURCE: McLaughlin and Zellers (1994).

Employee Choice
Some workers who are eligible for coverage choose to “just say
no.” A recent study comparing household surveys from 1989 and 1996
reveals that a greater number of workers, particularly low-wage workers, are declining to take employer-sponsored insurance (Cooper and
Steinberg-Schone 1997). The turn-down rate is higher among lowwage workers. A reasonable interpretation of these data is that these
workers are not willing to pay the out-of-pocket premiums and hope to
trade at least some wage growth for health insurance. In the 1996
national survey, 80 percent of workers who were offered a plan chose
to participate. In contrast, only 63 percent of workers earning less than
$7 per hour chose to participate. Less than 50 percent of those working
part time chose to participate, in addition to 70 percent of those under
age 25 and 74 percent of those working in firms with fewer than 25
employees (Cooper and Steinberg-Schone 1997).
In addition, as noted in Table 2, some workers choose not to participate because they have insurance through another source. Of those
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Table 2 Reasons for Choosing not to Participate
• 75% have other source of coverage
• 23% say plan is too costly
• 2% say plan has too many limitations
• 6% say they don’t need or want coverage
SOURCE: 1993 Current Population Survey data reported in Yakoboski et al. (1994).

who decline, 75 percent have other group coverage, usually through a
spouse’s plan (Yakoboski et al. 1994). Analysis of the 1993 CPS data
revealed that women were more likely to choose not to participate
(Yakoboski et al. 1994). Buchmueller (1996) found that men who
work full time are more likely to receive employer-sponsored health
insurance than are women who work full time. According to his analysis, this gap is driven largely by the tendency of married women to
decline employer-sponsored insurance in favor of being covered
through their husband’s employer’s insurance policy.
The availability of another source of insurance enables many workers to choose employment in the small business community, to say no
to costly or undesirable plans, to elect to stay home and engage in
child-rearing, or to obtain further training and education. It is also,
however, the source of inequities. Employers rarely charge employees,
either directly or indirectly, the full marginal cost of choosing a family
plan rather than a single plan. Therefore, single workers (or married
workers with a spouse covered by employment-based insurance who
elect single coverage) subsidize workers who choose family coverage
at reduced prices. While society may decide that this subsidy is an efficient way to enable parents to stay home or spouses to remain in
school, problems of horizontal inequity arise between similar workers
of large firms and small firms.
Not all workers who decline coverage or work for a firm without
coverage have insurance through another source; a significant number
of them are uninsured. In fact, 85 percent of the uninsured are workers
and their dependents (McLaughlin 1999a). The number of medically
uninsured adults and children is steadily increasing and is the cause of
many policy recommendations, at both the federal and state level.
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While some people are uninsured because of underwriting conditions, most are not. Many workers are eligible for coverage yet
decline; others work in firms that do not offer coverage. These two
groups of workers are very similar in measured characteristics: young,
lower wage, and single (Long and Marquis 1993; Cooper and Steinberg-Schone 1997).
In some cases, these uninsured workers feel that they do not need
coverage. They are basing this decision on their known health status
and past experience. Unfortunately, if one of these workers is in a car
accident, or develops cancer or diabetes, we do not say, “Too bad, you
made your choice and chose not to trade wages for health insurance.
Now we choose not to provide care for you.” In part, we recognize that
there is poor information about future needs, about the probability of
an exogenous shock to our health status, and we decide to provide care
for them that is then subsidized by those who chose to make the trade.
Chernew et al. (1997) estimated the subsidy amount necessary to
prompt voluntary participation in health insurance. They estimated
that for a significant number of workers, the subsidy would have to be
almost as large as the premium; therefore, the welfare loss of mandating that they trade wages for health insurance would be quite high.
There is a high price to taking away people’s choice.

CHOICE OF PLANS
Finally, we get to those workers who choose to participate; they
remain the majority of working adults. Half of these workers have no
choice in plan, and most of them are offered only a traditional fee-forservice plan. Half of those with choice are offered only one or more
traditional plans; about one-third are offered only one or more managed care plans. For many workers, the choice of employer determines
the choice of plan. Although the percentage of firms offering more
than one health care plan is increasing, it is still the case that the majority of all firms offer only one plan (McLaughlin 1999a).
As shown in Table 3, just as being offered any plan varies by firm
size, so does the availability of choice of plan types. The percentage of
firms offering more than one plan increases with firm size—as low as
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Table 3 Combinations of Plan Types Offered by Employers, by Firm Size
% of firms
that offer
Combinations of
plan typesa

% of full-time workers
offered

Firm <100
workers

Firm 100+
workers

Firm <100
workers

Firm 100+
workers

74

44

62

32

HMO only

8

8

11

6

PPO only

12

18

14

15

FFS + HMO

3

17

7

22

FFS + PPO

1

2

1

2

HMO + PPO

2

9

3

14

<0.5

3

1

9

FFS only

FFS + HMO + PPO

SOURCE: Bucci and Grant (1995); BLS data for 1992–1993.
a FFS = fee-for-service; HMO = health maintenance organization; PPO = preferredprovider organization.

10 percent of firms with fewer than 100 employees and rising to 90
percent of firms with 5,000 or more employees (McLaughlin 1999a).
A 1996 KPMG survey found that only 9 percent of employees of firms
with fewer than 10 employees were offered a choice of plans, whereas
54 percent of employees of firms with more than 200 employees were
offered choice (Gabel, Ginsburg, and Hunt 1997).
Of those firms that offer a choice, the majority offer a choice
between two plans (Bucci and Grant 1995). About one-fifth offer a
choice between three plans, and a few offer more than three plans from
which to choose. About one-half of all workers with choice are offered
two plans, one-fifth are offered three plans, and the rest are offered four
or more. Again, the tendency to offer multiple plans increases with
firm size. A 1997 Mercer survey estimated that 56 percent of companies with 3,000 or more employees offer three or four plan types (Mercer’s Fax Facts 1997).
It turns out that for many of us, the choice of health insurance is an
important one. Once enrolled in a particular plan, consumers are constrained by the specifics of the plan. The decisions about when to seek
care and which provider to use are influenced by the type and financial
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incentives of the plan. The choice of treatment is also constrained by
plan specifics. A person who is a risk-taker and who would want every
possible treatment known, whether experimental or well-established, if
faced with a life-threatening disease, would want a different kind of
plan than a person who is more conservative in treatment choice. An
employer can use health insurance options to influence the kind of
worker seeking employment in that firm. For example, offering a subsidized family coverage benefit may discourage single workers and
encourage young workers with families. A firm whose work requires
risk-taking may want to offer a high-deductible plan.

LIMITATIONS TO CHOICE
One of the basic principles of managed care is reduced choice, particularly reduced choice of provider. In general, healthier individuals,
those who anticipate needing very little interaction with the medical
care sector, are going to be less sensitive to this reduced choice. The
resulting enrollment of healthier workers, combined with a host of
financial incentives and structural aspects, has led to lower premiums.
These lower premiums, coupled with low co-pays, particularly for
pharmaceuticals, have encouraged consumers to overcome their aversion to reduced choice and elect to enroll in managed care plans when
given a choice.
Much of the unhappiness with the managed care market results
from lack of information. When surveyed, most enrollees focus on the
reduced premia and co-pays and express ignorance about limited
choice (Mechanic et al. 1990). When they then get sick and become
acutely aware of the limitations, they are unpleasantly surprised and
angry (McLaughlin 1999b). Of course, the response can be, “Well,
you chose lower costs over limited choice. Now you must live with the
consequences.” Again, this is assuming that they were fully informed
about the consequences of their choice, that they were able to read and
understand the fine print in their insurance contract. If workers receive
more information, some may choose the traditional plan instead. For
the one-third of workers who had no choice other than managed care,
the only option is to seek employment in another firm.
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In some important ways, the individual who chooses to self-insure
faces the least constraints; he or she is free to choose any willing provider. Of course, lack of money greatly reduces this freedom for many.
In fact, one could say that for most people, the major constraint to
choice is money.
At this point, it is clear that these decisions at the endpoint work
back through the other decisions. The perceived need for freedom of
choice of provider and treatment may reflect knowledge of medical
need, which in turn influences the desire to enter the workforce to
begin with. The decision process is certainly not a nice, neat linear
model of consumer choice. Rather, it is more like the highways around
Los Angeles, looping under and over, with complex figure eights, and
equally congested and frustrating to the analyst. Unfortunately, private
and public policymakers considering policies that address issues of
health insurance choice must look at all the various pieces, recognizing
that a change in the relative prices or options faced at one dyad will
affect other choices. Only when researchers provide better estimates of
the likely size of these so-called unintended consequences will policymakers be able to develop policies that yield the desired effects.

Notes
1. See, for example, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 24:5. Special Issue:
The Managed Care Backlash, Mark A. Peterson (ed.), 1999.
2. From author interviews.
3. From author interviews.
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6
Positive Economics and
Dismal Politics
The Role of Tax Policy in the
Current Health Policy Debate
Robert B. Helms
American Enterprise Institute

Those who have participated in this series for several years must
have learned by now that economists do not view the world as others
do. And those who have participated so far this year must have learned
that this is especially true of those economists who specialize in health
economics. Given that most of my career has been spent in Washington, it is my observation that economists play a very small role in the
national health policy debate. While there is a grain of truth in the
well-worn jokes about economists not being able to reach a conclusion,
the reality is that health policy debates have been dominated throughout the twentieth century by strong groups of providers who have a
direct stake in the outcome of legislation. In the last few years these
groups have been joined by other groups claiming to represent “consumers” or specific groups of patients. All of these participants in the
health policy debate provide ample employment to a new army of pollsters and political analysts willing to tell the politicians and the public
what kind of health policies they think we want. In the midst of all this
noise, the hard-working academic or government health economist,
trained to ask fundamental questions and seek answers based on factual
information, and having earned a reputation for producing overly technical and dull reports, has a difficult time being heard. The result is a
political environment that has a higher probability of producing legislation based on emotion and wishful thinking than on the economist’s
usual standard of economic efficiency.
Nowhere is this danger for bad policy more prevalent than in the
current health policy debate. Politicians are striving to legislate im-
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provements in medical quality without asking why our current market
arrangements have put too little emphasis on quality and consumer satisfaction. They are beginning to seek ways to reduce the number of
uninsured without considering the root causes of why most of the uninsured choose not to buy insurance. Legislators are expressing more
concern about the future of Medicare without considering how to get
both consumers and providers more involved in the choice of productive and cost-effective medical plans and procedures. It is still my opinion that economists have a positive role to play in guiding health
policies toward more efficient arrangements. Despite our reputation for
dull reports, health economics is anything but a dismal science.
The purpose of this chapter is to give my own interpretation of a
rather large body of economic literature about how modern medical
markets have developed. The emphasis will be on the role that tax policy has played in shaping the distinctive form of health care institutions
and incentives that characterize our market today. This background
will then be used to comment on various tax policy changes being considered to make health insurance more available to the presently uninsured.

THE POSTWAR HISTORY OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH INSURANCE1
World War II provides a convenient demarcation in the history of
medicine and health insurance. Numerous advances in scientific
knowledge had been made prior to the war, but these advances were
not generally available to the vast majority of Americans. Prior to the
war there was little that the average physician could do for the average
patient to change the course of a disease. That changed dramatically in
the two decades following the war, especially as a result of the development of penicillin during the war and more powerful antibiotics after
the war. These new drugs gave physicians the power to fight infection
and made possible many of the surgical operations that we now take for
granted. New research on medical products and procedures, and the
wide dispersion of this new knowledge to a growing number of health
professionals, made the average person more willing to seek medical
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care than in the earlier part of the century. The increased availability of
more effective medical care changed expectations about what physicians could do and increased the demand for medical services. As one
indication of this change, Somers and Somers (1961) reported that
annual hospital admissions per 1,000 population increased from 56.7
during the period 1923–1943 to 99.4 for the period 1957–1958.
Not only was the average citizen more willing to seek medical
care, but they were increasingly able to afford it. The postwar period is
known as one of rapid growth in population, employment, productivity,
and personal income. In 1982 constant dollars, disposable personal
income increased from $5,285 in 1945 to $8,944 in 1975, an average
annual growth rate of 1.77 percent over this 30-year period (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1990, table 695).
The increase in the demand for medical care was accompanied by
a supply response from every factor market in the medical sector. In
his history of the U.S. hospital sector, William White (1982) reported
that, “Between 1940 and 1965 the total number of general hospitals in
the country increased by nearly 40 percent, while the number of beds
increased by over 85 percent.” During this same period, the number of
physicians increased 74 percent, while the number of nurses increased
116 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975).
These structural changes in the health care sector also had a strong
effect on the way health care was paid for. The postwar increase in
medical productivity and the infusion of large numbers of personnel
and capital resources meant that the cost of medical care increased,
both absolutely and relative to average incomes. The average consumer had a stronger incentive to worry about the cost of medical care
because they faced a higher probability of going into a hospital and utilizing the services of highly trained medical specialists. This change in
the medical market created a desire on the part of consumers to protect
themselves against the small probability that they would face a large
medical expense. This increase in the demand for risk avoidance created the favorable conditions for the growth of the private health insurance industry following the war.
But, medical science and higher income were not the only forces
attributing to the growth in the health insurance industry. In fact, tax
policy contributed significantly to both the rate of growth of private
health insurance and many attributes of its structure and performance.
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Again, the role of tax policy in health markets had its origins in World
War II.
Glied (1994) pointed out that the exclusion of health benefits provided by an employer “existed implicitly since the inception of the federal income tax in 1913.” But with almost no demand for health
insurance prior to the war, this provision had little effect until labor
market conditions changed during the war. In an effort to control the
cost of war production, the federal government established wage and
price controls during the war. With the expanding demand for labor,
the wage controls created a classic case of excess demand and gave
employers strong incentives to increase fringe benefits and other nonwage components of employment. These inducements primarily took
the form of the provision of pensions and health insurance, a practice
that received official sanction by the War Labor Board in 1943. Field
and Shapiro (1993) stated that, “In a war economy with labor shortages, employer contributions for employee health benefits became a
means of maneuvering around wage controls. By the end of the war,
health coverage had tripled.” After some vacillation by the IRS following the war, the Congress made the exclusion of employer-based
health insurance from taxable income a permanent feature of tax law in
1954.2
While this special tax treatment for employer-based health insurance was established for other reasons, it ended up having a profound
effect on the development of health insurance and, in turn, on the
development of the entire medical sector. While other forms of insurance were growing in the postwar period in response to the increase in
consumer incomes and the desire to protect against financial losses, tax
policy caused the health insurance industry to grow primarily by the
growth in group policies rather than individual insurance. As illustrated in Figure 1, group health insurance grew at a much faster rate
than individual insurance in the postwar period covering 158 million
persons relative to 43 million in individual policies by 1970.
Tax policy increases the demand for employer-based health insurance by making the insurance more attractive relative to wages. When
wages are taxed and health insurance is not, employees have an incentive to favor additional health insurance over additional wages. This
discount, or tax subsidy, for the purchase of health insurance is directly
affected by one’s marginal tax rate (MTR), which means that the sub-
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Figure 1 Private Hospital Insurance Coverage: Group
versus Individual, 1940–1970
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975). Employer group is the total
of persons covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (B403) plus insurance company group policies (B404).

sidy is greater for higher-income people than for lower-income people.
This also explains why the total amount of the tax subsidy has
increased over time as increases in income have pushed more employees into higher tax brackets. To illustrate, Feldstein and Allison (1991)
found that MTRs for federal taxes in 1969 ranged from 13 percent for
incomes under $1,000 to 36 percent for incomes over $25,000. They
estimated that the total tax subsidy in 1969 was $2 billion, which
implies a 15 percent discount from $15.7 billion total health insurance
premiums in that year. In an update of these estimates, Feldstein found
that the tax subsidy in 1978 exceeded $10 billion on insurance premiums totaling $42 billion, which implies a discount of 24 percent.
Another indication of the growth in the value of the tax subsidy is
the estimates of tax expenditures published by the Congressional Budget Office (1992), which are presented in Table 1. This study estimated
the actual loss in federal and state tax receipts due to the exclusion of
employer-based health insurance from 1969 through 1990 with projections for 1995 and 2000.3 These estimates show that since 1969, the
value of the medical expense deduction has declined in importance rel-
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Table 1 Health Related Tax Expenditures, 1969–2000,a ($, billions)
Principal federal tax expenditures

Total
federal

Employerpaid
insurance
premiums

Medical
expense
deduction

Year

Total

State

1969

3.9

0.3

3.6

1.5

1.7

1970

4.0

0.4

3.6

1.5

1.7

1975

8.7

0.8

8.0

3.5

2.3

1980

21.6

1.9

19.7

12.4

3.2

1985

35.9

3.7

32.2

21.7

3.6

1990

50.4

6.3

44.2

32.9

2.8

1995

86.8

9.9

76.8

58.4

4.2

2000

144.0

16.2

127.8

96.3

8.2

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (1992).
a Untaxed Medicare benefits, deductibility of charitable contributions, and interest on
state and local bonds for nonprofit hospitals are not included in these data.

ative to employer-paid health insurance premiums. The table also
illustrates the dominance of federal taxes over state taxes, although the
MTR of states varies from 0 to 10 percent. This means that some taxpayers in the highest federal tax brackets and in some of the high-tax
states may get tax subsidies exceeding 50 percent when they obtain
health insurance through their employers. While Sheils and Hogan
(1999, p. 179) found that 68.7 percent of tax expenditures in 1998 went
to those with incomes of $50,000 or more, their estimate of an average
family tax expenditure of $1,031 implies that the average family
receives a discount of approximately 2 percent of family income.4
Given the size of this tax subsidy and the fact that it could be
obtained only by purchasing one’s health insurance through one’s
employer, it is not surprising that it had a strong effect on the structural
development of the health insurance industry. The subsidy gave incentives to employees and their unions to seek relatively more increases in
health insurance benefits than wages since only the latter were taxed.
Policies that covered primarily hospital stays in the 1940s gradually
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added surgical (major medical) benefits, outpatient physician services,
and later coverage for such routine services as dental care and eyeglasses. In addition to the expansion of types of coverage, the degree
of coverage also increased, resulting in higher maximum benefits, coverage of dependents, and lower levels of cost sharing (deductibles and
co-payments). While such expansions obviously increased both the
number of people covered and the extent of their coverage, they also
had the usual moral hazard effects of insurance, the tendency of people
with insurance to use more of the covered services since they were at
least partially shielded from the effects of the cost of the coverage.5
The result of this tax-induced increase in demand for both health insurance and medical care was an increase in both the quantity and cost of
medical care beyond the levels that could have been expected in a less
distorted market. Feldstein and Allison (1981, p. 216) concluded their
1972 pioneering study of the effects of the tax treatment of health
insurance by concluding that the subsidy “causes a substantial revenue
loss, distributes these tax reductions very regressively, encourages an
excessive purchase of insurance, distorts the demand for health services, and thus inflates the prices of these services.”
If the tax treatment of health insurance helps explain how we
developed our present system of health insurance with its built-in
incentives for inefficiency, what role, if any, can tax policy play in solving the policy problems we now face? The next section turns to this
perplexing issue.

LIVING WITH AN INEFFICIENT HEALTH CARE
MARKET: PROSPECTS OF EFFICIENT REFORM
Since economists have been responsible for identifying the distorting effects of tax policy, one would expect that they have also been the
ones proposing changes in the tax treatment of health insurance. That
has indeed been the case, starting with Feldstein in the early 1970s and
proceeding to the present.6 Except for a brief period when a tax cap
proposal was included in President Reagan’s 1984 budget submission
to the Congress, a serious proposal to substantially reduce the tax subsidy to health insurance has not been proposed by any member of con-
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gress.7 The politics of such a proposal are not hard to understand
given that a relatively large subsidy that has gradually grown in size
and importance over the last 57 years has created strong political support for the status quo.8 The situation was best captured by Havighurst
(1995, p. 102) when he wrote,
[A] tax subsidy is insidious precisely because, in addition to being
an off-budget public expenditure, it can misallocate huge amounts
of society’s resources, yet be entirely painless at the level of individual producers and consumers. Since the affected interests simply adjust their behavior to the incentives created, they have no
occasion to complain or to call for political attention.9

But the world is never static, and the existing policy is creating
other problems that may be changing the reward structure for politicians. Tax policy, by increasing the demand for health insurance, has
increased the cost of both health insurance and medical care. In addition, it has created incentives that have expanded covered benefits and
reduced deductibles and co-payments. Although tax policy can be
credited with increasing health insurance coverage among the majority
of laborers who are in unions and work for larger firms, it has made it
more difficult for lower-income workers, the self-employed, and those
who are more transitory in their employment arrangements, as well as
the dependents of these workers. In addition, Pauly and Berger (1999)
have argued that tax policy, by placing the choice of plans and costcontainment strategy in the hands of employers, has increased employees’ dissatisfaction with managed care—the so-called managed care
backlash.
These somewhat complicated effects of tax policy have exacerbated the main policy problems of cost, lack of coverage, and concerns
about quality that are the central issues in today’s policy debates. The
policy concepts that are being discussed cover a wide range of ideological beliefs about what causes the problem and what policies should be
adopted to correct them. The specific proposals from each camp reflect
these ideological beliefs. Liberal proposals have traditionally featured
some form of federal mandates to assure universal coverage, either
mandates for individuals to buy or employers to provide insurance.
But the strong opposition to the mandates in the Clinton health proposal has made even the Democrats leery of this approach. Instead,
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they now lead with expansions of specific government programs such
as Medicare for the near-elderly, Medicaid for the low-income, and
increased subsidies for safety-net providers treating the indigent.
Expansion of the Medicaid eligibility provisions for children established in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP) in
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is a common feature in President
Clinton’s and Al Gore’s proposals.10
Even among Democrats, direct subsidies to individuals or business
firms are somewhat out of vogue when they cannot be tied into an
existing program such as S-CHIP or traditional Medicaid. While not
generally opposed to government administration of a program, they do
seem sensitive to the current popular criticism of the ability of federal
and state welfare bureaucracies to effectively run such programs. For
this reason, some Democrats have turned to tax credits as the most
expedient means to provide subsidies to the uninsured.
Refundable tax credits are the principle subsidy mechanism in two
separate proposals by long-time Democratic advocates for universal
coverage, Congressmen Pete Stark (D., California) and Jim McDermott (D., Washington). 11 These two proposals differ in several
respects, but mostly in how they would determine the tax credit. Representative Stark would provide a 100 percent subsidy for the amount
paid for qualified health insurance up to a cap of $3,600 for a family of
four. It would only be available to those without other forms of coverage. Representative McDermott’s tax credit would be 30 percent of the
amount paid for health insurance limited by the person’s income and
Social Security tax liability. Of course, the more generous the tax
credit and the more people who are eligible for it, the greater the cost
of the program. Because Democrats have been less interested than the
Republicans in using federal funds for defense or tax cuts, they have
been more willing to propose more expensive tax credit proposals.
Democratic presidential candidates have developed extensive
health proposals that include tax credits. Vice President Gore proposed
a 25 percent credit that goes to small businesses whose employees
choose to get their insurance through a purchasing cooperative. He
also proposed a 25 percent refundable tax credit for people who are not
covered by their employers and purchase individual insurance.12 Senator Bill Bradley, in addition to providing full subsidies for health
insurance premiums for the low-income, proposed to use income-based
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refundable tax credits as the means for subsidizing both children and
adults.13
Republicans have traditionally been less active than Democrats in
proposing specific health care plans. They apparently reason that
health care is a Democratic issue and that they are better off politically
playing a defensive role. But Republicans have been forced by the
public’s demand for solutions to the growing inequities and other problems in the health care sector to become more active in this field in
recent years. Proposals based on Medical Savings Accounts (MSA)
and tax credits have been popular with Republicans because they are
seen as ways to promote individual choice without expanding bureaucratic control. Specific tax credit proposals have been introduced by
three Republicans, Representatives Nancy Johnson (R., Connecticut),
Dick Armey (R., Texas), and John Shadegg (R., Arizona). The tax
credits in these plans are less generous than Stark’s or McDermott’s,
for example, covering 60 percent of the amount paid for health insurance up to a limit of $2,400 for a family in the Johnson plan and 100
percent of the amount paid up to a $1,000 family cap in the Shadegg
plan.14
The Republican presidential candidates face a dilemma when it
comes to health care. The professional pollsters are telling them that
health care is not an important issue among Republicans voters during
the primaries, but it will be one of the leading issues in the national
elections (Serafini 2000, pp. 336–337). So far, George W. Bush and
John McCain have made only general remarks about their approach to
health policy and have not come forward with detailed plans similar to
the Bradley and Gore plans. Many observers believe that because tax
credits were not included in Governor Bush’s tax proposals, they have
already been rejected in favor of a proposal to provide new block
grants to the states for the purpose of expanding coverage to the uninsured. All we know for sure is that his advisers are still working on a
plan to be used in the general election.
Senator McCain has mostly talked about new efforts to expand the
coverage of children through Medicaid and S-CHIP and the expansion
of MSAs and care for veterans (Serafini 2000, p. 337). His Web site
even contains a proposal to “use the tax code to provide powerful incentives for employers and individuals to obtain affordable coverage.”15
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As yet, there does not seem to be a detailed proposal based on tax credits.
Because winning the nomination in the primaries is the first order
of business for both candidates, it is not surprising that health policy is
not at the forefront of their agendas. What is important for our purposes is the position occupied by tax credits in the health policy debate.
While both parties have approached health policy from different ideological directions, the most common feature in the serious proposals to
reform the health insurance market all involve some variation of a tax
credit. Whether tax credits will turn out to be solid grounds for compromise or just another pool of political quicksand has yet to be determined. But there seems to be strong opposition to any set of alternative
approaches, be they the expansion of existing programs (Medicare,
Medicaid, or MSAs) or new ideas to expand insurance in the individual
and small-group markets.

ISSUES IN DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE TAX CREDIT FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS
If tax credits are to become the basis for a political compromise, a
number of key issues will have to be addressed. In the last year a rather
large, and in my view overly pessimistic, set of studies about the details
of using tax credits to expand health insurance has emerged.16 Analysis
that is more optimistic is in a distinct minority.17 The following will
not try to debunk all the criticism, but will attempt to identify the issues
and raise the possibility that we now know enough to give tax credits a
try.
The first basic question about tax credits is, will they work? If the
objective is to induce low-income working employees to choose to buy
health insurance for themselves and their dependents, what kind of
subsidy will it take to persuade a significant number to do so? And, is
it best to subsidize the small employer, as Vice President Gore proposes to do, or is it best to subsidize individuals, as most of the other
proposals do? Does the form of the tax subsidy matter? Are tax credits
more effective than tax deductions? Should tax credits be refundable?
Should they be a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of the cost of
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insurance? Is the IRS capable of adding such a scheme to an already
complicated tax code? While all of these questions are difficult, it
turns out that there is some analysis, and even some empirical research,
to give us some answers.
Several elasticity studies have been done about the likely response
of employees to tax subsidies to determine the take-up rate.18 Four of
these studies are illustrated by the four demand curves in Figure 2.
While not drawn to scale, they represent the order of magnitude of the
estimates, ranging from the most inelastic by Chernew, Frick, and
McLaughlin (1997) to the most responsive by Pauly and Herring
(1999). Based on these elasticity estimates, projections are then made
on the likely response of various groups of people to various tax credit
plans. The results are difficult to compare because there is not a common definition of a tax credit proposal and because they use different
assumptions and data to make their estimates. Still, some useful lessons can be learned by comparing the results of three of the studies,
which are illustrated in Figures 3–5.
Sheils, Hogan, and Haught used a price elasticity of –0.203, which,
when applied to national numbers, implies a “loss of coverage for
about 300,000 persons” for a 1 percent increase in the price of insurance (Sheils, Hogan, and Haught 1999, pp. 56–57). First, Figure 3
illustrates their estimates of what would happen to the number of unin-

Figure 2 Elasticity Estimates
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Figure 3 Estimated Tax Subsidy Effects in 2000
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SOURCE: Sheils, Hogan, and Haught (1999).

sured if a tax deduction were given to those without access to
employer coverage. The authors then showed the effects of refundable
tax credits of 30 percent, 59 percent, and 80 percent made available to
all those without access to employer coverage. Their deduction is
assumed to be “above the line”; that is, it is subtracted from adjusted
gross income so it is available to all taxpayers for nongroup premiums,
even those who do not itemize deductions. They found that for the
year 2000, 12.2 million of the 51.7 million who would be eligible for
the deduction would take the deduction, but that 68 percent of these
would be people who were already purchasing nongroup coverage.
Their relatively low elasticity assumption (compared to the others
below) restrains their estimates of the reduction in the uninsured as the
amount of the credit is increased. Meanwhile, the higher levels of tax
credits raise the costs to the federal government, from $11.3 billion per
year for the 30 percent credit to $50.3 billion for the 80 percent credit.
They argue that only by eliminating the present tax exclusion and mandating individual coverage, as is done in the Heritage plan, can universal coverage be achieved at a more reasonable cost to the federal
budget. 19
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The next set of estimates are by Jonathan Gruber, who estimated
the effects of a tax deduction and different types of tax credits on various classes of insured and uninsured people.20 Gruber used a base elasticity of –0.625, somewhat more responsive to price changes than that
assumed by Sheils. But he also adjusted this elasticity down for lowerincome persons.21 To reflect the low participation in other tax credit
programs, he also assumed that only 50 to 90 percent of those who are
now buying nongroup policies will take advantage of the new tax credits.
For display purposes, in Figure 4, I have subtracted Gruber’s estimates of the reduction in the number of the uninsured from the
43,450,000 uninsured used by Sheils, Hogan, and Haught. His results
for the tax deduction were consistent with Sheils, showing very modest
effects. As he explained, this is not surprising since the deduction is
worth very little to those with low incomes. The three tax credit proposals illustrated in Figure 4 are all refundable but are assumed to
apply for only nongroup insurance. But, since all persons are assumed
to be eligible, each of these has a strong effect on inducing people with
Figure 4 Estimated Tax Subsidy Effects in 1999a
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that all are eligible.
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group insurance to switch to the nongroup market. In the most generous case of a tax credit of $2,000 for an individual and $4,000 for a
family, Gruber estimated that almost 14 million people who previously
had group insurance would switch to the nongroup market.22 Although
not illustrated in Figure 4, he also finds that this switching out of group
policies would be reduced to only four million if the credits were
restricted only to those not presently offered health insurance.23
Pauly and Herring (1999) concentrated their analysis on the 32.3
million workers and their dependents who are uninsured, the part of the
population that tax credits are primarily designed to reach. They
argued that their estimates are substantially different from other estimates because the elasticities used by Gruber, Sheils, and others have
been obtained from studies of other working populations that are predominantly higher income than the low-income population tax credits
are designed to help (Pauly and Herring 1999, p. 2 and p. 14).24 As
illustrated in Figure 5, they provide separate estimates of three levels of
tax credits showing the results separately for those below and above
300 percent of the federal poverty level. No restrictions or caps are
placed on eligibility for the credits.

Figure 5 Effects of Tax Credits on the Uninsured
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Pauly and Herring (1999) drew several conclusions from their estimates, most of which can be seen in Figure 5. First, refundable tax
credits are going to be more effective on the low-income than on
higher-income because they are, by design, targeted more toward lowincome people. A given percentage credit will have a stronger effect
on the low-income compared to higher-income because it will move
more of them over their “reservation price” and give them a reason to
make a decision different from the one they had made without the subsidy. But, low levels of subsidy will not be as effective at higher
incomes because most people who have already made a decision not to
buy insurance will not be induced to change their minds until they see a
substantial difference in their cost of insurance. Pauly and Herring
reached the same conclusion as Sheils and Gruber—that small tax
credits are not likely to have a large effect on the number of the uninsured. But unlike the previous studies, they found that higher levels of
subsidy could have substantial effects on the uninsured, especially the
low-income uninsured. Assuming a 40 percent loading factor, their 50
percent tax credit reduces the uninsured by 45 percent; if a larger individual insurance market would reduce loading factors to 30 percent,
they estimate that the number of uninsured would decrease by 80.5 percent (Pauly and Herring 1999, table 2).25 They also estimated that a tax
credit equal to two-thirds of the premium would reduce the uninsured
to zero (Pauly and Herring 1999, table 2, note c).
A common conclusion from these studies is that tax credits will be
more effective than a tax deduction in reducing the number of uninsured, and a refundable tax credit will be more effective than a flat dollar tax credit in reaching relatively more of the low-income. In
addition, there seems to be agreement that low levels of tax credits will
have relatively small effects. There is less agreement about both the
effects of high levels of tax credits and the policy prescription that tax
credits should be our next major initiative in health policy. Gruber
(1999) has proposed that we conduct a large and relatively sophisticated demonstration in order to learn more about what it will take to
change our tax-subsidized health insurance market. Pauly and Herring
(1999) have reminded us that we presently give large tax subsidies to
most U.S. workers, so we should not look at a policy that shifts these
subsidies as necessarily a net loss in economic efficiency. A policy that
both increases government expenditures and decreases government
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revenue may have distributional effects without imposing a real economic loss (Pauly and Herring 1999, p. 3 and p. 27).

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: POSITIVE
ECONOMICS AND DISMAL POLITICS
To paraphrase one of the oldest jokes about economists, we have
now lined up end-to-end all the economists working on tax credits and
they can’t reach a conclusion. So, one might ask, if the economists can
not agree, how would we ever expect politicians to agree? The answer
is that tax credits might become the basis for a political compromise to
expand health insurance coverage if enough politicians believe that
there is no chance to get the alternative policies they prefer. The next
election of the president and the congress will have a big influence on
that possibility.
Without having a comparative advantage in making political predictions, let us look at three possible outcomes. The first is that the
Republicans win both the White House and the House of Representatives (the Senate is assumed to remain in the hands of the Republicans
in all three cases). This result will likely bring about less overall interest in health policy, and certainly not much interest in achieving universal coverage. There will be some interest in expanding the use of
MSAs, health marts, and block grants to states, but there will not likely
be enough agreement on premium support to do much about Medicare.
The Republicans are likely to try to pass some low-cost, income-based
prescription drug benefit for Medicare. Their interest in cutting taxes
and controlling the growth in federal expenditures will not leave much
room for expensive new health programs like tax credits.
The second outcome to consider is that the Democrats win both the
White House and the House of Representatives. Even without control
of the Senate, they will be in a position to carry out a substantial part of
their agenda, including expansions of S-CHIP to families of uninsured
children, higher income eligibility for Medicaid, and more direct subsidies to safety-net providers. More likely too would be an expansive
Medicare drug benefit and a patient protection act with a strong right to
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sue. Expanding insurance coverage in the private sector through complicated and expensive tax credits are not likely to be very popular.
The third possibility is, of course, that party control is split
between the White House and the House of Representatives. Regardless of how this happens, and assuming that one party does not gain the
power to overcome a veto, it leaves us in somewhat of a political stalemate, not unlike the situation we have mostly been in for the last 20
years. In such a situation, neither party has the ability to carry out its
preferred agenda. Tax credits, which already enjoy some bipartisan
support, might emerge as the basis for action, but only if there is a
strong desire to do something about private coverage. Two current
trends, if continued, could help bring that about. If the cost of health
care and health insurance premiums continue to increase, this could
increase the number of the uninsured as some employers drop coverage
and others cut back on the proportion of the premium that they cover,
causing more employees to decline coverage for themselves and/or
their dependents. In addition, if more firms decide to convert to a
defined contribution approach, this could improve the efficiency of the
individual market, making the cost-effectiveness of a tax credit
approach more acceptable to the Congress.26
That is anything but a definitive prediction, but I have lived in
Washington too long to have much faith in anyone’s ability to predict
the future of political events. If politicians decide that tax credits are
the only way to achieve a desired political objective, then there is
enough positive economic analysis around to tell them how to make
them work. If they were accompanied with some limit on the tax
exclusion, we could make a faster start on the road back to a more efficient health care market. Politics at this time is too dismal for that
much change.

Notes
1. This section draws heavily on Helms (1999).
2. This history is discussed in more detail in Helms (1999), pp. 9–12.
3. Sheils and Hogan (1999) provide later estimates of tax expenditures for 1998 that
seem consistent with the Congressional Budget Office projections. For 1998, they
estimated state tax expenditures of $13.6 billion and federal tax expenditures of
$111.2 billion.
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4. Computed by dividing the average family tax expenditure by average family
income of $51,855, the latter coming from U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical
Income Tables: Experimental Measures,” Table RDI-1, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/income/histinc/rdi01.html.
5. For readable explanations of the basic economics of insurance, see Hall (1994),
especially Chapter 2, and Pauly (1980), pp. 201–219.
6. For examples of proposals placing emphasis on capping or eliminating the tax
exclusion, see Feldstein (1971); Pauly et al. (1992); Butler (1992); Steuerle
(1993); and Arnett (1999).
7. The Administration’s proposal was sent to Congress on February 28, 1993, and
introduced as, “The Health Care Cost Containment Tax Act of 1983,” S.640.
8. For one defense of the present system, see Custer, Kahn, and Wildsmith (1999).
9. Havighurst also says, “. . . capping the tax subsidy is a notion that only a policy
wonk could love, a meritorious policy idea with no natural political constituency,”
p. 103.
10. One-third of the 25 million low-income uninsured are children (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 1999).
11. A more complete description of these and other current tax-related proposals can
be found in Weiss and Garay (2000).
12. Http://www.algore2000.com/agenda/agenda_healthcare.html, pp. 3–4. Accessed
February 2000.
13. Http://www.billbradley.com/bin/article.pl?path=280999/3. Accessed February
2000.
14. The Armey plan covers 100 percent of the amount paid up to a cap of $3,000 for a
family of four (Weiss and Garay 2000, p. 8).
15. See Health Care, p. 10, at http://63.224.30.9/issues/qna.html.
16. For examples of this literature, each of which contains useful analysis and data,
see Blumberg (1999); Meyer, Silow-Carroll, and Wicks (2000); Gruber and Levitt
(2000); and Salisbury (1999).
17. For more positive views of tax credits, see Steuerle (1993); Pauly et al. (1992);
Butler (1992); Pauly (1999); and Butler and Kendall (1999).
18. Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997); Sheils, Hogan, and Haught (1999); Gruber and Levitt (2000); and Pauly and Herring (1999).
19. Sheils, Hogan, and Haught (1999), executive summary-1.
20. These estimates are summarized in Gruber and Levitt (2000), but the information
here is taken from Gruber’s (2000) technical report.
21. Gruber (2000), p. 38.
22. Gruber (2000), table 7A.
23. Gruber (2000), table 4A.
24. Pauly and Herring (1999) also make estimates assuming a 30 percent loading factor in the nongroup market, but only the more restrictive 40 percent assumption is
shown in Figure 4.
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25. For a discussion of how an expanded individual market could lower loading factors and improve the risk pooling function of insurance, see Pauly, Percy, and Herring (1999).
26. For a recent account of the interest in a defined contribution approach, see Winslow and Gentry (2000).
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